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After the oil industry, the Iraqi Cement Industry is one of the 
largest industries within the dominant public sector of the Iraqi. 
economy, and its future development is vital to the wellbeir..g of the 
co~~try as a whole. Iraqi State Industry as a whole faces management 
problems caused by rapid growth within a still largely unindustrial 
society. The aim of tr~s thesis is 1) to specify these problems and 
2) to bring the expertise and experience of the modern industrial 
world to be;.U. upon their solution. However, neither the theory of 
management control systems developed in the West, nor the Iraqi State 
industry in general or the Iraq Cement Public Co. in particular, exists 
in a vacuum, and the transfer of western ideas to the social culture of 
Iraq is no straightforward and easy matter. To make the intelligent 
application of these ideas possible it has been necessary to relate the 
management practices of the State industries and I.C.P.Co. in particular 
to its present environment and past history, and similarly to relate 
management experience ~1d ideas briefly to current practice within the 
nationalized industries in the U.K. and Eastern Europe. It is only upon 
this broad basis that sensible recommendations can be made f'or the 
future development of the Iraqi industry and specifically the I.C.P.Coe 
and, as may be seen from Chapter VI, these recommendations involve larg~ 
questions of social education just as much as adjustments within the 
Company itself. 
A work of this kind, involving a survey of the current theory 
of management control systems, necessitates an extensive account of 
the opinions and findings of others. Every attempt has been made 
(1) 
to cite the source of ideas culled and used, but the use to which 
they have been put is, of course, my responsibility. The two field 
investigations I have done into management practices in the state 
industries of Iraq as a whole~ and the I.C.P.Co. are to provide, 
the bases for Chapters II and IV. I am, however, personally res-
ponsible for the viewpoints I have presented or expressed through 
the thesis, or for the recommer~ations summarised in Chapter VI for 
the integration of developed countries expertise into the fabric of 
the I.C.P.Co. in particular and thus into the Iraqi government!3 
managerial policy and strategieso 
(II) 
SYNOPSIS 
As stated in the Foreword,this study focuses on the problem 
of finding ways to help in raising the efficiency of Iraqi State 
Industry in general, and of the Iraq Cement Public Company. in 
];)articular, by applying appropriate concepts of management control. 
In Gpite of the new tools and systems of management control 
now available, and despite the general recognition that has now been 
given to many of the principles of management, nevertheless, very 
little effort has been made by the top people employed in Iraqi 
State Innubtries either to develop a unified concept of management 
control encompassing both new and traditional approaches, or to 
formulate an integrated approach to all kinds and levels of control 
situations and problems. The result h::.s been a somewhat haphazard 
approach to organising and operating a system of control within 
state industry as well as in the Iraq Cement Public Company. This 
situation tms led to widespread frustration and dissatisfaction 
among the managers of these organisations, 
This study attempts to provide some guide-lines for solving 
these problems. It is organised in the following way: 
Chapter I is a summary review, which considers the background 
of Iraqi Industry from the economic and manageriaL st2ndpoint. 
Chapter II contains the results of £ield research in Iraq, 
condueted by interviewing several managers in seven different 
Industrial State Companies. This research revealed that ineffic-
ient control systems are utilised by all the companies visited. 
Chapter Iti·is an analytical survey of literature concerned 
with the theory of Management Control Systems, and with management 
(III) 
experience. This enables inferences to be drawn from the difference 
between what is generally accepted in Management Control, and the 
practices as tested specifically in the Iraqi Cement Public 
Company and in Iraqi State Industry in general. 
Chapter IV deals ~~th field research in the Iraq Cement 
Public Company. The examination of the current Management Control 
Systems and the level of training given in the Company, showed that 
there was a lack both of good control systems, and of adequately 
trained personnel. 
Chapter V focuses on the comparison between the principles and 
experience drown from the survey of literature on Management Control 
Systems (Chapter III), and the practical working of Management Control 
Systems as in-licated through the empirical researci1. in the Iraq Cement 
Public Company (Chapter IV) and in Iraqi State Industry in general 
(Chapters I and II). It was found that the practice at factor,y level 
did not generally follow the principles laid down at this - level, 
but the differences between managerial practices in the Iraqi policy and i.n the 
State-owned industry oi' Eastern Europe, are much smaller. 
Chapter VI summarises the study and offers my conclusions. 
The general recommendation of this study is that the Company 
should so develop its practices, that it m~ adapt modern principles 
of management to suit its ov.n environment, and moreover that it should 
also create a climate which will stimulate the successful use of the 
Control System it has adopted. 
(IV) 
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CHr\PrER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
ThA cement indust.r;r has nov1 become the second largest industry 
in Iraq. As a backgro,~d to my study of it, I will in this chapter, 
diecuss the Government's efforts to develop the economy and promote 
better management of state industry since nationalisation. The 
chapter includes a brief description of ho•tl the public sector was 
established, including details of the establishment and growth of 
the cement industry. 'T'!1ere is a discussion o.f the investment 
progra:l'ne 1 which 'tlas assisted by the vast increase in revenues, 
especially after the nationalisation o.f the foreign oil Companies. 
The Govern:::ent 1 s attitude t:J•,.rards the :rnanagei:lent of the public 
sector is discussed, and an exa•:1imtion made of the reasons which 
persuaded the Governr'lent to establish a public sector. A stt~dy is 
made of ho,.v the public sector itself sees the role of management 
Control, and the current edt1cational si. tuation in Iraa. 
1. The 3acl(o:ronnd 0f _the Ce;;1ent Industr;L 
The ce;nent industry in Iraq v-Ta.s established in 1936 v1hen the 
Iraqi Cenent Co"nnany ':.fas founded 1rdth a cauital of tNo hundred 
thousand Iraqi Dinars (l) HovJever, the ::;econd. \'/orld ';far prevented 
the com.J?letion of the building of the plant, so actual production 
cornm.end.ed in +..he ~ddle. of October 1 19h9 (2 ) with an output of 
'\, 
SO thousand tonnes annually. 
(1) 
The Company undertook to double its output by setting up three 
other kilns, \-Jhich Here completed in 1952, 1953 and 1955 respectively. 
The overall output~ therefore then reached around 400 thousand tonnes 
annually. 
The grm1th in output was reflected in an increase in company 
canital Nhich, by October 1954, amour.ted to ID,l,250r000 and by 
August 1955 amounted to ID,l,?50,000. gy 1962, just prior to nation-
alisation, output had reached ID·,2,625,000. The period between the 
years 1953 and 1955 saw an important develou~ent in the Iraoi Cement 
. - -
industry. SinL;e then it has begun to produce t\vo new types of Portland 
Cement, ~u..~phate resisting cement, and the low heat cement, in addition 
to the ordinary onee As a result of the rapid eA~ansion of building 
activities and. the increase in local demand, some businessmen in Hosul 
city decided to estat-lish the Rafidain CeT.ent Compaily. Badoosh village 
was chosen for the site of its factory, which corrrncnced production in 
1956 with two kilns, with a production capacity amountine; to 200 thousand 
tonne::; annually ( 3) • The success which 1r1as achieved by the first Company 
and the profit realised by the second company, was responsible ·for at-
tracting private investors to this developing industrJ•. Thus the Furat Cement 
Company and the United Cement Company \'!ere established. The factories 
commenced production in 1957 and 195'3 respectively. The production 
capacity of each of them is about 200 thousand tonnes anntslly, making 
the Iraqi capacity arouud one million tonnes annually by the late 19501 s. 
-~-
'•. 
\ 
(2) 
The Iraqi Govern~ent (through the Development Board in 1956) 
had also founded two other cement factories, to provide for the 
needs of the Development Board's projects in the northern region, 
and partictuarly for the dams and barrages. The first is located 
in Serchinar, the the other in Hammam al-Aleel. The production 
capacity of each is between 100-200 thousand tonnes annually. 
The Government played such an important role even in early days, 
before nationalisation, vrhich took effect mn the 14th July 1964i 
because of; 
(a) lack of private ca~ital to invest in such large project, 
especially in the northern region, \vhere the State needed the cement 
urgently to build darns a.nd barrages. 
(b) Inability of the private sector to secure enough competent 
managerial ~ersonnel tn rQ~ the project. 
(c) The Governrnent 1 s vrish not to be dependent upon the private 
sector to supply the expanded state structural projects. 
(d) Desire of th~; Govermnent to co-ordinate projects o 
(e) Political objective of the Governrnent, ltianting control over 
the comrnanding heights of the econow;o 
The State cer::ent f.J.ctory of Serchinar co!"!unenced production in 
1957, t-Thile the production of Harrrnam al-Aleel cement factory was 
delayed until the year 1962. Since then the production capacity 
of Iraq has been estimated at 1.25 nullion (one and a quarter 
million) tonnes ammally, and the caoital invested in this industry 
has exceeded 12,500,000 '-( t1delve million, five hundred thousand 
\ 
Dinars). (4) 
( 3) 
On the 14th July~ 1964, the Iraqi Govern~ent, according to Law 
Noo.99 of 1964, nationalised all banks, insurance, reinsurance companies~ 
major commercial companies and major industrial companies, including 
the cement industry, and founded the "State Establishment of Industry", 
which was to regulate and control the industrial sector. 
The Iraqi Government took this measure because it felt that 
a strong and independent economy needed a sound industrial base, and 
a national outlook that would ensure industrial growth and serve 
the interests of the masses. Because of the earlier neglect of 
industry and the dominance of foreign monopolies in the financial 
trading sectors of I,..aq, domestic private enterpreneurial capabilities 
had not developed sufficiently to meet the challenges of Iraq's jump 
into the industrial sphereo As the principle of social justice re~ 
quired the dis~establishment of private monopolies, which would come 
to dominate the social and political life of the Country, so it was 
inevitable that the public sector would play a big role. 
A few months after the nationalisation took place, and before 
the end of year 1964, the Furat Cement Company, the Iraq Cement 
Company and the United Cement Company were merged, forming the 
Iraq Cement Public Companyo The Rafidain Cement Company and 
Hammam al~Aleel Cement Administration were merged in 1965 to form 
one company, the Mosual Cement Public Company. It was decided 
to merge Iraq's cement companies into.large units as figure Noo 1 
shows, f~~ the following reasons: 
\ 
{4) 
(a) The geogranhical closeness in location of the merger 
companies meant that adnunistrative costs could be reduced. 
(b) Each of ~he merger companies has technical expertise 
in production, sales, distribution or the purchase of raw materials 
from locs.l or internattonal markets. This will hel? i!'l !'aising 
the productivity of the mbrged cement companies, as they complimented 
each other. 
(c) It was also felt. that after the "'erger, the individual 
companies could become more efficient in fulfj_lling both their 
internal and external market obligations, by co-ordinating their 
efforts to achieve this objective,than if th~y had remained 
independent. 
The Companies before the 
Merger 
Iraq Ceme~t Company ) 
Furat Cement Company ) 
United Cement Company ) 
Rafidain Ce~ent Company ) 
Hammam al-Aleel Cement ) 
Comnany ) 
Serchinar Ce~ent 
Company 
Figure No. 1. 
The Companies after the 
Nerger 
The Iraq Cement 
Public Company 
The r.fosul Cement 
Public Company 
Serchinar Cement 
Company 
The thriving activities of the building construction industry 
at home .:.nd the continuous increase in demand for Iraqi cement 
abroad led to steady increase in production capacity in the 1960's 
'\\ 
and 1970's. 
( 5) 
As a start, production was doubled at the Furat factory in 1969, 
reaching 400 thousand tonnes annually. A much larger expansion was 
also undertaken, including the doubling of the outputs of the 
Serchinar factory and the Ha.rnn:.am al-Aleel factory, resulting in a 
total output of up to 200 thcusand tonnes annually at each factory. 
This goal was realised in 1973. Another expansion to the Furat 
Cement factory was also carried out in the middle of 1974, adding 
about half a million tonnes to make the total capacity to about 
900 thousand tonnes. This was achieved by making it possible for 
the clinker pr'")duction stage to take place at the Samawah site, 
while grinding and filling could be completed at Um Qasr•, thus 
facilitating export operations to the Arab gulf. The eJC9ansion 
policies hav~ also included the establishment of new production 
units. Cement factories have been fotmded in the cities of Kufa 
and Falln,ia, ~·1ith a combined output of 200 thousand tonnes annually. 
The Kufa fact~ry started production in Septe~ber 1974, whil8 the 
Fallt1ja ~actory 1trJ.S operating by the beginning of 1975. :·Ience the 
overall voltune of C0'"'ent capacity today arr.ounts to a1:nost 2.7 million 
torLDes annually, (see figure No. 2). 
The r~vernK£nt, through the Planning Council, d~cided in the 
middle of 1971+, on a nnriber of proposals affecting the Cement industry, 
which are detailed beloh;. (6) 
1. To exnand the Fallu_ja Cer:1ent factory by adding tHo kilns of 
200,000 tonnes cenacity. These v-rere to replace the old No. 2 kiL'1 of 
the Baghdad f<:.ct.ory, vrhose c2.pacity v-;as 100,000 tonnc:,s. 
\ 
• h.n Iraqi port on the 1;.n1f. 
(6) 
This development wg,s to be com:=>leted before the end of 1975. The 
rest of the 1dlns in the Baghdad factory will probably be demolished 
in J.9g0, and tte factory vlill 'Jegin to specialise in milling. 
2. To expand the RafidC\in Cenr::mt factory by adding a kiln 
of 200,000 tonnes a:r.m19.l cr.pacity. 
3. To expand the Hru-;::nam al-AlESel Cement facto;ry by adding a 
kiln of 500,0C·O tormes an.t1u.al canacity. 
4• To coYlstruct the ne'·r l\tua Cer:!ent -:Jroject beside the existine 
plant, ~'lith an a:rnual capacity of 2,000,000 tonnes, provided by 4 
ldlns of 500,000 tcnnes annual ca!k'_city each. The Gover::·y;~e!lt started 
to construct 3'1Ch ove'!.:'-star.dard size 1dlns, a.s th<=::se '"Iould lead to 
a decrease in the costs of 1dln productivity. A Dlan "'ras t:mblished 
- -
showing the de,·elo":l::-!ent of the Projected ca"!')acity of the cement 
industry tlnti} 19~Cl. 
The -r:-aoi .::ement tr~dnstrv "'ras developed e..t a rapid ?ace under 
the ulan, 1>~ith pr:)duction incr<?asing from 2.7 million tonnes to about 
6 million tonnes by the end of 1978 (7). 
\ 
(7) 
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" 
(g) 
The avt=-;r,~ge annual C(msumntion of cement in Iraq vJill be close 
to that of the industrialised cm.mtries, approachin,?; 200 kg. per he.s.d 
of population in 19.~0 (j). The industry 1llill be able to take its 
place in suuplvinF! the rec~uireme!lts of national development projects. 
Local dema!ld v!ill be in the rer;ion of 3 million tonnes per year fror.t 
1980, and in the ex::ort field the cement industl:"J 11vill aim to export 
a further 3 million ton:..1.es by the same date ( 9) 
2. The ~ole ·Jf the. cement indus.tl:"r in the econonw of Irao. 
The Iraqi cer::1ent industry is considered one of the largest c:.nd 
most develonecl nrocessing industries in the cmmtry, apart from the 
petr-Jleum industry, The size of the \·iorkforce in the three state 
cement industries vias 3,500 persons by the r:liddle of 1973, and the 
amolmt of total sales for the fiscal year 1972-73 1--..ras about ID.l2 
million, 'Hhile the annual output of this industry \'las, by 1973, 
around 2.1 mi1lion tonnes. T<oreover, cement products are second 
onlv to petroleu.:n oroducts in Iraq 1 s industrial exports, and in 
some vears ce~1ent expor!-,s have a'Y!olli"ltca to 500 thousc.nd tonnes. 
The IraCJi cerccnt industry has hc.d no problem in selling its 
nroducts since the be ginnin.'?: of i t.s pl~oduction, both domestica.lly 
and in exnort nlar1(ets. Ir. 1951 Iraq sturted to export its cement 
to foreicsn motrkets, initially to the Gulf states, v..rith 20 thousand 
tonnes _q;oing to Kuwait. In 1952-51:. the cement exlJort sto~p'ed, 
because of the high local de~and as o. result of construction activities 
in the cmmtry, and in t.he be'!i~ning or 1Y55 Ir.3.c; even had to import 
', 
69 thousand tonnes. In i956 the situation chan0'ed, allm·1in9: the 
exnort of 33 thousand tonnes from sur>Jlus production, as a result of 
be~in.'lin;< products of the Ratidain Cement Company in Hosul, and the 
comnletion of t'!:e Irao Cement. C0mJ?a~w eXD?..nsion. 
(9) 
The f'on>ttij_ng of the 11 Cer:1ent Selling Burea1111 , in accordance V>lith 
Law No. 41 of 1961, regulating the cement trade, has had its effect 
on the adjustment of local consw:1ption, and has brought abont the 
merging :::~f all tb0 cement production in a domestic cartel to 
regnlate the distribution of cement in the local marlt:et. The 
F{,J.reau is nart of the state 0r?,anisation for construction industries, 
and has offices in every oublic cement company. :Sxports of Iraqi 
cer:1ent are not controJ~ed by the sa"ne regulation as that used in 
the home mar~:et. Control of export is carried out by the State 
Exl)ort Organis1.tion, p3.rt of the r·'iinistry of Trade. 
The cement industry has, in general, tended to escalate, as 
a re~ult 0f increased activities in the building incustry ,,r:d the 
increase in p;ovec-n:::1ental demand as lJrge dC\TelO',Jing nr0 ject.s ~-Jere 
inple:r'.ented. Th~2·e is li'-:e.·iise an ex~Jansi·:m in t!-!e usage of cement 
in t~ne various cons+,ructi.:m ind'Jstries. For ex.::::!;}le, in the :nanu-
facturing of panels, asbestos, pi_pes, floor tiles, mosaic, concrete 
blocks and pipes and 0ther sirrlila.r nrodu_cts. 
AlthcmC"h t.~ere has heen mostly a rising local def71znd for ce<:Jent, 
there have heen considerable fluctuat.ions,in 1957 fe1r instance, output 
of the ceElent conr)anies was vJell in excess of local consumption, 
v!hich ultimately ca.'JSed a crisis of -r)roduction disposal, as a resu-lt 
of 1.{ee~ing +}-e ce.:1ent factori..es -,Horking at full capacity. 'I'his cdtu-
ation culminated during the vears 1959 and 1960. In consequence, 
the nrivate cTn'lanies and public factories started to co-ordinate 
their efforts, aiming at exnanding the external 1:.arkets for cement. 
(10) 
Prices were reduced and the low price and high quality of the product 
meant the. t it soon started selling well overseas • c; ement is, hO\tl.'ever, 
a heavy material to transport, v~hich increases costs, but most of 
the count~ies which buy Iraqi cement are nearbJ in the Gulf. This 
location helps the exp·::>~t operations. The inc~~ease in the export 
quantities continued pragressively, until it reached its peak in 
1967-68, when more than half a million tonnes of cement were 
exported. This increase in cement export v1as not the result 
of the development of new markets however, but a consequence of 
increasing demand in the traditional market3 of the gulf. Nor 
were exports given CJriorit.y over domestic consu1nption requirements. 
Consequently, when demestic cons~T.ption ~ose in the late 1960's 
the exnort of cer!!ent decreased in contrast to the year 1967-6B. 
About 342 thousand tonnes were exported in 196B-69,, and 316 
thousand tonnes in 1969-70. Great impor·;·,ance was attached to 
the increase of the volume of production iY1 the begir..ning of 
1970 in order to meet the increased de~~nds of local and foreign 
markets. Hence exports increased to 352 thousand tonnes in 1970-71 
and to 354 thousand torilles in 1971-72. The export of clinker and 
cement (unground cement) increased during the yea~s 1972-73 and 
1973-74, ':vhen it reached 399 thousand tor..nes and 491 thousand tonnes 
respectively (see figure No. 3). 
(11) 
I 
The major. countries to which Iraq exported it,' s cement are, 
in order of eXport quantities: Km'lfait, the United Arab Emirate, 
Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Pakistan, Srilar~a and Ir~~. 
The previous expectation about the internal consumption of local 
cement, before the last 1974 construction boo!ll; vJas around 
2 million tonnes in 1980, with one million tonnes as the export 
target fol' the sarne year. Thus the previous goal for cement 
productivity capacities vias three million tonnes by the end of 
the seventies (ll) 
The actual ex?orted quantities of clinker 
and cement in thousand tonnes 
1963 196/.~ 1965 1966 1967 196G 1969 1970 1971 19?2 
Years to to to to to to to to to to 
1964 1965 l9bb l9o? l9t>8 l_';fb'} i'i(O 1971 1972 1973 
Quantities 316 37~ 45Cj 395 527 342 316 352 354 399 
The Change 100 1 120 145 125 167 103 100 111 D2 126 -
% i 
Figure No. 3 (lO). 
The old ex~ansi~n nlans have become out-dated in the after-
math of the last 1974 construction b'Jor:1, and new procl.t~ction targets 
have nm.J been adopted. The I"Iinistry of Industry anC:. :·Iines now 
exnects de~and for cement to increase as follm,.rs: 
(12) 
\. 
1973 
to 
1971 .. 
491 
155 
Year Local demand expectation on 
different cement (in 1,000 tonnes) 
1975 1820 
1976 1957 
1977 2103 
1978 2259 
1979 2427 
l9d0 2608 
Figure Noo 4 (l2) 
The Hinistry ryreferred to add 2C/t to the above ex9ectation 
fi~Jres as a reserve to cover the exnected increase on the crude oil 
nrices. This means the local demand for cenent v1ill be aronnd 
3 million tonnes in 1980o The sane 'fc'Iinistry ex"9ects the !_)ossi-
bilities of export in the year 1980 to be .s.round 3 :nillion tonnes, 
as exnlained in figure ~Too 5o 
The Region Quantity expected export 
in thousand ton.1es 
Arab Gulf Conntries. 2,600 
Africa and Asian Cotmtries:. 100 
Euro1)e and r1edi terrane an 250 Countries 
·~igure Eo. 5 (13) 
(13) 
According to statistical eJ."'Pectations based on individual 
consu~ption trends and the increase of ir~ividual income during 
the period 1964-72, the Hinistry of Industry a:rd r-!ines expects 
that the local demand for cement in 19.95 will be ai~ound three 
million and three ouarter tonnes (3,749,000) (l4) 
Fluctuations in the demand of ce:nent are caused by different 
factors, the most important are: 
(a) political stability in the count:,;r 
(b) rising general li\~ng standards 
(c) Govern~ental investments in the various sectorso 
For instance:, the highest percentage of I:.:· J.qi cement was exported 
in the period of 1967-63 after the Arab-Israeli war, which had 
the effect 0f discouraging the establish!:,ent of new Governr!'!.ental 
projects and discouraging nrivate people from building houseso 
This 10'\'1 loce:.l consurnn':.ion of cement enabled the Gove.rrunent to 
export all surplus ~reduction of the local manufactureo In 
contrast, after 1973-74 Iraq experienced an economic boom, as 
a result of a sudden increase in the Goverru::1.ent re.~renue from the 
rising prices of crude oil, and c:.s a result the Government 
started to build rnany ne1rJ projects, which alrnost eliminated 
unemployrrtent, "dhile the standard of living of a large l)roportion 
of the "!_)eonle started to rise, especially the entrepreneurs and 
the contractors, v1ho were building for the Goverrr:1ent o 
(14) 
}Tortgage 9ank easy terms heloed civil servants to build their 
houses on the resident land c-Jhich they ~ot throu~h residential 
societies at very cheap prices. 
Cement pricing is controlled by the cement selling bureau, 
and as the P:ove:..~rtment ref"ards ceDent as an essential commodity 
for the neople, pricing takes account of social needs rather 
than profit. All these factors made the loc~l de~ands for 
cement so high that there was no room for export. The factors 
that encouraged the government to put such a lo1r1 pr5_ce on cement 
are that, 
(a) most of the factories work v!ith 3 shifts, and sometimes 
over-war'<: the plant, i.e. produce more than the quantity stipulated 
by the manufacturers of the plant. 
(b) About 95~: of the reJ:v :na.terial is available locally. 
(c) Recently the governuent has started to install 
big-capacity cer.1ent kilns in .:Jrder to decrease the costs. 
(d) Along 11ith the above specific factors, cement manufacture 
is one of the oldest industries in Iraq, the accu-:-"'llulated techniques 
and experiences ~ained have made it one of the most intensely 
productive. 
Since 14th July 1964, 1-:hen all the major industries were 
nationalised, including the ce1r.ent companies, their financial 
activiti~s h<J.ve--come 1Jnc1er state control, \vhich is exercised by 
the Ei.nistry of I. ~.c N. 
(15) 
Every state cement cor.J.pany has its own •,vorking ca~ital, and as 
the investment capital consist::: of fixed assets v1ith the vwrking 
capital, this means that every state com~any fi~ances its 
industrial activities, either by it's ov.'n. self-produced profit, 
or by getting lo~ns or grants from the government central budget, 
if the r-1inistry of I. ~: H. believe that there are practical 
reasons to offer such aid. The investment expenditure of the 
central government sector in the economic plans in 197L~ amounted 
to ID;40 million (l5), allocated as loans granted to government 
departments and organisations. The investment decisions are 
taken after definin~ the availa.blc financial res~urces by the 
Consultation Council for Industrialisation in the Hinistry of 
I. & H. This COU.i'1Cil consists of presidents of state qualitative 
organisations and two deputy ministers, and is chaired by the 
Minister and it is considered to be the highest managerial authority 
in the Hinistry of I. '~: E. It has the pm~er to take decisi~ns on 
all short~term general investment and production for the whole 
public industrial sector, after considering the rep0rts of the 
Boards of Directors of the state organis~tions. These Boards 
consist of the General Hanagers ·::>f public industrial companies 
belo~~ing to the organisation concerned, and each is headed by 
the president of the organisation. Each board draws up its reports 
according to the views and ideas of the public industrial com~ittee's 
consultative board (lb). 
(16) 
The consultative committee crystalises it's reports after 
combining it 1 s views with the viev~s and ideas of the Company's 
middle management level. 
The long-term general policies on financing, production and 
investment, which embrace the public industrial sector as a whole 
as well as all other public sectors, are dravm up by' the high 
plaTh!ing council at the r·,:inistry of Planning. This consists of 
the l~inister~ of I • ~~. ~I., Planning, Finance, Trade and members 
of the Economic Affairs Bureau in the P.ev:>lution Comr..and Council. 
The high planning cmmcil is headed by the vice president of 
the Revolution Co:mnc:.nd Council. The major task of this council 
is preparation of a general detailed economic plan; and annual 
plans, determination of economic, fiscal, monetc.ry and production 
policies, determination of method, and selection of the agencies 
to imp~ement the projects of the plan. For the public industrial 
sector, the council determines and approves the suggestions 
prepared by the consultatton council for industrialisation. 
Its suggestions are made in the light of prelL~ina~J studies about 
the project's economic and technical validity. The projects are 
assessed in the context of the major industrial development plans 
if the costs exceed one million Dinars. 
(17) 
\ 
The Consultation Council for industrialisation formulates its 
investment plans, and makes suggestions about financial, production 
and investment policy. In addition, it sponsors a few general 
studies which are carried o•1t by experts. From these studies 
and reports a reasoP.able picture of the requirements of the state 
industry can be drai.·:n, on v1hich the consultation council can 
base it's decisions. 
The belief that the state sector must neglect profitability 
when considel'ing its investments, is not s01md or practical. It 
is, of course, only right that there shotu.d be social and political 
objectives , as well as ?rofitability targets in the state sectors, 
but profitability represents an :L11dex of manage.:-:-1ent capability in 
using the economic res0urces ':Jhich are placed at its disposo.le 
In addition, prof1ts in the public compan1es are considered as 
a main means to finance nev-1 expansions and rising productivity. 
Reasonable ur0fits do not clash ~.-·ith the nationaliss.tion policy 
of the State. 3asically the public econon~c projects lJrtJduce 
profits to finance new economic investments and ultimately raise 
national income, and to build a str::mg 'Ilaterial base for Iraq's 
society. 
(lS) 
Even in the Soviet Union reasonable profits have special importance 
as A. Nove puts it: 
11Considerations other than direct profit expectations do 
influence actions of managers in. the west, and profits do 
affect, to some extent, the behaviour of managers in the 
U.S.S.Rc" (17) 
A.N. Kosygin elucidated it more frankly: 
"Improvement of the forms and methods of planning will 
make it possible to tackle the problem of strengthening 
and developing the system of cost accounting in a new 
way. Lenin stressed that each enterprise must work on 
the basis of its profitability, i.e. it should completely 
cover its expenditure from its income, and should make 
a profit." ( 18) 
Iraq suffers from low product1vity in almost all of its 
state industl·ial corq>anies, and this is why few of them have 
produced a profit, as we will notice in the next chapter. The 
government decided to take measures to raise productivity in all 
state sectorso It found that one of the major remedies to overcome 
this serious problem is to ask every president of a state organ-
isation to be responsible and to produce a reasonable profit. 
As the Vice President of the Revolution Command Council said to 
the presidents of all state organisations, when they met in -
September 1976 to discuss the factors that affect low productivity: 
11How can you ask to increase salaries and wages, when 
most of your organisations suffer from losses. Money 
incentives depend on profits from production, and 
profits imply good quality and high quantityo 11 ( 19) 
--.. ( 19) 
However, lack of incentives and profits is not the only reason 
for low productivity, there are other factors like administrative 
inefficiency, over-ambitious plans, technical and political 
factors. Lack of profits is probably a consequence rather 
than a cause. Excessive centralisation, low morale and lack 
of any sense of participation in constructive work also badly 
. affect the efficiency of the cement industry. 
------. 
(20) 
3· How the Public Sector was Established in Iraq. 
0n the 14th July.~~ 1964 the Iraqi Government, by issuing 
Law No. 99 of 1964, nationalised all the following companies: 
Insurance 1 Reinsurance, Commercial Banks, ro_ajor Commercial Companies 
as well as most of the main Industrial Companies. In the same year 
the Governrr~nt issued Law No& 99, which established a special 
organisation called "The Economic Establishment" which took the 
responsibility for managing the Nationali~ed Industrial, Commercial 
and Insurance companies. Also to be attached tc. the Establishment, 
according to the law stipulating its foundation, were all the 
Government i~dustrial boards, which had already existed before the 
issuing of the nationalisation decisions. Then the Goverrment 
formed the "State Organisation of Banks" to take responsibility, 
together with the Central Bank, for managing both the nationalised 
commercial banks and the Rafidain Bank, (the latter had been founded 
as a Government bank long before the issuing of the nationalisation 
decree). 
The Economic Establishment w~s abolished by the law concerning 
"State Establishments", No. 66 of 1965. (20) Its responsibilities 
were distributed between three organisations - the State Organis-
ation of Industry, the State Organisation of Commerce and the 
State Organisation of Insurance, which together with the existing 
State Organisation of Banks, made a total of four organisations. 
---.. _ 
\ 
(21) 
These four organisations were considered from that date to be the 
controlling body of the public sector.. In all, 27 private industrial 
co~panies and 10 State Industrial boards were taken over by the 
Economic Establishment between 1964-65, and were subsequently 
attached to the State Organisation of Industry, when Economic 
Establishment was abolishedo (2l) 
In this manner the construction of the State 0:-ganisation of 
Industr3 was completed, and the area of the organisation's activ~ 
ities became familiar to the companies attached to it. Although 
there were several deficiencies in it's activities, such as the 
pursuit of different types of economic and managerial activities 
which were not dependent upon qualitative specialisation, the 
existence of the org~nisation could help to develop greater effie= 
iency and productivity while making the control system ar~ 
supervision of the productivity of the industrial companies more 
effective.. A detailed discussion of this will follow in the section 
after next .. 
\ (22) 
The Organisational Structure of the State Organisati0n of Industry 
The transfer of the property of the industrial companies jn 
the mixed and priv~te sectors to the public sector, and the found-
ation of the State Organisation of Industry (S.O.I.), has forced 
the two sectors to establish a soundly based developing industry 
along the lines set out in the industrial plan. Thus a number of 
laws and directives were issued dealing with the reorganisation 
of the public industrial sector and the c·:eation of new organisations o 
The s.o.I. consists of the following departments: 
lo the Department of Administrative Affairs 
2 o tl.e Department of Technical Affai 'ItS, inclur!ing the 
following organisations: 
= the \'leaving and Spinning Organisation 
= the Construction Products Organisation 
= the Shoe and Leather Organisation 
- the Cigarettes and Related Manufactures Organisation 
= the Organisation for Foodstuffs, Oil and Associated 
Products and Washing ~~terials 
3o the Department of Control and Direction. 
This cGmprises the directorate of auditing, the directorate of 
inspection, the directorate of costing and the directorate of marketing. 
4o the Department of Industrial Relations. 
~. 
\ (23) 
The responsibilities and aims of S.O.I. have been defined 
(22) 
(a) To inspect all Industrial Companies attached to it. 
(b) To assist in solving personnel problems in the industrial 
companies, to assist in estimating their budgets and 
production plans~ to assist as m~ch as possible in pur= 
chasing and in the sale of goods in both domestic and 
foreign markets. 
(c) To study annual budgets and the profit and loss 
accounting of Industrial Companie~ 
(d) To publish directives for Industrial Companies and to 
study their problems in order to find the best solution 
to themo 
(e) T~ make reports on the various activities of all the 
Companies lL~ked to the Organisation and of all the 
factories which it controls. 
These duties are in addition to those which the Governing 
body of the Organis~tion has empowered the Companies to carry out, 
as laid out in its Constitution. 
Certain changes took place in the Orgat1isation and its assoc-
iated companies, when some industrial companies with similar kinds 
of production joined together in a single Industrial Comp~~y to 
reduce administrative costs and to co-ordinate the work of ~he 
different production units. 
(24) 
This made possible a more efficient use of the expertise and 
~tentialities of the Companies than had previously been possibleo 
There were also a number of advantages from a technological point 
of view. This merger of Companies with similar fields of operation 
took place in conformity with the decree or the Board or Directors 
or the Economic Establishment or 16th May, 1965, as is shown by 
the following examples: 
The Iraqi Cement Comoany with the followins constituent companies: 
= The Iraqi Cement Company 
= The United Cement Company 
= The Furat Cement Company 
The Mosul Cement Company, with the following constituent companies: 
= The Rafidain Cement Company (Mosul) 
= The !iamma.m Al=Aleel Cement Company (Hosul) 
The Iraqi Technical Flour Company, with the following constituent 
companies: 
= The Al-Damar ji Flour Company 
= The Rafidain Flour and Trading Company 
= The Technical Flour Company 
The Iraqi Cigarette Comnany, with the follo\1\ring constituent companies: 
- The Aboud Cigarette Company 
= The National Cigarette Company 
= The Rafidain Cigarette Companyo 
\ 
(25) 
In addition to these mergers, and the economic, technical and 
m~nagerial changes accompanying them, there were other changes 
in the managerial structure of S.Q.I. It was necessary to assess 
the advantages of setting up public Industrial Organisations which 
included companies with different activities, as had been the 
practice in the period before 17th July, 1Q68, and the advantages 
of reorganising the public sector into specialised organisations, 
with responsibility for the management of a defined sector, or 
part of a sector of the economy. 
The old system was considered necessary to maintain compet-
ition, whD.e the new systemwas based on specialisation to bring 
about increases in total production, and could direct and control 
each section and subsection as a single unit, in accordance with 
the developnent plan. \'/hen the goals of the 1970-74 development 
plan were elaborated for each section and subsection, it was found 
necessary to replace most of the old organisations by specialised 
enterprises. In order to do this the law concerning Public Organ-
isations attached to the Ministry of Industry and Mines (No. 90 
of 1970) was published, and this gave directions for the formation 
of public e11terprises on the basis of specialised quantative 
organisations. 
----
\ (26) 
Evaluation of the 'dark of S .o.r. 
s.o.I. started its functions and familiarised itself with its 
duties and powers according to its charter, during the period between 
its original inception and J~~e 1970, when it was divided into 
specialised organisations, (see page 30 ). Throughout this period 
it encountered. many techni_cal and managerial problems, but never-
theless it managed to establish new statutes for the nationalised 
Industrial Companies and the Government Industrial Agencies which 
had existed prior. to nationalisation. Furthermore, the Organisation 
directed its attention to investigating the goals for which it was 
working and to raising the efficiency and increasing the industrial 
activities of its associated companies. In order to achieve these 
ends it took the following steps: 
(a) It oublished an internal system for the whole organis-
ation, defining those posts which carried the responsi-
bility for the collective direction of industrial 
activities while retaining the profit-making nature 
of the Organisation. Thus it was possible to achieve 
major improvements in the quality of production and 
the precision of specifications. 
(b) It r.reated a system for the co-ordination of industrial 
activities into collectives with unified goals. This 
creates co-ordination and hannony between different 
plants producing similar products and also raises the 
level of production and facilitates the fullest ex-
ploitation of the technical potential of any individual 
plant for the benefit of other similar plantso 
(27) 
(c) It ensured that monthly reports were made on the 
financial and production situation of all its associated 
companies .. 
(d) It made scientific studies aimed at impro\•ing the 
quality and quantity of production, as well as encour-
aging differentiation of production. 
(e) It undertook to export some of its product3 and to 
find foreign markets for theme 
(f) It lowered the prices of some essential commodities in 
order to enable members of lower income groups to purchase 
themo 
(g) It tried to inaugurate all round planning to control 
production processes and the supply of ral'l materials 
and to apply new methods of storage for raw materials 
and finished products. The activities of the Organis-
ation have been divided up in such a way as to 
facilitate the work of management in its associated 
companies, and the collection of reports and information 
on how far objectives are being achieved. 
(h) It made scientific studies aimed at trying to eliminate 
waste in production. 
(±) It attempt~d to raise the standard of living of the 
working class by increasing wages and instituting 
social and health services. 
{j) It reconsidered certain contracts to discover to w~~t 
extent they were in Iraq's best interests~ 
-~---
\ (29) 
(k) It took measures to free the Government Companies from 
obsolete routine, and' to introduce new methods of work 
based on commercial ~!·inciples which would guarantee 
improved efficiency. 
Among the aims of S.O.I. were the presentation of a comprehensive 
plan ~~th recommendations for the future; planning the sale of goods 
stored in warehouses and planning to finance investment. To achieve 
these aims, it was decided to inform consumers about the goods which 
the Organisation produced» and to try to f~.nd export marketso 
In spite of the difficulties facing the s.o.I.» it managed to 
achieve many of the goals which it had been set. It also achieved 
its socialist aims for the benefit of its workers, such as the 
distribution of profits to workers and the participation of both 
workers and managers in the meetings of the Boards of Directors 
of its associated Companies. 
In addition, all possible efforts were made to achieve 
harmonious relations between workers and management. It was felt 
that if healthy human relations existed within industry, this would 
certainly have the long term effect of increasing the level of 
production and increasing the involvement of workers. To insure 
the creation of such harmonious relations, a special industrial 
relations department was created, whose function was to supervise 
the implementation of the Social Security and Labour Law, and to 
implement proposals to improve relations between workers and 
management. (23) 
(29) 
In 1970, by the passing of Law No. 29, the s.o.I. was split 
and reorganised into five specialised qualitative organisations 
to cope with the expansion of its activities. The new organis= 
ations were: 
la The State Organisation of Spinnir~ and Weaving 
2o The State Organisation of the Clothing, Leather and 
Cigarette Industries. 
3a The State Organisation of the Chemical and Food-stuffs 
Industries. 
4• The State O~ganisation of the Construction Industries. 
5o The State Organisation of Engineering Industries a 
The Iraq Cement Public Company is O;le of the companies 
attached to the State Organisation of the construction industries. 
This organisation encompasses the following companies: 
la The Iraq Cement Public Company 
2a The 1>1osual Cement Public Company 
3~ The Serchinar Cement Board 
4• The Public Asbestos Industries Company. 
5o The Public Real Estate f;Ianufacturing Company. 
6. The Public Glass Industries Company. (24) 
·:.. .. 
(30) 
The Oil Nationalisation 
Another important step in the expansion of the public sector 
which proved to be a turning point in the economic history of 
Iraq, was the nationalisation of the oil extraction sector.? 
which had until then been dominated by international monopolistic 
interestso The operations of the Iraqi Petroleum Company Ltd, 
were nationalised by Law No. 69 of 1972, and the Iraqi Oil 
Operations Company was set· up to take over control of the 
nationalised industiryo Later the Mosul Petroleum Cc1npany was 
subordinated to the Iraqi Oil Operations Company. (25) In 
October, 1973P 23o7% of the shares of the Basrah Petroleum 
Company held by the two American Companies, Standard Oil of 
New Jersey and Mobil Oil Corporation, were nationalisedo In 
the same month, the holding of the Royal Dutch Oil Company 
in the shares of the Basrah Petroleum Company, amounting to 
l4o25% of the total, were also nationalisedo Ownership of these 
shares was transferred to the Iraqi National Oil Companyo In 
December, 1973, the Gulbenkian Foundation's shares in B.O. Coo, 
(5% of the total) were also transferred to the Iraqi National 
Oil Company. By about the end of 1975, Iraq controlled 85% 
of its oil petroleum, and owned a tanker-fleet for the trans~ 
portation and marketing of national oile On 8th December, 
1975 1 Iraq nationaLised the last remaining shares in the Basrah 
Petroleum Canpany, which were held by British Petroleum, Shell 
and the French company C.F.Po (26) 0 
\. •. 
(31) 
Iraqi people generally are willing and capable of adopting 
the new knowhow., Iraqi culture presents no serious obstacle 
to the implementation of new industrial processes., So the basic 
problem which now faces Iraq in meeting the requirements for 
development is the creation of a qualified working force to man 
the various industrial projects and to undertake different 
economic activities., The employment of foreign expertise to speed 
up industrialisation provided no long-term solution to the problem& 
However, the provision of a well trained r~ti~e workforce is a 
practical alternative; indeed the whole industrial structure and 
n~ equipment will become obsolete if a highly skilled workforce 
is not available to j;.nplement the n~ pr0jects. 
As devel.opnent in general and industrialisation in particular 
required different levels of skill, it is necessary to maintain 
a balancing between: 
1... Demand: this represents what is available from the working 
force for both present and future projects. 
2. Supply: this represents what is available from the working 
force at present and what could be added through education 
and training. The workforce required to man current pro-
jects, planned projects, and projects under consideration 
for implementation during the five year plan 1976-1980, 
would be 50,665 personso. (27) 
(J3) 
\ 
\ 
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4o Iraoi Educational Environment 
Industrialisation requires an educational system functionally 
related to the skills and professions imperative to its technology. 
Such an educational system is not primarily concerned with conserving 
traditional. values or perpetuating the classe~, . it does not adopt 
a static view of society, and it does not place great emphasis on 
training in traditional law. The higher educational system of 
industrial societies stresses the natural sciences, engineering, 
medicine and managerial training, whether public or private. 
It must steadily adapt to new disciplines and fields of specialis~ 
ation.. It is only three decades ago that Iraq started to 
industrialise, and since 1973 when financial revenues became 
available due to rises in crude oil prices in international markets 
the Govern~ent has allocated the necessary investments to speed 
up building new industrial projects. Alternative industries to 
oil had to be developed, as in the long term oil revenues will 
be exhausted. The establishment of a strong economic base depends 
upon the existence of flourishing industries, and development of 
these industries should be helped by the rich agricultural and 
mineral resources of Iraq. The main problem is to change the 
mentality of society from an agricultural outlook to one which 
perceives the needs of a developing industrial economy. The 
population of Iraq, according to the last general census of 
17th October 1977, was around 12t million. 
Iraqi people generally are willing and capable of adopting 
the new knowhowo Iraqi culture presents no serious obstacle 
to the implementation of new industrial processes. So the basic 
problem which now faces Iraq in meeting the requirements for 
development is the creation of a qualified working force to man 
the various industrial projects and to undertake different 
economic activities. The employment of foreign expertise to speed 
up industrialisation provided no long-term solution to the problem. 
However, th~ ~revision of a well trained native workforce is a 
practical alternative; indeed the whole industrial structure and 
new equipment will become obsolete if a highly skilled workforce 
is not available to implement the new pro~ects. 
As development in general and industrialisation in particular 
required different levels of skill, it is necessary to maintain 
a balancing between: 
1. Demand: this represents what is available frcm the working 
force for both present and future projects. 
2. Supply: this represents what is available from the worlcing 
force at present and what could be added through education 
and ~raining. The workforce required to man current pro-
jects, planned projects, and projects under consideration 
for implementation during the five year plan 1976-1980, 
would be 50,665 persons. (27) 
(33) 
or this figure» about 30 thousand would need to be skilled 
and semi~skilled labourers obtainable from: 
(1) Industrial Secondary School 
(2) Training Centres 
(3) Industrial projects 
These projects may themselves produce skilled and semi=skilled 
labouro But this would sometimes be an inefficient method of producing 
such labour as productivity would be lower3d during the period of 
trainingo \'lhile this problem still exists it is less acute than 
formerlyo Such is the demand for skilled and semi-skilled labour 
across all p:!:'ofessions~ whether for the tndustrial projects under 
the Ministry of Industry or under other Ministers» that the 
Industrial T~aining Committee under the Planning Ministry has 
decided to establish 21 industrial school::. throughout the country» 
alongside the vocational training centres to be established by 
various Ministerso The Ministry of Industry has itself decided 
to establish four other vocational training centreso This Ministry 
allocated I .n. ! million to establish 10 training units in 10 
industrial companieso In spite of all such preparation, a study 
by the ¥dnistry of I. & M. indicated that there is still a man= 
power deficit o It may be said that this is an exaggeration, and 
that it is easy to find workers for the projects envisaged by 
the five-year plan, but such workers if unskilled or semi-skilled 
will hind~r the successful development of Industryo 
\ 
(31~) 
Financial incentives could be one of the means of overcoming this 
problem, as the raising of wages for the semi-skilled will provide 
an incentive for unskilled workers to develop specialisations and 
skills, so that they may then be transferred to the semi-skilled 
bracket with an attendant rise in productivity. Recently the 
Iraqi Government has decreed that the minimumwage for unskilled 
labour in the public sector will be I.D. 1, (2S); previously it 
stood at F.650 (29). Usually a skilled wo~ker in the public 
sector, who has at least ten years' experience, receives wages 
over I.D.3o 
To prepare the rest of the workforce, such as managers, 
technicians, engineers etc., is not such a crucial problem. 
In Iraq there are now six universities which cover moat of the 
natural sciences, engineering and social science subjects. In 
addition, there is one university and one polytechnic institute 
specialising in engineering sciences. The current plan is to 
make university studies and numbers in enrollment meet the 
requirements of the national development scheme for the country. 
It seems probable that this plan will lead to the required result 
before the end of the current five year period (1976-1980) by 
supplying the country progressively with the necessary graduates 
though not all of them are going to be qualified for the jobs they 
will occupy. 
\ 
(35.) 
Before the end of 1976 the Iraqi Government had decided to 
make elementary study compulsoryo But this will not be effective 
until the academic year 197S-79o The illitera~y when this 
decision was made was about 5o%o The scheme hoped to reduce 
this rate t-o 10% by the end of this century o An example of the 
progress made in education may be seen in the increase in student 
numbers in elementary education from 1,947.182 in 1976-77 to 
2,049,090 in 1977~78, an increase of about 5%o Secondary education 
has shown an increase in students pursuing purely academic studies 
from 555,184 to 652 1 398, an increase of about l8%o (30) The 
1976~80 national development plan has given consideration to 
vocational education and university graduates, one of its main 
provisions for the development. of human r~sources being to increase 
the number of students accepted in vocational learning to 35% of 
the total intake in secondary education, while the number of 
university graduates will be increased during the years of the 
plan to 25 ,OCO in the applied and pure sciences in 1980, and to 
23 1000 in the social and educational sciences. (3l) ,. 
\ 
(36) 
5o The Position of the Public Sector in Economic Life 
The Present Economic Structure 
The economic structure of Iraq as it exists at present, is 
largely the result of efforts to develop, which have been intensified 
during the last few years, but it is still not quite free from the 
vestiges of the period before nationalisation. Furthermore, only 
part of the achievements and general improvement in the economic 
environment can be seen by conventional econoffijcindicators like 
national income, capital formation, etco Improvements have been 
made, but there are still problems to be tdckled. An attempt will 
be made to present as compact a picture a::: possible. 
National Income 
Total national income as well as per capita national income 
has shown a ~~rsistent rise over the years. Per capita income more 
than doubled between 1953 and 1972, with a further large increase in 
1973 and 1974, so that in 1974 the per capita income was nearly 6 
times that in 1953 (at constant prices, see table No. l)o The main 
cause of this rise v:as the nationalisation of the oil sector, and 
the improvement in oil prices. 
The manufacturing industries have increased their share of the 
national income over the years, but still contributP- only a small part 
of it. Similarly the services sectors and others including construe-
tion, transport, trade and finance, Govern11ent administration and 
services, and personal services etc., have increased their share. 
(37) 
A sudden change in the position of the oil industry changed the 
structure drastically in 1974. The task ahead is obvious - it is to 
achieve a rate of growth in indU.stry and the other public sectors · 
that will make them the dominant constituents of the national economy. 
Year 
1953 
1959 
1963 
1969 
1972 
1974 
TABLE No. 1 (32) 
National Income and Per Canita Incane at Current 
Prices and Constant Prices (1964) 
National Per National Per Capita 
income at Capita Income income at 
current income at ~-964 1964 prices 
prices in at curr- prices in I. Dinars 
~..ill. ID. ent prices in lJiillo 
in I. Dinars LD. 
244o0 43o0 290-9 51.2 
374o0 57o3 401.7 61o5 
525·3 69.1 536 .. 5 70.6 
792.9 97.9 749 .. 2 94o0 
1217.,9 120.2 1159o9 1.1.4·4 
3367.0 312.8 3176·4 295.1 
Note: Figures for 1974 are preliminary and subject to 
revisiono 
(39) 
The Investment Programme for April - December 1975 
The first programme of investment after the revolution of 14th 
July, 195S and the emergence of a planning Ministry, covered the 
years 1959 to 1970o It included -the formulation of four development 
plans which gave a higher priotity to Industry, increasing the 
allocation of investment to the industrial sector to 26.5% (33) 
while the agricultural sect.or's allocation dropped to 22% of the 
total allocation of I.D. 1521 mo 
The second phase after 14th July, 195S covered the years 1970 
= 1974 and witnessed the first development plan formulated as a 
result of the 17th July, 196S revolution. The objectives of the 
plan were definud and 1rrere much more comprehensivea The overriding 
. . + goal of the plan ( 1970-71 )-( 1974-75 ) was to achieve a national 
income growth rate of 7.1%, which would outstrip the population 
growth rate and make it possible to double the national income 
within ten yearso (34) 
The plan included five investment progrrummes, each covering 
a fiscal year, as all the plans and the progr~~nes were on a fiscal 
year basis (April 1st to Jviarch 31st) parallel to the State Budgeto 
This practice was, however, discontinued following the Revolution 
Command·Council's resolution of 7th February, 1974, which decreed 
the formulation of all Iraqi budgets and plans (including national 
development plans and, consequently, investment programmes) on a 
calender=year basis __ _( January 1st = December 31st) o As the R .c .c •' s 
resolution would come into. effect starting from January 1st, 1976, 
the last nine months of the current year, 1975, have been considered 
as an extension of the 1970-1974 five-year plan. 
4- Fiscal years. 
(39) 
An investment programme hasp therefore, been formulated to complement that 
for the preceding five years. As this is the latest information available 
on this subject, and as this progra~~e could be taken as an indication 
of later trends in investment programmesp I will tackle it in some detail. 
Revertirgto the mention~d programme, we find that it is neither 
limited in scope (number of projects) nor less ambitious than any of 
the previous ones~ The aggregate amount appropriated for expenditure 
on its projects is I.D. 1,076 m. for a nine month period (April to 
December, 1975), or I.D. 1,436 m. calculated on a twelve month basis. 
Table 2 below shows the progrrunme's allocations divided into sectors. 
TABLE 2(35) 
Main Outlays of the Current Investment Progra;ool~ by 
Sector (April to December 1975) 
(In Nillions of Iraqi Dinars) 
Sector Nine month 
Allocations 
Agricultural 207o5 
Industrial U.SoO 
Transport and 
Communications 166.0 
Building & Servicesl88.0 
Others 66 .. s 
Total 1076oO 
Adjusted on 
12 month 
basis 
276o7 
597o3 
22lo3 
250o7 
89.7 
J.434e7 
t'er l;ent of 
'I'otal 
l9o3 
u .. 6 
100.0 
On comparison of the total allocations of the current programme 
as adjusted on a 12 month basis ~ITJ.tn tnose or each of the five pre-
ceding programmes (Table Noo 3), it is found that the aggregate amount 
allocated is almost double that ot· the first four programmes added 
together, and approximately three times the total of the actual dis= 
bursements made. 
f, n\ 
The adjusted twelve month figure is 2o% up on 1974-75o 
A new method has been adopted in channelling the expected oil 
revenues to the state budget and investment programme. The adoption 
of such a method, for the first time in modern Iraqi history , is 
an indication of the great significance attached by the State to 
national development plans: instead of dividing the oil revenues 
between the budget and the programme on a 50% hasis, as was custom-
ary prior to the fiscal year 1974-75, a fixed amount of I.D.500 mo 
has been allocated to the state budget, leaving the balance to 
development funds. Thus no ceiling is imposed on development invest~ 
menta 
This new method has made a clear impact on the programme, in: eo 
much as autogenous revenues are no longer the decisive factor in its 
formulation, but rather the assL~ilatory capacity of the country as 
a whole and the ability of its infrastructures to bear the stress. 
Hence the allocations of the current programme, although the largest 
in the country's history, have not covered all sectorial requirements 
due to the limitations of the country's assimilatory capacity and the 
necessity of ensuring equilibrium in development at a time when new 
projects with immensely large allocations have been introduced into 
the programme. Some of these projects aim at the elimination of bottle-
necks in the Transport and Communications and the Building and Construc-
tion Sectors, while others, in the Industrial and Agricultural sectors 
have been introduced with a view to implementing the long-range plan 
aimed at restructuring_ the economy on an equipoised base qy develop-
ing the non oil-sector. \ 
(U) 
TABLE 3 (36) 
(IN THOlliANDS OF IRk~ I DINPJ?.S) 
Year I 1970 - 1971 1971 - 1972 
Expend. Expend. 
Sector : Appropns. Dis bursts. Efficiency Appropns. Dis bursts. Efficiency 
' , % 
,.._, 
/ /o 
Agricultural 28~000 14.058 - 60.000 49 .• 310 82.2 
Industrial 28~000 21.14-5 75.5 50.000 35.917 71.1 
Transport and 
Com11unications 15.268 7.406 4.8.5 28.000 16.964 60.6 
-
Buildi~ and Services 13.000 9.894 76.1 28.000 17.605 62.9 
..;::,.. 
1\.) Other 32.262 25.549 - 36.000 33.987 ...__., 
- -
116.530 78.052 66.0 202.000 153.782 76.0 
TABLE 3 (Contd.) 
Year 1972 - 1973 1973 - 1974 
Sector Appropns. Appropns. ~xpend. Dis bursts Expend. Appropns 
before after Dis bursts. Efficiency Appropns. up to 13.3.74 Efficiency · Invest. 
.Amendt. .Amendt. % Programme 
1974-1975 
Agricultural 70.000 23.211 29.267 126.1 65.000 34.525 53.1 .• 190.000 
Industrial 60.000 28.000 22.212 79.3 60.000 52.558 87.6 225.000 
Trans. & Com~unications 29.000 16.000 19.864. 124 .• 2 40.000 29.531 73.8 120.000 
3uilding & Services 35.000 22.000 16.717 76.0 4-5.000 33.689 74.9 175.000 
Other J...B.;oo 4;2.282 L~O.!:z.60 
-
100.000 71.537 - L:·.22· 000 
242.500 134 •. 500 128.529 95.6 310.000 221.81!-0 71.6 1,169.000 
A Comparison of the Possibilities of the Public and 
Private Sectors 
The Public Sector 
Planning for projects in the public sector is carried out in 
the fallowing was: 
Each Ministry lays down priorities for the various projectso Its 
suggestions are made in the light of preliminary studies of their 
economic and technical validityo The projects are assessed in the 
context of the major industrial development plsns whose costs exceed 
one million dinarso The Planning Cotmcil must then agree on the 
selection of a suitable advisory bureau to be charged with a study 
of the economic validity of the undertaking and the soundness of its 
conceptiono The Federation of Industries is responsible for making 
such project studies in the private and mixed sectorso Furthermore» 
each ministry undertakes to complete the projects of the previous 
plan when putting forward its projects for the current plano In 
assessing these projects, the Hinistry of Planning may call upon the 
assistance of a number of specialised agencies, such as the National 
Centre of Consultancy and Hanagement Development, the Establishnent 
for Design and Industrial Construction, the Central Statistical 
Organisation, and experts attached to the United Nations, to provide 
technical details and engineering specifications in the framework 
of the recommendations provided by the preliminary studiese 
\ 
(43) 
During the years 196S-73, the planning process was developed to 
include the existing industries and the agricultural sectoro 
At the same time (following the revolution of 17th July, 196S) 
the reorganisation of the industrial sector was inaugurated, 
andin order to overcome the difficulties of management in 
production allocation and integration, specialised organisations 
v1ere created to replace the (S .o .I.) - see page 30 above.. The 
immediate aim of this reorganisation was to achieve specialisation 
and decentralisation of ITk~nagement, or more specifically, to 
achieve centralisation of planning rather than centralisation of 
execution, with important concessions made to1trards the public sector 
to enable it to perform its role in the development of Industry to 
the greatast possible degree of efficiency.. (3?) 
The next table (No .. 4) shov/S the span of public Ll1dustrial 
sector development; the figures indicate how important it is for 
Iraq to be ready from now on to create sufficient specialist 
(38) -
bodies of all kinds e ·rhe ~inistry of Industry turned lts attention 
to the problems of production,and measures were taken to increase 
the efficiency of the L~plementation of plans in the foll~~ing ways: 
(~) Reduction in institutionalisation ahd administrative 
costse 
(b) Continuation of the develo~nent of the number of 
technical staff., 
(c) Increased corn.rnitment to training and experimentation 
centreso 
(d) Keeping closely to the annual plan implementation 
programme .. 
(e) Paying particular attention to process of work and 
productiono · 
(44) 
(f) Making attempts to improve the co-ordination among 
production workers. 
(g) Reliance on modern methods of _storing raw materials 
and manufactured productso 
In order to understand and overcome the problems of production 
the Directorate of P1arming and Research was created within the 
Ministry of Industry and Hines to conduct research l.nto projects 
concerned with i~ational Development planning. The work of this 
Directorate is undertaken within a fixed timetable and budgeto 
Details The Basic 
Yea1· 
1967-68 
Capital 
invested 43,000,000 
Value of 
actual 54,950,000 
production 
Value of 
actual 51,215,000 
sales 
Manpower 20,608 
Wages 6,252,910 paid 
--
Net No 
Profits Precise 
inform. 
Table No. 4 
C<l-'IPARATIVE TABLE (40) 
1971-72 % ot 
diff .. 
- -
$6,012,060 lo74 
105,477,852 2.00 
35,729 lo73 
12,231,511 lo95 
10,190,714 
-
(45) 
1972-73 % of 
diff. 
157,591,524 4o0 
127,412,604 2.31 
134,042,213 2.75 
41,878 2o03 
14,18?,151 2 .. 26 
15,812,294 0 .. 50 
Rer...ark:1 
No inform-
ation "vail. 
for 1971/72 
Information 
sunnnarised 
for ease of 
comprehension 
-
Including 
employees & 
officials 
-
In comparison 
with 19'71/'72 
Total allocations to the Economic plan for 1970-1974 were 
fixed in the supplement to the plan law (first supplement No. 187 
of 1971). The amount was fixed at a maximum of 1559 million dinars, 
an increase of 4l5-6 million dinars on the original allotation, 
which represents an increase of 7.1% of the gross national income. 
In the meanti."'le, the gross national income increased from I .D. 
7B5o5 million in 1969 to I.D. 1,107 in 1971, and average per 
capita income from I.D. 96.7 to I.D. 112.6 (4l) over the same 
period. The financial and industrial capacity of the public sector 
increased during the period of the 1970-1974 Development Plan in 
proportion to the Plan's imple~entation. The success of the plan 
was largely due to the nationalisation of the oil-fields, which 
took place in June, 1972, and also to the possibility of using 
the large deposits of sulphar in the national interest, which 
facilitated appropriate measures to support the public sector, as 
well'as co-operation between the public, and the mixed sector in 
furthering development projects. 
The Private Sector 
The Iraqi experience sh~fs that the local capitalist sector had 
failed to activate widespread economic development, particularly the 
development of heavy industry, and the consequent building up of the 
national economy. 11The country is in need of rapid development and 
the participation of ti.1e whole population in the process, including 
the participation of the private sector in the industrial programme, 
and especially in the consumer and complementary light industries. 
·"\. 
(46) 
It is, therefore, very important that the state should encourage this 
sector, and provide all necessary facilities and guarantee for its 
success" o (42) 
In order to ensure the participation of the private sector, 
the Government set aside an allocation of I.D. 50 million in the 
National Development plan for the period 1970-1974~ This was to be 
spent on the construction of a number of industrial projects in 
different parts of the countryo The National Economic plan enabled 
the private se~tor to participate in a total of 820 industrial 
projects. Specialised state institutions p~ovided free economic 
and technical assistance for the majority of the projects. Among 
them were projects for food processing pla~ts (215), spinning and 
weaving companies (185), metal works (132), tanneries, shoe factories 
and rubber and plastic factories (60), and projects for the manufacture 
of constructic~al materials, glass and insulators (54). (43) 
As the fresident of Iraq declared on 5th July, 1970 -
In order to reach this goal -.the development of industry in 
the private sector - the Goverr~ent has undertaken a number 
of steps such as spreading the geographical distribution of 
the ne\v private sector. Amongst these steps are the easing 
of restrictions on opening businesses and the increase of 
the incentives given in the L~# of Industrial Development. 
Recom~endations have also been made to the financial offices 
to facilitate the distribution of grants to industrialists. 
Authority to grant L~port licences for raw materials need in 
the industrial sector has been given to the State Organisation 
for Industrial Dyvclopment, which is part of the Ninistry 
of Industry. (44J . 
~. 
'\ 
. \" 
(47) 
In order to encourage industrialists to continue their work, 
the Government has amended the Law, which structures a number of 
companies and organisations (Law No. 103 of 1964). The amendme~t 
provides that each limited liability company with paid up capital 
of I.D. 70,000 or more should take the form of a Joint Stock Company 
in such a way that the limitation of liability rises to I.D. 100,000. 
At the same time, the limit on individual share-holding has been raised. 
from I.D. 10,000 to 2o% of the capital of the Joint Stock Company. 
These changes have encouraged industrialists to make use of their 
capital in industry. Many industrial proje~ts have been undertaken. 
It must be stressed here, that the response of the industrialists 
in investing the.ir capital was entirely due to their confidence in 
the seriousness of the Government's intention to give assistance to 
the private industrial sector. Sixty private industrial projects 
were inaugurated between 1st November 1970 and 25th February, 1971 
with a total increase in capital of I.D. 1,400,000. (4S) In 1973 
410 establishing licences were granted to industrialists to begin 
new projects; involving nearly I.D. 19 million. (46) 
Before concluding this section, a brief discussion of the reasons 
for the administrative division into public and private industrial 
sectors would seem to be desirable. Certain factors seem to justify 
the division, e.g.: 
1. Co.o.ordination and harmony betv.,reen the two sectors are vital 
to the success and execution of all economic planning. 
·---
-·-. 
•·. 
\ 
(48) 
This can not be achieved unless preparatory directives and legis-
lation are issued defining the field of activity of each sectoro These 
are essential because natural resources, manpower and finance are 
limited and fixed within a definite period, and if the distribution 
of these resources is not properly regulated, this will have a negative 
effect on economic development as a whole and lead to confusiono 
2o The need to achieve various economic, administrative and 
social objectives for the public gcodo 
3o The division of the economy into two sectors widens the 
possibility of each one playing its part in the changes 
required within the scope of a general clear frameworko 
4o The widenL~g of the scope of the public sector enables 
it to control key industries related to the development 
of t.he industrial or agricultural sectors, such as the 
production of chemical fertiliserso 
5· The need to avoid the concentration of capital in the 
hands of private capitalists, which would result from 
their investment in major high profit projectso 
Before ending this section, it is necessary to stress the 
importance of the Iraqi Industrial Bank, which is part of the 
Ministry of Industry and ~1ines, in assisting industrial devel-
opment, especially in the private and mixed sectors. 
\ 
(49) 
The Industrial Bank has played an effective role in the industrialis= 
ation of the countx,' in the past few years, both ~ the extent of its 
financial participation and by the number of industrial projects 
which is supported before the nationalisation of 1964o The Bank 
participated in the work of 17 industrial com_pB.nies 1 and the value 
of its shares amounted to almost I.D. 2 million or 2~ of paid 
capitaL (4.7) 
After issuing the Nationalisation Laws 9 the Bank's shares 
were transferred to the s.O.Io and subsequently divided between 
a number of industrial companies known as mixed industrial 
companies. There are n~N 10 of these companies and the Bank 
has a holding of I.D. 500,000 of their paid capital, representing 
a proportion ranging between 20% and 51% of the capital of each 
company. The companies involved are the Iraqi Bicycle Company, 
the light Industrial C~mpany 9 the National Chemical Company (which 
produces sponges and artificial leather) , and the General Battery 
Company 9 the National Beer Company, the Kadhamiya Date Company, 
the Karbala Date Company, the Kut Hanufacturing Company, the Amara 
Manufacturing Company, the Hillal Company, and the Northern Timber 
Company. 
The Industrial Bank is involved in a number of other Industrial 
projects, of which the most important are the vehicles assembly 
project, a factory for the manufacture of tomato extract and another 
for the production of wood fibre pulp. 
-- '· 
(50) 
The Bank has also taken a number of initiatives 'in order to improve 
and facilitate investment processes and motivate tht investors, 
for example: raising the percentage of credits from 50% 
for any particular project to 60%. It was also decided to fix 
as high a credit li111it as possible for private business, and it 
was in consequence raised from I.D. 50,000 to I.D. 70,000. 
It should be noted that the demand for loans increased 
because of the general increase in opportunities which the 
Bank's activities provided. The total capital loaned out by 
the bank has reached I.D • .4, 750,000·. (4B) 
6o Reasons for Nationalisation of Iraqi Industries including the 
Cement Industry 
It will be clear from what has already been said that industrial 
development in Iraq began with public and private companies existing 
side by sideo The move to'iJ'Tards the nationalisation of the Cement 
industry as well as other industries naturally had the effect of 
increasing public ownershipo Nationalisation of major Industries 
was the result of the development of various fundamental factorso 
One of these is that developing societies like Iraq are passing through 
a period of economic, political and social change, and of rapid 
technological development, although Iraq has not prepared itself 
t.o absorb fully these technological changeso The 1...rriter believes 
that at this point in its history, Iraq has came to the realisation 
that there is a huge gap betvmen itself and the developed worldp 
in spite of the country having very considerable natural resourceso 
The intervention of the state in public economic life can accomplish 
essential objectives, such as the acceleration of the development 
processes and of economic integration, particularly in the industrial 
sphereo The state is also in a position to determine the avail-
ability and supply of personnel in order to accelerate the development 
process, and it supplies the investment capital which this process 
requireso The state is also responsible for setting up factories 
to fulfil the strategic goals of the economy, while also taking 
account of political, social and economic factors in the geographical 
distribution of these factories, in some cases without regard to the 
profit motive and economic validityo 
\, 
(52) 
Professor A.H. Hanson, Professor of Public Administration in 
the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Leeds, says, 
These cotmtries known as underdeveloped countries (like 
Iraq) have decided to increase their economic activities 
and to develop them by depending mainly on the public ( ) 
organisations for economic, social and political reasons. 49 
He also states that: 
These factors are ideological from one point of view and 
practical from another. 
Other f&ctors which governments have to take into account 
in order to establish and develop their public sectors are: 
lo The general scarcity of private enterpise, and its lack 
of will to develop institutions with strategic aims. 
2e The desire to create economic institutions exercising greater 
control t'b.an that which the private sector could exercise, such 
as electricity, transport and heavy industrieso 
3· The desire to establish production models on a scale which 
the private sector in developing countries cannot afford. 
4. Many private enterprises have failed in their aims or have 
not wanted to develop the required quality or quantity of 
products. 
·--'--· 
\ 
(53) 
7 o }.fanac;ement Control Systems in Iraq's Public Sector 
It was stated in the political report adopted by the 8th 
regional congress of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist party (Iraq) in 
January~ 1974: (50) 
The problem of developing has been and will long 
continue to be a very important and basic questiono o o 
It is vital to provide all material, technical and 
hu~an resources to achieve swift and balanced devel-
opment in every sphere of life in our society~,~~ 
the central task in our present situation and in t.he 
years to came is to lay down a development strategy 
in order to bring about socialist change~ to m~~e 
the development of the socialist sector in c.griculture, 
industry, trade and services our first priorityo 
During the writer's visits to the management of various public 
industrial cunpanies in Iraq, he made enquiries about the effect of 
Governmental intervention on management central sys~emso An outline 
summary of the anS'.Ners follows o The government» represented by the 
Ministry of Industry and Nines, made a great effort to improve the 
MoCoS., which were acting as a serious impediment to the new 
experimento The Ministry created a principal department in each 
qualitative state organisation, and in all public companies belonging 
to it, including cement companieso These departments were called 
either "Productivity and Organisation Department" or "Organisation 
and Methods Department", as the situation demandedo They are directly 
linked to the Minister, the President of the state organisation, or 
to the ~neral Manager of the public companyo 
(54) 
Such departments have the following duties: 
lo To collect information and run special surveys of 
managerial orga~isations within the organisation. 
To study and ana~yse aDns and fields of competence, 
and suggest ways of improvements. 
2o To study work methods within the Unit (Organisation 
or company) and to suggest simple solutions to problems. 
To identify obstacles caused by bottle necks, 
procrastination, and unjustified interfer~nceo 
3· To study the organisation structure of the unit, 
the various posts and their areas of responsibility. 
To define their hierarchical level:3 and their staffing 
relations. 
4e To study the progress of work and to make suggestions 
whichwill increase production and proper exploitation 
of all available resources and pot~ntialitieso 
5· To set up and develop systems of management information 
to assist the tmits in planning and controlling. 
6. To develop accounting systems and cost controlling 
mechanisms for accurate costing in order to serve the 
different manaeement levels in planning and control. 
7. To publish "procedural guides" to explain to me'Tlbers of 
the organisational unit (51), members of the public and 
other organisational units, hm>~ to follow the principal 
instructions. (52) 
Decree No. 333 concerns the role of the National Centre of Consult-
ancy and Hana,gement Development, and lays down hm<J it should parti-
cipate in the setting up and supervision of r-1.c .s. in the State 
Sector. 
(55) . 
The National Centre for Consultancy and Management 
Development must exercise sufficient authority to ensure 
the efficient working of the product5vity and organisation 
departments or Organisation and Methods Departmentso 
'1'-he following are the most important responsibilities of the 
Centre, as laid out in the Decree: 
lo The selection of specialised personnel to work in 
the departments, particularly from the staff of the 
unit. itself o The responsibility for decisions on 
transfers of personnel from other organisations, and 
for new appointments vJhich must be in accordance with 
the conditions laid dm~ by the Centre and be agreed 
upon by the President of the Organisation, which is 
actually making the appointment. Employees can only 
be transferred to other work with the agreement of 
the Centre. 
2. To set up a training programme for personnel of 
the Organisation, and for the personnel in the 
productivity and the Organisation and Methods 
departments, both within and outside the Centre 
and both in Iraq and abroad. 
3" To put forward guidelines for work within the 
departments and their relations with the higher 
management within the organisational unit. This 
is one of the objectives of the plano 
As Assistant Director General of one of the industrial companies 
in Baghdad told me, any Decree of the Revolutionary Command Council, 
I 
affecting industry and industrial development, has the force of 
laWo 
(56) 
The following are some of the main duties of the Centre: 
(a) A reconsideration of financial end ccounting practices~ 
in order to facilitate quick decisions, while ensuring 
the rights and duties of both the state and the citizenso 
(b) The inauguration and development of scientific management 
inf0rmation systems to help organis&tion units in their 
planning and controlo 
Section 4 of Decree 333 makes the following provisions: 
(a) The technical activities of the "productivity and 
organisation departments" or the :•Organisation and I·'Iethods 
departments 11 are to be under the supervision of the Centreo 
(b) The work plan of the above-mentioned depertments should be 
subr.:itted to the Ninister responsible or the Senior Officer 
of the organisational unit for discussion, follm"ling this 
orders should be given for the plan's exe~utiono 
(c) If there is a disagreement between the centre and the 
organisational unit, the case should be submitted to the 
Senior Officer for discussion at the highest level. If 
there is disagreement between the Centre and a particular 
Ministry, the differing viewpoints should be brought before 
the Planning Council, whose decision will be final and 
bindingo 
(57) 
, Usually the Management Control System is a comprehensive system, 
in the sense that it embraces large aspects of the Conpany's operation. 
It needs to be a comprehensive system because an important manage-
ment function is to assure that all parts of the operation are in 
balance with one another, and therefore, information about each 
of the parts is needede 1tfith some exceptions, Management Control 
Systems are built on a financial structure, that is resources 
and outputs are expressed in monetary units. Money is the only 
common denominator by which the heterogeneous clements of outputs 
and resources (for instance, hours of labour, type of labour, 
quality and quantity of material, amount and kind of products 
produced) can be combined and comparede 
As Professor R. Anthony said: 
Although the financial structure is usually the central 
focus, non monetary measures, such as time, number of 
persons, and reject and spoilage rates are also important 
parts of the system. (53) 
The 1-!inistry of Industry and Hines convened a special 
conmittee to set up a ~.mified accounting system, which was in fact 
started in co-operation with experts from Egypt and Syria. It was 
found desirable to apply the system first to all companies associated 
\iith the State Organisation of Weaving and Spinning Industries, since 
one of the Iraqi experts with practical experience of the application 
of the system is Director of Planning and Financial Control in this 
Organisation. The system was inaugm·ated on lst April, 1972, and 
after its success was apparent from the half yearly reports of the 
weaving and spinning companies, the Ministry of Industry and Hines 
on 19th October, 1972, ordered the application of the syste1n to all 
companies associated with the organisation from lst April, 1973• 
(58) 
To clarify how the system works we refer to the work of Sahib 
al-Hustaufi, the Iraqi expert who participated in its implementation: 
The unified accounting system is a collection of measures 
which facilitates the recording of accounts at company 
level, as well as the levels of the aualitative indus-
tries, or the industrial sector as a ~whole, or at the 
national level in the widest possible senseo It makes 
possible the draHing up of final accounts and budget 
plans from a framework based on recognised accountancy 
procedures o (54) 
From this it will be seen that the unified accounting system 
consists of financial, management and cost accounting.. The unified 
accounting system aims at a number of goals on all management 
levelso Thesa aims differ in kind and in detail according to 
the management needs of the projects o It can be said that the 
unified acco,~ting sy~tem aims at preparing accounting statements 
which satisfy the requirements of the various levels of the 
organisations in Iraqi society and facilitate planning» execution, 
and controlling. The system has shown great efficiency in the 
development of financial and management accounting in so far as it 
fulfils the requirements of the economic structure of the society 
and the wishes of the planners and businessmen. It has also helped 
businessmen to meet a large proportion of their set targets by 
providing them with practical information based on accurate figures. 
The unified accounting system is considered as basis for the 
reform of financial practice in the production units, and as a way 
of discovering s~~etimes in advance, the defects which might affect 
the success of the overall plan., 
\,. 
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It is possible to implement the system in various different 
kinds of projects 1 >vhether they are profit seeking or aim 
at specific services. This applies to projects in the private 
and public. sectors, whether in production of service companies. 
It is a system which ass1sts deve~opment, and is in harmony 
with all activities independent of their nature and effective-
ness. It leads to the unification of c>.U accounting methods, 
records, balance sheets, and final accounts ~thus it leads 
towards unified usage. (55) 
The book by the Ninister of Industry and Nines, Industrial 
l'ianagement and the Hequirements of Economic Development, gives 
examples of government intervention L'1 Hanagement, producing 
changes and reforms in the public sector in Iraq. The Minister 
says: 
Industrial ~~nagement has direct influence on all 
aspects of production in productive enterprises. 
basic factors of industrial management which must 
incorporated into any fundamental change in order 
implement management changes CI.Ild reforms are: 
other 
The 
be 
to 
1. A r·~consiaeration of the legislation and laws with 
which industrial management works. 
2. A reconsideration of the organisational structure 
to accomnodate new aims and ne~ management methods. 
3· A reconsideration of the essential qualifications 
for posts in industrial management in order to 
supply people who understand the new methods and 
approaches. This goal is connected with the new 
political reality which is closely associated 
with the interests of the working people, as 
well-as being linked to the just relations in 
industry, which the political system is endeavour-
ing to establish. 
4. The availability of the financial capability, 
which is necessary for the achievement of the 
desired change. (56) 
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SUMMARY OF CHAPTER I 
This chapter shows how Iraq implemented the nationalisation policy 
in industry and services, nationalisation being concentrated in the 
industrial field. The nationalisation procedure started on 14th 
July, 1964. Chapter One is divided into seven parts. 
The fir~t part describes the background of the cement industry in Iraq, 
explaining why the Government played an ~portant role in the cement 
industry before nationalisation, why the public sector is necessary in 
Iraq, and why the merger of the cement industry was desirable. It 
then gives some detail about the expansion of the cement industry. 
The secnnd part deals with the role of the ce1nent industry in 
the economy of Iraq, concentrating on the fluctuations in demand 
for cement · in Iraq and abroad. It then deals with the chain 
of authority from the high planning council to the middle level of 
management in the public companies, and lastly describes the attitude 
to profitability on the part of the nationalised companies in Iraq. 
The third part shows how the public sector was established 
in Iraq. Firstly, the working of the public sector in Iraq is 
explained in detail and this explanation is followed qy an account 
of the structure of the State Organisation of Industry. There then 
follows a critical account of the functions of this organisation, 
and of how the oil nationalisation programme was ~plemented. 
The fourth part concentrates on Iraqi education. 
\ 
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The fifth part explains the position of the public sector 
in economic life, emphasising national incomeo The investment 
programmes are discussed, then a comparison is made between the 
possible roles of the public and private sectors, and an account 
is given of the priorities of the Iraqi government in their 
endeavour to develop effective productivity in Iraqi industryo 
The private sector is then dealt with and its influence on 
industry as a whole is discussed, as well as the procedures 
adopted by the Government to encourage this sectoro 
After this there is a brief discussion of the reasons for 
the division into public and private industrial sectorso We 
conclude this part by stressing the importance of the Iraqi 
Industrial Bank in assisting industrial development~, especially 
in the private and mixed sectorso 
The sixth part is about the reasons for the nationalisation of 
Iraqi industries, incJ.uding the cement industry.. In this part the 
reasons that persuaded the Government to concentrate on the public 
sector are analysedo 
The seventh and last part of this chapter concerns the attitude 
of the Government towards management, and how it sees Management 
Control Systemse 
The investigations in this chapter attempt to provide a back-
ground to Iraqi industry from an econornic and managerial standpoint .. 
·'\. 
Next chapter is a field research carried out in Iraq, 
with seven different selected industrial companies., The 
aim of the research is to p~asent an accurate picture of 
the current managerial situation, and the ste.ndard of the 
manage.'Ilent control systems follcr.-~ed in Iraqi state 
industry as a whole e 
·'\. 
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.Q'URRE.NT MP.J'I.AGEMENT CONTROL 
SYSTEMS IN A co:.r:?::aEHENSIVE SELECTION 
OF IRAQI -li'IDUSTRIJ!L COi:iPPJITES-
Over::>ll Organisational Structure of' Ministry of Industry 
and 1lincs 
Defore defining the objectives, systems, organisational 
structure and other aspects of the Management Control Systems of 
the State Industrial Companies that I chose during my first visit 
to Iraq in May and June, 1975, it will be useful to describe the 
modern organisational structure of the Ministry of Industry and 
0 
Mines in Iraqo This is the Ministry specifically responsible 
for the implementation of' objectives and the designation of manag-
ement control systems for the public industrial sector, and for 
encouraging the expansion of' the private and mixed sectorso The 
aim of this Chapter is to discover the general management control 
Systems that are currently being applied in Iraqi State Industry., 
If' we take a good look at the organisational structure of 
the Minist2y, (please see Chart No. 1), we see that it comprises: 
Ao1 Five State Qualitative Organisations; concerned with 
the supervising and control of 42 public industrial comp~nies 
and having a ~ingle centre in Alexandria for the professional 
training of industrial engineers. The activities of the State 
Organisation of' Technical Industries are secret, because they are 
restricted to militar,y concernso 
Ao2 The State Organisation of' Design and Industrial 
Construction; 
Its chief responsibilities comprise the following:( 1) 
L To prepare iletailed preliminary, technical studies 
(68) 
for commiesioned projectso To submit proposals 
with the related r~orts and statisticse To 
amass~-where possible, adequate information, from · 
the industrial proje~ts in Iraq and from relevant 
industries abroado 
iie To prepare preli.minary surveys and tenders including 
technical specifications, general stipulations, 
quantitative charts. To at~ applications, submit 
proposals and to prepare contracts in their final form 
tor major industrial and electricity projectso 
iiio To supervise the implementation of the projects and 
ensure that the projects in progress are compl~ted on 
sched.uleo 
ivo To plan and follow up the execution of the projects 
and to co-ordinate the operations between the various 
branches of the organisation and outside agencieso To 
participate in choosing the land required for the project 
and to investigate the transactions of acquisition and 
occupancy. To take the necessary measures to hand the 
project over to the beneficiary agencies, and to ensure 
that the corrmitments of the contract are met. 
A.3 The Specialised Institute for Engineering Industries; 
~is Institute was established according to Article 28 of the 
year 1972 to carry out the follcrning operations :(2) 
1. To launch essential and practical scientific studies 
and:researcho 
(69) 
iio To implement the studies and designs o To prepare 
the. conditions and specifications in specialist 
fields and to prepare plans for theil· ~plementationo 
iiio To launch research intermediate between long-term 
research and the practical development research11 with 
the aim of advancing the industries in which the 
Institute specialises~ 
ivo T0 work towards solving technological problems in the 
industrial field, and to deal with defects that may 
appear in the products either e.uring production or 
Vo To make all the analyses and estima.tes in the fields 
ot phYsics. mechanics and chemistr,y 9 that are necessar,y 
for the factories connected with these induetrieso 
vio To introduce improvements and innovation~ in equipment 
and ra:w materials to raise the quantity and quality of 
produotiono 
All the above~entioned State Organisations, together with the 
Specialised Institute for Engineering Industries are under the super= 
vision of a Deputy Minister~ who is responsible for themo 
The other sid~ of' the Organisational Structure is supervised 
by anothex· Deputy Minister, who is responsible for planning and 
developmento He is in charge of the following offices := 
Ao4 Tbe Iraqi F~qgratign of Industries:(3) Its objectives 
may be sunmarised as follows : 
It is the-only professional establishment which orgarAises 
effective industrial projects in Iraq in all sectors~ public, mixed 
(70) 
and privateo It represents the national industries and industrial 
interests to. the public authorities and all other committees., It 
works for the advancement and protection of Industry and has ·the 
authority to draw up and adminjster its general policies within 
the public political and economic framework of the nationo Half 
of its Admjnistrative Committee represents the public sector and 
the other half represents the private and mixed sectors. A public 
secretariat is to be established for the Federation in order to 
implement the public policies of the Administrative Committee 
and to carry out the duties assigned to it by the first .Article 
of the Association, noo 52 of the year 1956' and subsequently by 
the present amendment of the last Articlep Noo 13 of the year 
1962o The third paragraph of that amendment contains the 
following definition of responsibilities:(4) 
io To amass, classify and publish informatiou and 
statistics which concern industryo 
ii., To study the conditions of' the country's industry and 
to review the methods used for the advancement of' 
industryo 
iii. To review the laws dealing with industrial affairs, 
taxes and the tax conditions imposed on industry and 
manufacturersp and to amass a list of industrial 
problems whose solution requires government help 
dependent on industrial supporto 
ivo To study and review industrial relations, and the 
economic and technical agreements between ~raq and 
other oountrieso 
, . 
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w o To submit proposals connected with the leying down 
of technical specifications for Iraqi industrial 
product so 
vio To judge and settle differences ocourring between 
entrepreneurs, and to form a Judicial Committee for 
this purpose o 
viio To define the concept of legal practice and legal 
contractual terms in industrial affairso 
'!J'iiio To certify the dating of papers presented and the 
photocopies of the papers registered with themo 
ixo To set up exhibi tiona and industrial fairs, or to 
participate in such within the limits set down by 
the relevant lawso 
Xo To issue certificates validating the Iraqi origin 
of products from Iraqi factorl.es, and to approve all 
documents that will help in exporting these productso 
ixo To issue certificates establishing the financial 
.competency of a member at the request of governmental 
departments and agencieso 
The most important contributions of the Federation of 
industries to the private and mixed sectors arc the following: 
~It prepares economic and technical viability studies 
for industrial entrepreneurs and others hoping for profito 
-It presents ready-made programmes of industrial projects 
assigned to the private and mixed sector in the national 
development plan, for the benefit. of industrialists with 
initiativeo I~ also ofrers advice and proposals as soon 
as these are requiredo This task is undertaken by the 
(72) 
permanent Technical Consultants Committee or the Federation 
of Industrieso 
Ao5 The State Organisation of M~: This second office will 
be the responsibility of' the :Deputy Minister~ who deals with 
planning and f'ollow-upo This office was established recently 
(in March$> 1975) and because of' its connection with the Ministry 
@~ Iodu.stry ~ it was known as the .Mi.nistry of' Industry and Mines 
The majority of this organisation's activities used belonged 
to the Ministry of Petroleum9 but because of the connection of this 
organisation with t~e nature and objectives of' the Ministry of 
Industry and Mines, it was recently joined to ito The organis= 
ational structure of' this establishment comprises the following: 
io The State Directorate for Geological Surveys and 
~ Inv~stigationo 
llo The State Directorate f'or projects - The activities of 
this office will entail the launching of' necessary 
economic, administrative and technical studies for 
every project connected with mining both now and in 
the :futureo 
iiio The State Directorate :for Sulphur in Mishraq = this 
company is responsible f'or the activities of mining$> 
pU!"if'ying and selling sulphur both in Iraq and abroado 
Ao6 The State Organisation of Industrial Development 9 comprises: 
&) The Industrial Banko We have already mentioned in some 
detail its activities and its influence on the national 
economy in Chapter 1, PPo 49 = 51. 
\ 
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b) The Directorate of Organisation and State Welfareo 
c) The· Directorate of Research and State Industrial ContX"olo 
The above~entioned establishment was brought into being according 
to Article 134 of the year 1973 to ~lement the following ~bjeotives:(5) 
io To incorporate an industrial growth plan for the 
p~vate and mixed sectors into the policies and 
objectives of the national growth plan at the 
national level, or alternatively to use the latter 
as a programme at the provincial levelo 
iio T,., form share-holding companies and to encourage 
investment by offering bank faoilitieso 
iiio To present openings and opportunities for investment 
in industry P and to give facili +.ies "for investors 
and savers 11 encouraging them to invest, whether they 
be Iraqi or frO!ll other Arab countrieso 
ivo To improve established industrial projects by extensio~~ 
or modifications P and to stipulate conditions to be ful-
filled and methods to be follcm-ed in giving credit, and 
financing industrial projectso 
v., To launch viable technical and economic studies to give 
rise to new projects, or to extend existing projects, or 
to develop production, by the use of specialised offices 
in the organisation or in the co-operative 11 together 
with technical offices present in the country or in the 
mixed and private sectors either in Iraq or abroado 
ivo To provide industrial projects with technical and admin= 
istrative aidp guidance and information on an outright 
(74) 
fee basis, or on commission, or free of charge, and to 
issue import licences for industrial projects both in 
the mixed and private sectorso 
viio To check the quality of :industrial products and their 
conformity with the specifications., To provide guidance 
and direction in order to improve the quality of these 
products. 
!.7 The State Electricity Organisation, which comprises : 
a) The State Directorate for Electric power Generation. 
b) The State Directorate for Minor Projects and Electricity 
in Rural Arte 9..5. 
o) The State Directorate for Major Electric Projectso 
The objectives of this State Organisation include the increase 
and development of the uninterrupted supply of electric power in most 
parts of the country i;o aid economic and industrial progresso 
A., 8 The Directorate of Planning and Follow-up; which comprises 
the following sUb-directorates : 
a) The Planning Directorate 
b} The following " 
c) The Contracts " 
d) The industrial Relations Directorate., 
Ao 9 The Ministry Office : 
The objectives of this office are to facilitate routine activities, 
the flov1 of commissions and propositions from the State Organisations 
and companies to the top levels of the Ministry of Industry and Mines 
and vice versao 
--...... _ 
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~10 The Directorate of Manning and Professional Training(?) 
The importance of this department m the industrial progress 
of Iraq will be shown in an outline of its most important objectives 
and duties : 
io To stud.Y » discover what industrial projects are 
needed in administration and technical fields, 
and to define their future require.a-aents of 
trained personnelo 
ii.. To combine with the Ministry of Industry and .Mine~s 
in administering industrial professional training 
centres, to supervise the practical a~d theoretical 
training programmes, to follow up all activities 
connected with these centres, to supply them with 
machines, equipment, tools and raw materials, to 
facilitate the smooth running of the training, and 
to incorporate any new industrial teclmiques which 
may be developed during the training programme .. 
iii. To ensure that the projects planned by the new 
Training Centres accord with the needs of industry, 
to construct and establish these centres, and supply 
them with specialists, technicians and t1 .. ainers9 
' . 
iv.. To establish specific qualifications for the professions 
in the industrial sector, and lay down specifications 
and practical and theoretical training schedules for 
the training centres belonging to the Ministry of 
Industry and Mines . To translate the textbooks for 
the different subjects taught in training centres .. 
(76) 
v o To launch a. general study of industrial companies~ 
-
to select those companies capable of providing 
practical training in diff'erent professions for the 
Training Centres and to provide an incentive for 
the students selected from these companies to receive 
their practical training in the Centres. To draw up 
a time table for ever,y student showing the time spent 
on every skill specialised in. To prepare a file for 
each trainee~ and records for different training schemes, 
eogo apprenticeship» the fast trainir~ scheme and the 
scheme to raise professional efficiencyo 
vL Taking the proper measures in co-operation with the 
~ecialiscd bodies, to put an end to illiteracy in 
industrial projectso This problem is considered one 
of the greatest barriers to effective production. 
viio To issue monthly or two~onthly reports on the effie-
iency of man-power in the org~sations which belong 
to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals. 
A.11 The Consultation Council for Industrialisation. This is the 
highest authority in all matters of planning and of the implement-
ation of general policies throughout the public industrial sector. 
A.12 Special Bureaux. These are secretarial officesp one far the 
Minister and one for each Deputy Minister. 
·-. 
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B. Examples of Public Companies from all Qualitative 
Organisations; their Current Objectives, Systems 
e.nd Structure. 
During my first research visit to Iraq» I collected 
infonnation, and I conducted field research with seven public 
industrial companies, one company from each qualitative state 
organisation, except for the State Organisation of Chemical 
Industries, from which I researched three industrial companies. 
The companies researched are these : 
a) Two out cf the three companies (the Public Com:p&ey" 
of the Fertilizer Industry in Basrah and the Public 
Company of the Paper Industry in Basrah) are located 
at what is almost the farthe~t point from the Board 
of Directors of the State Organisaticn for Chemical 
Industries, whose headquarters are in Baghdad city. 
This Organisation supervises seven industrial public 
companies, among them ths two companies mentioned 
above. 
~b) These two Canpanies represent the kind of Industry 
that the Ministry of Industry and -~~_!le_s_ has already 
taken measures to encourage and expand, for it is 
interested in expanding the petrochemical industries, 
whose raw materials exist in Iraq in ablUldance and 
at low cost. (7) 
In addition to the two mentioned, the following companies 
were also selected : 
1 o The Public Bata Company in Baghdad, one of the 
companies belonging to the State Organisation for 
Chemical Industries. 
(78) 
2o The Public Company for Mechanical Industries in Alexandriao 
One of the companies belonging to the State Organisation of 
Engineering Industries. 
3o The Public Vegetable Oil Company.. One of the companies 
belonging to the State Organisation of Food Industries. 
4o The Iraqi Public Spinning and Weaving Company. One of the 
companies belonging to the State Organisation of Spinning 
~,a Weaving Industries. 
5o Iraq Cement Public Company. One of the •Jompanies belonging 
to the State Organisation for Construction Industries. 
I compiled a checklist of 30 questions (see Exhibit 1). 
All 30 questions were not asked of each respondent, but only 
those that were relevant in a particular case. Respondents were 
selected so as to give a fairly wide response to the questions. 
They includedP for example, departmental managP-rs of: Organisation 
& Productivity, Accounting, Administration, and 1viaintenance. If 
the respondents' responses needed clarification, further questions 
were asked. The respondents were not shown the questions on the 
checklist. The replies were recorded in note form by the 
researcher, and his personal observations were then added as 
follows : 
B.1o The Public Comnany of the Fertiliser Industry in Basrah 
- The objectives of this Company as stated by the Administration 
Division Manager ~d his assistant are as follows: 
A note on the Company itself(B) 
Established on the 16th September, 1969, in Basrah 
County. Nominal Capital (I.D. 12 million). On 
the 1st April, 1974, attached to the State Organ~ 
isation of Chemical Industrieso Its major products 
and capacity are as follows : 
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a) To produce :f'ertilizers :Cor local use and :f'or 
exporto 
b) To help in reducing \Ulemploymento 
c) To do its best to reduce costs and increase 
production, in order to compete with :f'oreign 
produce in the international marketo 
d) To participate in creating an industrial atmosphere 
in the southern part of Iraqo 
e) To participate in developing the area aro\Uld the Company 
both socially and economicallyo (The Company is located 
about 20 miles away from Basrah City) o 
t) To train un~killed and semi-skilled workers~ in order 
to reach a reasonable level of productivityo 
g) To make a profit if conditions of' production and marketing 
permit it, and if the national interest requires ito 
Product 
1 Urea fertiliser 
2 Ammonium Sulphate 
fertiliser 
The Expansion ( 9) 
Tonne 
Tonne 
46,000 
120,000 
Cauaco 
On the 22nd April, 1972p Ministry of I. & lvio decided 
to expand the existing factory in order to raise 
Urea production. The Contract was awarded to the 
Japanese Mitsubishi Company. This Company took the 
responsibility for initiating the whole project on 
the 11th September, 1973, at a cost of (I.D. 33 
~llion) and set a date for completion by the end of 
1976. 
(8o) 
= As the Cost Accountant mentionedp the Company has not made 
a profit since its establishment on 27th June, 1971. He 
ascribed this to the need to sell the product in the local 
market at prices equal to the production cost at most timesp 
since the Company's product is distributed by purchasing 
bodies and also governmental officeso The product is mostly 
Ammonium sulphate~ Urea, Ammoniun gas 9 H2 S04 and Liquid 
Arrmonium to public industrial companies» or to peasant 
societies, which are also under government supervisiono 
The second reason, which is beyond the Government's 
control» is the lo\'r price of such products in the international 
market. 
= The technical reasons behind not making a profit» as mentioned 
by one of the Company's Engineers~ are: 
a) Frequent sto,poages, which happen to the factory 
machines as a result of technical faults ~~hen 
the machines were installed» and frequent power 
cutso 
b) Shortage of efficient Iraqi technical staff to 
maintain the factory machines and increase 
productivity. 
\ 
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o) Unsuitability of the machine design .for Iraqi ' 
weather. (The area where the Camp~ is situated is 
considered one of the most humid and hot places in Iraq). 
d) Eveu under perfect conditions, production in the Company 
never e~ceeds 7:t/o of the designed capacityo 
= Among the other points, mentioned by the Cost Accountant, as 
sufficient reasons for not making a profit~ is one which creates 
dissatisfaction among the manpower in the Company o This is the 
prolonged and complicated procedure, which must be gone through 
before taking the most important deci:dons .. 
This situation results in a negative attitude D when the 
decision.·: is at last made, and it frequently results in the loss 
of profitable deals on the international marketo other points 
mentioned by this officer are the distance at which the people 
responsible for production planning, Qarketing and expenditure 
operateo (Those people are members of the Board of Directors of 
the State Organisation of Chemical Industries, and their offices 
.are located in Baghdad City, which is about 360 miles from the 
Company site)o Very rarely does any one of them COIIle personally 
to visit the Company and try seriously to investigate and live 
through the problems of the factory and its workers, before the 
central Board enforces its general plans for such things as 
productiono 
A third factor noted is the urgent need to increase the 
authority of the Consultative Committee of the Company. 
This Committee is much more familiar than any other body with 
the needs and problems of the Company. If, however, it is to 
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take speedy and effective action, it must have sufficient 
authorityo 
= The long term general objectives, which embrace the public 
industrial sector as a whole, are drawn up by the High Planning 
Council at the Ministry of Planning. This consists of the 
Ministers of I • & M • , Planning, Finance and Trade and members 
of the Economic Affairs Bureau in the Revolution Command 
Council, together ldth members of the Consultation Council for 
Industrialisation. (lO) The High Planning Council is headed by 
the Vice President of the Revolution Command Council. The short-
term general objectives for one or a few state industrial companies 
are planned by members of the Consultation Council for industrialisation. 
- Some changes occur in regard to the general short-term objectivec, 
mostly once a yearo 
- The organisational structure of this particular company defines 
the authority and responsibilities of the high and middle management 
levels, in order to control and supervise the functions of the 
divisions, departments and section, and then defines the possibility 
of co-operation and co-ordination among these offices (See Chart 
No. 2). 
- Members of the Consultative Committee are chiefly responsible 
for the success of the organisational structure. 
- The Company prepares two kinds of accounts - Forecast (Budgeting) 
and general Final Accounts (see Table No. 5). 
- The Finance Hanager would not give me a copy of the final general 
balance sheet, as he said this information was considered secret, 
\, 
according to instructions from State Organisations to all public 
(83) 
companies. I did obtain the figures of the Final Balance Sheets 
of the companies. I visited from the annual report issued by the 
Ministry of Industry and Junes . for the year 1973/74, after I 
had received written legal permission from the Deputy Ministere 
- The Company does not use any c001puting machine to calculate 
the financial process. .Actually no part of public industrial 
sector uses a computer system in its activities. 
- There is a manual to help managers draw up the budget. ( 11 ) 
= The process which is followed when the managers prepare their 
forecast budgets, is that each division prepares detailed 
information about its needs, and its estimated expenses during 
the next fiscal year. This financial iD.formation is collated 
in the accounting division and after co--ordination, presented to 
the Consultative Cammitteeo This Committee studies the infor.m= 
at ion, amends when necessary, and presents it to the State Organ-
isation that supervises the Company, i.e. to the Planning and 
Financial Office, which then studies the budgets from all financial 
aspects. After that, the Planning and Financial Office presents 
the Forecast budget to the Board of Directors of the Organisation 
for discussion and approval, and then presents it to the Ministry 
of Industry and Mines for final approvaL To take the instance 
of the Maintenance Department, which is part of the Technical 
Affairs Division. Since the Head of this Department is also a 
member of the Estimated Budget Preparatory Committee, he uses 
all the information available to him about the needs, and forecasts 
\, (84) 
of the Maintenance Department , and he personally classifies his 
Department budgeto This budget, combined with those of all 
other departments is subject to the Technical Affairs Divisiono 
The same prooeciure is carried cut in all the other divisionso 
~ Usually the required reports about control processes for · 
instance cost aoooun·tingi statistics and a profit and loss sheet, 
are presented each month to the Manager of Technical Affairs (see 
Tables Nos.. :6, .1J o 
= The Company does not use Standard Costing as a means of control-
ling Engineering Costso Estimatesi as the Cost Accountant mentioned, 
tuli'il this objective.. He also said that no other controls are 
exercised by accounting division. The reason is that most of the 
Teclmicians in the factory do not e.ecept any kine of control or 
interference from cost accounting officerso For instance, when 
one of the Technicians in the Maintenance Department asks to 
purchase any material from the local or foreign market, he never 
consults the Cost Accounting Department about the prices or quality 
of the materials needed .. 
= Reports are presented daily or weekly fran the Technical 
Supervisors to their Department Heads and then to the Cost 
Accounting Department .. 
... There is a manual, which might be considered a management plan, 
listing the objectives of each department (See Job description, 
No. 1 .. ) o 
Personal Observations: 
1o Some of the officers I met an~ered the questions, 
in a limited and specific WS(f. Some of them tried 
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not to answer clearly, especially when they aaw 
that their answers were being put in writing. 
They were afraid that if their answers were 
critical they might be held responsible for 
what they had said. 
2. Some respondents, due to lack of experience and 
specialisation, d.id not understand the mer.ning 
of some of the questions, although I explained 
them in s:imple language. 
3. I f't.lund that there is a tendency towards careless-
nesb1 a lack of real interest in serious work 
requiring initiative. Most of the officers and 
employees are conscious of working in an !ll'ea far 
away frc:m the cities, which gives them an excuse, 
since they aN in an isolated position, to be 
dissatisfied with the lack of a modern social life. 
A good percentage of them hope later to be able to 
transfer to another Company near one of the cities 
like Mosul or Basrah or Baghdad. 
4. .All the public industrial sectors have broadly 
identical objectives and control systems. These are 
planned by a member of the Consultation Council for 
Industrialisation. But these objectives and the 
general systems, can be elastic, and there is the 
possibility o:f varying them to certai."'l extent, according 
to the needs of each Canpanv. 
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This ability to manoeuver depends on: 
a) The capability~ strength of personality and the 
extent of the political involvement of the General 
Manager .. 
b) The experience~ efficiency and enthusiasm of the 
managers in the high and middle levelso 
c) The location, type and quantity of product~ and the 
date when the Company was establi ehedo .All these 
elements can play a part in crystalising the control 
systems that fit each Compw..y within the general 
plan and policies drawn up by the Consultation Councilo 
5o As Iraq is developing in almost all spheres of economic 
activities~ after the sudden drastic increase of oil 
revenue, the change in the size, and the organisation's 
structure and their titles have to match with these 
developing activitieso 
B" 2 The Public Company of the Paper Industry in Basrah 
During my visit to the Company I met officers from the 
Technical Division, Controlling Department, Financial 
Organisation and Productivity and Administration Di~isionso 
A Note on the Company itself(12 ) 
Established on 17th September, 1970, in the country 
outside Basrah city. Its capital is IoDo 21~000,000. 
\ 
Their answers to the questions which related to their 
particular fields on the checklist in Exhibit.: I were as 
follows : 
= The objectives of the Company are clear and ~ be summarised 
as follows : 
a) To supply the Iraqi market with proC.ucts previously 
available only as imports. 
b) To exploit national resources previously ignored, in 
this case the material from the processing of sugar 
cane .. 
c) The Company has now undertaken labo1-atory research to 
investigate the usefulness of other cheaply available, 
cellulose material, i.e. palm leaves, cotton fuzz, etco 
cl) To provide further employment in the country and to 
create an industrial atmosphere in the area surrounding 
the site, which is located 30 miles from Basrah City. 
Further, to familiarise the neighbouring swamp inhabit-
ants with the workings of modern industry .. 
e) To exploit nearby energy sources, e.g. natural gas. 
f) To make use of the by-products of other industries, for 
example, pulp from the sugar industry, hydrochloric 
Produ::ts and Canacity of 
Product 
Paper (various types) 
Cartons " 11 
Expansion< 1 3) 
the Comoan;y 
Tonne 
Tonne 
Annual Canac. 
24-,300 
16,500 
A Contract was made for the expansion prog_,ramrne with the 
Saltzer Co. L'f Switzerland on 14-th March, 1974-, on the basis 
of a prepared plan and at a cost of I.D. 38,250,000.Completion 
has been set to take place, after a limit of 34- months on 14-th 
January, 1977.. The project will depend on terms of productivity 
on the raw material provided by sugar cane available in Southern 
Iraq. The expansion includes the construction of a unit to 
process "brevity dough 11 with an annual capacity of 30,000 tonnes. · 
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acid from the textile industry D lime from Mosul Sugar: 
Factory and H2 S04 from the fertilizer factory. 
g) To try to make a reasonable profit far the benefit or 
the whole national economy. 
- Theoretically an overall plan was to be produced by every 
qualitative (parent) Organisation far each of the o01npanies it 
administerso In reality the plan for the achieving of' the 
objectives has evolved internally. Suggestions and recommend= 
ations are first made by members of middle management, ioeo 
supervisors and department heads. These ideaa are forwarded to 
divisional heads at the meeting of' the Consultative Committee of 
the Canpany, when they are consolidated into a plan, which also 
takes intJ account the objectives drawn up by the Ministry of 
Industry and Mines. 
These objectives are then f'o~~ded to the Board of Directors 
of the State Organisation which supervises the Company. Arter any 
emendations which the Board mey find necessary, it is then sent 
to the Consultation Council for Industrialisation, which the 
Minister heads, !'or final study and approvalo 
= Details of' the organisational structure were not available because 
the Company was in the process of' expansion, but the ~Structure current 
at the time of' my visit can be seen in Chart 3o 
- The organisational structure is fixed, except when affected by 
expansion or changes in the high managerial levelo Such changes 
usually occur at intervals of between one and five yearso 
= The objective of the organisational structure is to establish 
Another unit with an annual capacity of 36,000 tonnes will 
produce dough from the brevity unit. A paper manufacturing 
machine producing 17,000 tonnes of white paper annually and 
a second machine with a capacity of 8,000 tonnes of paper will 
also b~ constructed, as well as a machine producing 4,000 tonnes 
of sanJ.tary paper a year. 
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hierarchical authority and responsibility - to limit the 
relationship between the divisions themselves and between the 
divisions and the other levels of the Camp~. 
- It is the responsibility of the General Manager al"..d. Divisional 
Man~ers (the Consultative Co~ttee) to monitor the success or 
failure of the organisational structure. 
- The Company prepa&~es budgets like any other state industrial 
concern. These are of two kinds. The first, called a Forecast 
Budget, coutains information about the Canpany' s intended finan-
cial activities in the coming fiscal year. The second, known 
as the general final balance sheet is a summary of the previous 
year's finlUlCial activities (see Table !Io. 8.). 
- As the I·-inance Ma!lager mentioned, the Company has not made a 
profit since its establishment 1 but it has working capital which 
enables it to continue production. This situation is ascribed 
by the Manager to the inability of the Company to reach designed 
production capacity in the early stages of its life. The Canpa.n,y 
does not make a profit, because : 
a) Technical and managerial staff lack experience and 
mistakes coeur whilst experience is being gained. 
b) Most of the Canpany' s efficiency depends on :imported 
raw materials, and this dependence puts the Company 
at the mercy of international price changes. 
c) The boring :outine creates an atmosphere in which 
correct decisions are not always made at the right time. 
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d) Limited authority has been delegated to the Camp~'s 
Consultative Committee. 
e) The cam.I>a.ny is hampered by a problem common among 
industrial concerns, especially those situated like 
this one, in rural areas, and that is the problem of 
dependence on local manpowero This particular area 
is considered to be one of the most backward of rural 
areas = it is an area of swamp - and the problem is 
one of attempting to change simple fanners into 
disciplined factory workers, a process whic!l takes 
considerable time, money and effort. 
= The Forecast Budget is sanetimes inaccurate by up to 4<J;b. 
- The final and forecast accounts are drawn up solely with the 
help of' manual accounting machines. However, information is 
available from the unified accounting systam which assists m~= 
erial staff' in drawing up their budgets. 
- The final balance sheet is drawn up by the officers of the 
Financial Division and then discussed by the Consultative Committee. 
- The Maintenance Department suggests its planning budget and the 
Financial Division puts it in an acceptable form for accounting. 
- The ideas and suggestions of foremen, supervisors, heads of 
departments are sent in the fonn of reports to the Divisional 
Managers of the relevant fields. After finalisation by the 
Divisional Manager, they are forwarded to the Financial Division, 
who analyse this information on a specially designed fonn. This 
information concerns the problems and achievements of production 
'\ 
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and development, and suggestions or ideas for solving existing 
problemso These reports are then studied at the weekly meetings 
of the Consultative Committeeo For the Maintenance Department 
there are daily and monthly reports and usually the heads of the 
Technical Department meet with the Technical Division Managero 
= The Compaqy does not use standard cost accounting procedures 
in order to control engineering costs because no specialists 
in this field are availableo 
= The Division responsible for drawing up productive specifications 
is the Organisation and Productive Division» but tmtil now the 
job has not been done by this division because it was only set up 
four months agoo Further, there are no work study staff. 
= The system of controlling engineering costs is oy a special form, 
filled in by workshop supervisors~ which provides the following 
inf'onnatior1: 
a) The cost of the raw material used. The workshop 
supervisors fill in the designation of the raw 
material, the store number from which it is drawn, 
and the standard unit and quantity used.o 
b) The number of man-hours necessar,y to complete the job. 
c) The machine hours on each individual maohineo 
This form is in quadruplicate, and after completion of the 
job the manufactured product is sent to the outward stores. The 
costing infonnation recorded on the form and the internal working 
document, and the information concerning raw material used in 
production, is recorded on a stock control documento Any surplus 
is recorded in the general ledger and returned to the storeso 
'"·. 
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Three copies of this document are sent to the Stores 
Accounts Office 11 where the raw materials are priced in the 
Originating Departmento The three copies are then sent to the 
Costing Department, where the wages costs j) depreciation, and 
other expenses are added, from the figures calculated in advance 
on the planning budget. 
The Cost Department calculates the total cost and sends the 
top copy to the Financial Division for the purpose of journal 
entr,ro The second copy is returned to the Stores Accounts Office 11 
where the stores receipt for manufactured material is appended 11 
and the material priced and entered on stock cardso The third 
copy remains in the Costing Department for analysis and use in 
non= internal functionso The total working cost is calculated by 
the Costing Department fran the total factory expenses, and the 
results are related to other divisions, according to their interest 
in that factory. This is a brief res- of the information on the 
method of calculating engineering coats given to me by the Financial 
Manager. 
~ As regards non-accounting control, the Organisation and Productiv-t 
ity Manager explained that each division has a pa...~icular respons-
ibility. For instance the responsibility of the Purchasing 
Division is to decide on reasonable prices for raw material, and 
to ensure that such material meets specifications. In the event 
of its being sub-standard, alternatives must be found. The 
Marketing Division co-operates with the Production Manager to 
amend and develop production, and to 'Jreate new markets for the 
developed producto 
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= Control over non-accounting aspects of direct work cost are 
exercised by these means : 
a) Daily and monthly reports obtained by Senior 
~nagement from Depar·tment Heads and Technical 
Superirisors in order to establish what problems 
and daviations might occur during work shifts. 
b) Quality control is exercised by guages fixed to 
the machin~ry and by prepared charts and formso 
= The system for providing management with information to assist 
in the planning of costs is as follcnrs : 
For maintenance, development, and Quality Control, none exists, 
but a serious study' is being undertaken by the National Centre for 
Consultation and Management Development in order to evolve a practical 
method. 
= There is a manual 51 which could be considered to be a plan for 
management, which delimits the job description of various divisions 
and departments. 
- The planning (Forecasting) budget is considered to be an outline 
for senior and middle management in the fulfilment of their objectivee. 
- The Supervisors are not responsible for the costing of their 
departments. 
=The easiest costs to control. are those of modern machinery, i.e. 
computers. These are not yet in use. 
- The most difficult costs to control are those incurred by the 
increasing percentage of unskilled and lazy workers and agitators. 
= Infonnation which is not to hand, but which would be of great 
benefit to management, is the real cost of all production 
activities and their accurate timing. 
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= There is no export since production does not satisfy internal 
demand ~ local markets are a function not of demand, but of the 
production capacity of the machineryo 
Personal Observations : 
I have made an exploratory visit to observe the Campaqy 
tvorki.ngo This visit started from the raw material stores and 
progressed through the production process to the finishing 
departmento I can summarise what I have seen, and the answers 
given to my questions by the Manager of the Organisation and 
Froducitivity Division: 
1 o The full design capacity of the machinery is not 
exploitedg even though enough time has elapsed 
since esta~lishment to allow this to take placeo 
2o I believe that the production flow line is not 
correctly organised, though the nature of this 
product requires consecutive a~semblYo 
3o The percentage of waste and spoilage duri."lg :prod-
uotion is unacceptableo 
~ Study of the last forecast budget reveals : 
a) That it makes super-human demands for its 
execution , and 
b) No Commercial Market Study is consideredg and 
there is only a superficial study of profit-
abilityo I consider this to be a result of the 
inability to undertake cost controL The prices 
are no~ competitive with those of foreign companieso 
(95) 
The reason, as the Manager explained, is not 
only that management control systems in developed 
countries are more efficient and effective~ but 
alsc that the opportunity exists abroad for mass 
production and industrial integration. In add~ 
ition there exists a greater industrial awarenesso 
5o There are weaknesses in the system of follc-wing-up the 
production processes necess~J to achieve the Ccmp~'s 
objectives. I consider the reason for this to be the 
lack of specialised technicians and managers. Those 
tec~icians and managers who do exist were found to 
lack enthusiasm for the execution of their respons-
ibilities. They realise that they will not be called 
seriously to account because of the difficulty in 
replacing them. 
. 6. There is a lack of real knowledge of the state of the 
international market in respect of the source and avail-
ability of spare parts, competitive prices and alternative 
spares. I found that some spares had been bought in large 
quantities indicating a lack of scheduling study. The 
result of this is frozen capital which might otherwise be 
available for other uses, and a shortage of other spares 
leading to slowing down and stoppages on some machines. 
7 o There are clear problems in regard to delimiting authority, 
some officers occupying a favourable position because of a 
relatio~~hip with someone in state authority. Those officers 
exercise authority in areas for which they accept no equal 
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responsibility. This situation gives rise to some 
sensitivity in the relations runong the personnelo 
Bo The Company suffers from a problem of wage rates., 
This is because it is situated near the Iraqi 
National Oil Company~ which is able, due to its 
greater wealth, to offer greater financial incent-
ives to those workers who have experience in ind-
ustrial work. This doubles the problem of finding 
trained technical workers for the paper industry. 
Bo3 The Pu~lic Bata Com;eany in Baghdad 
I visited the Company and met the Administration }!anager~ 
the Sales Manager~ and the Senior Cost .Acoountant. After present-
i.ng the questions, the following answers were received in the order 
in which they appear on the checklist~ although the answers were not 
as open and detailed as those given by the previous Company. 
A Note on the Compagy( 14) 
It was established in 1936 as a small branch of a foreign 
Company in Iraq. It expanded gradually up to 1952 when it 
became a limited Company with Iraqi and foreign capitaL 
The factory was built to manufacture shoes from leather, 
rubber and pl::l.stic. The Canpany was nationalised in 1964 
and attached to the People's Shoe Manufacturing Adminis-
tration in Kufa. Other Companies were attached to it in 
1970 when Organisation Statute No. 90 came into being, Yiz 
one of the ex-Ministry of Defence factories at .al Fw:-at, 
and the Sponge rubber factory. The capital is now ID.1,885,575. 
Products and Ca;eacity 
Product 
1 o Leather Shoes 
2o Rubber Shoes 
3o Plastic Shoes 
4o Sponge Rubber 
pair 
pair 
pair 
Tonne 
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Capacity 
2,168,000 (1 shift) 
1,258~000 (3 shift) 
580,000 (3 shift) 
400 ( 1 shift) 
~ The objectives of the Bata Company may be summarised as 
follows : 
a) Since there is an increasing demand for shoes? and the 
Government does not encourage imports, maximum possible 
use of the machines is one of the CampaQY's objectives. 
b) Profit is not considered to be an objective, but is in 
£act achieved from exports. 
c) Satis:i'ying a certain percentage of home demand is an 
objective. 
- The objectives are drawn up by the Consultative ~ttee 
of the Company. They are pursued together with the general 
objectives set by the State Organisation of Chemical 
Indus triP-so 
~ The objectives of the Company change according to the general 
plan of the Ministry of Industry and Mines, v~hich is linked 
to the National plan, renewed every five years. 
- The organisational structure is not in printed form. 
= The organisational structure does not change unless there are 
major personnel changes or expansion takes place. These sorts 
of changes usually take place every few years. For example, 
let us take the Kuf'a branch of the Bata Cofl\Pany (previously the 
State People's Shoe Company in Kufa); this branch was established 
in 1959, was independent managerially and belonged to the State 
Establishment for Industry (now abolished.) Wh~n the Ministry 
of Industry and Mines took over this factory in 1970, which 
is .90 miles from Baghdad City, it was attached to the headquarterso 
·----._ 
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Company in Baghdado Its association with the Headquarters Company 
includes planning and management controlo It is· also controlled 
for the purpose of distribution by the Company executive (the 
executive of the Public Bata Company in Baghaad) 'who also 
exercises responsibility for limitation of the market, quality 
and quantity of production, and details of fir~cial activities. 
The Assistant General Manager in Kufa, for instance, who carries 
out the duties of General Manager in that factory, receives 
instructions and authority from the General Manager of the Bata 
Company in "Saghdad, as do most of the individual departments. 
In short, authority is centralised. 
= There are about 100 outlets for the Company's product throughout 
Iraqo Tr.e people who carry out the job of marketing are commission 
agents who receive a percentage of the profits ~ between 3% and &fo 
of the sale price according to the location of the outlets and who 
are indepe!ldent of the Company. 
- At the mcment there are no foreign officers in this Company. 
= The organisational structure is designed to produce co-operation 
and co-ordination between the departments on each level and between 
the different levels, and helps to define authority and responsibility. 
~ The Company like the whole of the State Industrial Sector, prepares 
two kinds of accounts, planning (forecasting budgets and Final 
Statements - see Table 9). 
= Ever.y divisional manager is responsible for the preparation cf 
his divisional accountso These are collected and sent to the 
Financial Division in order to be put into final shape, ~d after 
discussion with the Finance Manager the accounts are presented to 
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the Consultative Committeeo They then go on to the Board of 
Directors of the Organisation and finally to the Ministry for 
e.pprovalo 
= There is a manual to help the managers to draw up their bud.geto 
This Ccmpa."ly does not employ a Stand&rd Costing System, but the 
historical one of' forecasting. The reason for this is the lack 
of' efficient accounts staffo 
- The Leather Costing Card shows information about the price of 
each pair of shoes, and the approximate quantities of' leather 
which should be used (oee Table10)o The Costing Department 
prepares doct.Unents specially for each model which exists in prod~ 
uction, and the specifications for all kinds of material used in 
the shoeso The information on these dooUJlents is used by the 
officers of the Production Department, who draw materials from 
the Stores Supervisoro 
- The Company has a forward production plan for four weeks ahead. 
After ·this short te~ plan has been accepted by the specialists, 
the Costing Department prepares all the models in the factory 
sections for each week, and then the raw material supply documents 
are prepared by the Cost Department and sent to the Production 
Department, so that the Cost Department controls the quantity and 
specifications of each model weekly. 
= There are no non-accounting control procedureso 
= Each supervisor in the Production Department is I'esponsible for 
having enough materials for a limited period of productiono The 
supervisor is considered responsible for the production of' a fixed 
(100) 
quantity of ~he finished product previously specified» and it is 
his duty to reduce unnecessar,y wasteo 
= The actual cost method is the easiest for controllingo The most 
difficult, according to the Senior Accountant is standard costing, 
and he ascribes this difficulty to the lack of cOI!!petent e.ccounting 
off'icerso 
- The previous officer adds that information not now available» 
which would be of use to management, could be proVided by 
specialised costing personnel, able to prepare a standard aystam 
which might give a clear and precise picture of the costing procedure. 
This would help top management to make the right decisionso 
= Export activities are controlled qy different accounting methods, 
tor instance, in the calculating of expo:t"t costs .• internal taxes 
must be disregarded in drawing up a selling price o The commission 
of the distribution agencies is similarly omitted, while some of 
the managerial expenses which relate to the Export Department, 
a part of the Sales Division, are addedo 
Personal Observation 
1 a The following observations were made during my visit to Bata 
in Baghdad and from the information received from the Senior 
Accountant after asking the final question. 
a) This Company makes a reasonable profit, perhaps partly because 
the management control system remains to a certain extent 
affected by the system in operation when the Company was under 
partial foreign ownershipo 
b) Many of the managerial staff have been employed here for several 
years and have accumulated e:xperience and abilityo 
(101) 
o) The sticcessful marketing operation which existed prior to 
nationalisation is still workable~ because the Marketing 
Division conduct field studies to discover real public 
tasteo This Division asks the Production Department to 
develop products according to the changing taste of 
customers of both sexes and most ages. 
d) Mechanisation has helped towards mass production.~~ which 
enables the unit cost to be reduced and the percentage of 
waste to be cuto The Company have all'\O saved time and 
money by creating skillf'ul workers. These factors 
contribute to products of high quality and reasonable 
price, which enc~urages the import by foreign countries 
of the shoes produced by this Canpany. For instance» 
"the 1974 figure to the u.s.a.&. was 15,000 pairs, and 
this is the lowest export figure in r~cent years" (15) 
2., The problems suffered by this Canpany are the lack of a profound 
,and factual study of the work specifications for each job~ ahd the 
difficulty of ensuring the appointment of staff with appropriate 
qualifications, interest and an efficient approach which will 
enable them to carry out their appointed task without any pressures 
other than those of the job in hand. The Canpany is nonetheless 
ideally situated in this respect in the centre of Baghdad City, 
where there is a wide choice of suitably qualified personnel. 
3. Some of the Company's employees were not qualified to accept 
the responsibility of their jobs, and so they tried in various 
ways to conceal the fact that they were working in a lazy and 
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dishonest way. They found a variety of excuses far 
absenting themselves from their duties., I believe tha.t 
the reasons are those stated in the previous observations, 
No ... 2 .. 
1,.., The Company takes care to ensttre adequate stock levels for 
a period of not less than six months aheado This period is 
considered reasonable, especial~ since same of the materials 
are imported from distant countries, and the sources are 
a:N'e::oted by political and economic factors, international 
price fluctuation and the availability of alternative 
materials. As for the finished goods in the Company's 
warehouses, these were few and sometimes almost non-existent. 
This is because the distribution channels in the home market 
are effective because of the financial incentive, and foreign 
deiDBJld is high because of the high quality and reasonable 
price of the Company's shoes and the satisfactory results 
obtained in the tests they are subJected to .. 
5.. This Company is the only one which operated a piece work 
system of paying wages. (This system was started a few years 
before nationalisation).. This method_, however, bad a 
detrimental effect on quality, especially in the last two 
years of its operation, and so a new method of assessment 
was prepared by the Production Department. The production 
operations were divided according to the skill required for 
their operation and designated 1 - 6 in an ascending order 
ot difficulty. For each level there is a set wage. This 
·'\. 
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system has been in operation since 1st October, 1975o 
Bo4 Public Company for Mechanical Industries in Alexandria 
During my visit to this Canpany, situated some 50 miles from 
Baghdad, I met the General Manager and the Comme~ial Managero 
However, the time they had available to answer the questions w:1.s 
limited and I found that they were reticent about supplying infonn-
ation not already available in printed formo The information gained 
.from these answers, the printed forms and my awn observation follows, 
but first I wish to give a concise pictlll'(;'! of this heavy industry o 
a) Organisational Structure and Main Offices of the Compan./ 1 6) 
According to Statute No. 90 (1970), the jobs of planning, 
:following-up and co-ordinating, the icsuing of credit on 
the basis of the forecast and final account, the prepar-
ation of financial statements and the supervision of the 
affairs of officers and employees, are all the respons-
ibility of the State Organisation for the Engineering 
Industry o While every public company carries out the · 
general plan by preparing the production requirements 
and manuf'acturing its products in order to fulfil its 
forecast budget, this Company is in addition involved 
in follovr.ing the market processes and obtaining the money 
Summary of the Company ( 17) 
When.ll in 1959, the Soviet-Iraq Technical and Economic Agreement 
was signed, it was decided to set up an agricultural machinery 
projecto This project was given a high development priority. At 
the beginning of 1968 the State Engineering Industry was establishe~ 
within the State Establishment for Industry and 1970 saw the estab-
lish~nt of the Stat~ Organisation of Engineering Industries, which 
took over responsibility for the creation of heavy industry in Iraq. 
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from sales., (Tlus specialisation among the qualitative 
Organisations and the public Industries which are admin= 
istered by them could apply to all qualitative Organisa-
tionso(1B) As there is a huge expansion in motor car prod-
uction, a special directorate has been created to control it.( 19) 
The directorate is attached directly to the State Organisation 
of Engineering Industries, besides its legal attachment to 
the Company. The offices which exist in the Organisational 
Structure (see Chart 4) are attached directly to the General 
Manager, who supervises the execution of the Conpany's indust-
rial policy and co~ordinates the jobs of different offices. 
There is a special bureau for checking and follow-up to assist 
the General Manager in the execution of his duties., 
b) Natm·.: of Work in the Company's Factories (20) 
Here I am going to present in some detail t~~ gist of the 
major functions of the Company's factories drawn from the 
available literatureo In order to give an idea of the nature 
of the work in these factories it is necessary to follow the 
various processes carried out from market research to after= 
sales service and development, which could be called the 
production cycle. This includes four major steps 9 the first of 
which is production designation. This includes checks on 
quality, specification and demand. The second step is prod-
uction itself, including preparing production requirements. 
This Company became one of the main companies in the Organisation 
and was later ~~named the public Mechanical Industries Company in 
Alexandria and was given the task of constructing agricultural 
machines and ancillary components. 
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production processes and quality controlo The third step 
is mar~eting, which encanpasses preparation for selling 11 
advertising and sales procedures and serviceso The final 
st~ is prcduction development, including improving quality 
and redesigning according to the state of the marketo In 
the first stage, a contribution is made to the investigation 
by the Commercial Office (Marketing), who ascertain the type 
of product and size of demand, while the Research and Devel-
opment Office makes a study of required production and arrives 
at the major specificationo The third step is helped by the 
technical, planning, quality control and commercial officeso 
The Technical Office decides on designs and the technology, 
which in turn determines the raw materials re'1_uired 9 and the 
Commercial Office (Purchasing) works to ensure the availability 
of these materialso Meanwhile spare parts are manufactured in 
the spares Department, which belongs to the Technical Of.f'iceo 
After preparing product requirements, the Production Divisions 
and its assembly lines produce and prepare the corrmodity for 
despatcho At the end of each production process there is a 
quality control process to ensure that the product confonns 
to specificationo During this process, when necessary, man~ 
power training takes place, as skill is a major requiremento 
This is the responsibility of the Administration Officeo To 
execute the third stage the Commercial Office have to advertise 
and contract with agencies to sell the final product, or to 
arrange d~ect sales and take care of after~sales service 
either directly or through agencies, and to collect informF 
ation about the suitability of the product far its intended job. 
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In addition they co-operate with the Financial and 
Economic Office for cost study and to establish a compet= 
itive priceo The fourth stage is the concern of the 
Research and Development Office, which t~ies to improve 
the product, or redesign a product suitable for the job 
according to the recommendations of the Commercial Office 
or the observations of the userso After completion of 
research and development, the samplee are presented to the 
Technical Office (Design Department), for completion of the 
production cycleo 
In addition there are other important jobs, which are not 
directly related to the production cycle, but are nevertheless 
of major importru1ce in :facilitating the production procedureso 
The most important o:f these are maintenance, transport, public 
services, stores and constructiono A brief picture will now 
be given of the nature of the work in some of the major 
departments related to our studies in the Company's factories, 
io eo to the Management Control System followed by this Company o 
1 o Planning 
The major objective of planning is to ensure the most efficient 
means of production by the intelligent use (jf' machines and ind= 
ividua.l processes. This could be achieved through issuing 
detailed schedules anQ preparing production sequences, also 
through following up the execution of each stage and analysing 
and assessing the results in order to amend the schedule for 
the next periodo Planning comprises these major departmentso 
Firstly - the Scheduling Department. This initiates the 
schedules, resulting from the documents, fonus and technolog-
ical procedures o 
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Secondly = the Despatch Department. This sends out 
inf'ormation on the use of raw materials~> spare partsJ) 
job orders~ and controlling, besides following up the jobs 
and making amendments where necessary. 
Thirdly = the Following Department. No doubt each department 
has to have its own follow=up procedures, but the central 
Following Department is still very important for unifying 
the facts and preventing clashes of procedure as a result 
of various changes. This following-up has two main functions: 
'io To produce awareness of actual activity as compared 
nth that planned, and to explain the reasons for 
tmy eli vergence. 
2. To suggest modification procedures to eliminate 
this divergence. The Planning Lepartment has a 
direct link with technology, productivity and 
marketing in the sense that it determines raw 
material, production, the shift production level 
and job stanuardisation. 
2o Quality Control 
The major objective of quality control is to ensure the high 
quality of raw materials, products, spares a."'l.d measuring 
equipment D besides drawing up analyses which include design 
procedures. Accordingly, the Division contains these major 
departments 
Firstly = the Investigation Department. This oversees assembled 
and non-assembled goods. The investigation must be carried out 
according to the technical requirements laid down by the designs, 
and this Department has investigation sections which take care 
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of all the production departments.» spares and assemblyo 
Second~ - the precise measuring laboratorieso Their function 
is to check equipment spares, etco, used in measurement, and 
to be sure of their suitability for the jobo 
Thirdly = the Mining laboratories. These are concerned with 
the quality of raw material and other materials used during 
the technicological processes, including mechanical, mining 31 
chemic'!l and heat processes and stoving~ painting and oilingo 
There is also a special laboratory for spectral and X-ray 
an~sis» and quality control has direct links with design, 
technology, production and planning. 
3o Costing 
Classio costing procedures cannot be considered as a means of 
calculating costs for the mechanical industries. In this case 
the def'inition I give extends to and. includes control of planning 
execution, showing divergence and bringing it to the attention 
of the Company services, besides controlling stock levels and 
wages distribution. The factories of the ~chanical Industries 
Camp~ have several production workshops and follow different 
technological methods for the production of dif'ferent itemso 
This situation calls for a ntnnber of costing centres within 
the framework of central costing, which means that calculation 
of forward cost depends on the technological contribution. 
For the purpose of establishing the cost of any product this 
equation may be used : 
where C = cost; Cd =direct cost; Ci = indirect cost 
C = Cd +.Ci 
(109) 
The direct cost comprises: Raw material (Mining) 
Secondar,y & completion materials 
(tyres~ glass and plastic)o 
Depreciation (casting, fixing and 
production machinery) o 
Power (electricity~ steam and 
pressed air)o 
The elements of indirect cost are: 
Industrial Services 
Marketing and administration 
serviceso 
li'ixed costs: (buildings etco) o 
Calculation of these items must take into consideration the 
:forecast for individual warkshopso The cost of raw material 
and Gecond.ary materials can be calculated by i'echnology Depart100nt • 
(Se~ .Table 11 o) The Company considers that building deprec-
iation will reach zero in 20 years, arid machinery in 10 yearso 
In order to execute these :functions the following sections 
exist in the Cost Department o 
io Forecast Cost Section 
iio Actual Cost Section 
iiio Load.i.Dgp distribution and Stores Expenditure 
Section. 
ivo Store Control Sectiono 
Vo Claims Seotiono 
The Cost Department has a close liaison with the Technology, 
Planning and Marketing Departments for the pucpose of' f'ore= 
casting costs ~~d assessing priceso 
The f'ollawing answers are the whole of the information 
\ 
received in reply to the questions on the checklist, and the answers 
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were given in a legal letter signed by the General Manager» 
the Engineer Latif al-Alwan .. 
~ Yes the Company has objectives .. 
~ The objectives here initi~ted by the Consultative Committee 
together with the Board of Directorso 
= The objectives have not changed since establishment. 
- The Canpany has a clear organisational structure .. 
- The organisational structure has not changed eince its eatab= 
lishment by the Industrial Development Centre for Arabic Countries 
in 19710 
- The Budget is prepared by the High Committee stnd Subsidiary 
Committees and the Office of Financial Affairs .. 
= Each division of the Company prepares its Budget in co=operation 
with each department and its officers .. 
= Budget follow-up takes place once a month by report. 
= The Company uses standard costing ~~ standards are set fer 
current work by the Technical Department, and for the further 
work by the Work Study Team. 
- Control for deviation of raw material is established by Material 
Control in the Planning Office and directed during working hours 
by the Production Division. The result is sent to the Costing 
Department on special forms. 
- Each supervisor is responsible for the execution of the plan, 
but not for cost control. 
- The planning Budget is divided into months and seasons and it 
must be followed precise~ as a monthly and seasonal programme 
:f'or production and sales. 
\ 
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= Each division specialises in certain functions» for which all 
information is fully available to the divisiono 
= There is no large export activity now because of home demando 
Personal Observations 
PRJ personal observations of this Ccmpa.ny through my visit ll and 
from information supplied to me in printed fcnn, are as follows 
1 o The following table is compiled. from Company products and 
shows present production growth compared with the previous 
year9 (see .!able Noo 12)o 
2o There is a tendency for both Iraqi and foreign personnel to 
leave their jobso This tendency was marked in 1973-74 and 
increased in 1974-75o Incidentally, this Company alon~ 
among t!!e Companies I visited employs foreign experts and 
technicians, most of whom are Russians and Czechoslovakso 
In order to ass~os the reasons for this it is necessary to 
point out these factso( 21 ) 
a} The difficulty which the employees encounter in 
transferring to the area where the Company is situated, 
despite the guarantee by the Company of transport for 
most employees o 
b) Most the employees live near the Company, in an isolated 
rural areao The Company has prepared a housing area a.'ld 
public facilities in order to encourage employees to live 
nearby, but although the number of ho~..;; consistently 
increases, it can not keep pace with demand, especially 
since the designation has been increasedD because of the 
family-and social ties of employees, most of whose families 
live in citieso 
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Products 
Unit 
Agrio. Equip. number 
Bodies 
" 
Wooden goods II 
Castings Tonnes 
Non-standard II 
tools 
Manual tools · number 
Springs Tonnes 
Other Manufao. II 
Tractors number 
Capital Manu£'- amount 
acturers 
Total 
Table No. 12. 
Fran the :.b~girming of the year to end of March 1974 
Same period 
.Actual Plannir.g of last yecr. 
Actual 
Quant. Price Quant. Price % Quant. Price 
--~· 
2,184 211,682 4-,120 598,970 35 734. 203,299 
585 103,223 1,100 251,120 61 294. 68,015 
diff. 151,936 diff' 0 14,600 104 diff. 93,122 
4,033 571,4.22 5,250 790,900 72 2,712 314,649 
355,171 89,405 860 212,500 4.2 diff'. 5.5,248 
6~~69.5 4-1,346 60,000 170,000 1.5 21,490 .5,329 
1,4.24 249,255 2,100 393,000 63 178,185 50,605 
197;583 68,916 716 126,260 55 d.iff. 15,467 
1,735 245,750 1,750 2492,500 98 710 984,100 
dif'f. 335,959 diff 584,750 57 diff. 535,988 
Dif:£'.,4330,594- Dif£.,5866,600 74 Diff. 2325,822 
-~--- -
Result of the Product Report for March 1974 (22) 
Growth% 
104. 
225 
126 
182 
162 
820 
498 
453 
250 / 
62 
I 
185 
. 
I 
I 
I 
,....... 
1""'1 
.-
.-
........, 
o) The difficult nature of work in some divisions = notably 
the Casting Departmento 
d) Employees of this Company do not receive wages comparable 
with the employees of other State Canpanies~ if account 
is taken of' the unpleasant nature of the work and the 
different circumstances from those which obtain in other 
Iraqi companies. Furthermore, it is an isolated area. 
I believe that these problems are common to most 
companies located at a distance fran county centres, 
but a serious practical study is being made to overcome 
·:.these problems in the near f'utureo 
3o The inevitable result of industrialisation in any newly 
developed country is development and technological dif'f'= 
icultieso This means obstacles in the early &tages, accom-
panied by deviations which make it hard to su.cceed. These 
problems and the consequent wastage are not easy to controlo 
All this is in addition to the Goveri'.ment policy of making 
products available at the lowest possible prices to consumers 
who are members of ~gricul tural societies or to other workers 
whose livelihoods are considered to depend on this Company's 
products. This point is given increased importance by the 
faot that agriculture is also planned and controlled by the 
Government. In addition, the prices of most of the raw 
materials and semi-manufactured products essential to final 
production have increased. In spite of all these negative 
factors, the Company was able measurably to decrease losses 
and to compensate for losses which might occur with revenue 
from reserves (see table No. ~:3) o 
(114) 
The following table (A) explains this ( 23). 
Table No. 13 
Profit & Loss 1971-72 1972-73 
ID ID 
Profit 
Loss 1093365 891376 
1973-74 
ID 
716806 
The Canpany was able to :find the :financial resources to fulfil 
its projects and execute its productivity plan by preparing and 
realising the necessar,y cash liquidity. 
The :following table (B) shows the different Sources ( 2.4) 
Sources 1971-72 1972-73 1973-74 
ID ID ID 
Increased banking face 1000,000 2000,000 4000,000 
Loans 750;000 1500,000 2876)>923 
Credit payments (unpaid) 4049,219 5289,800 1862,626 
Capital Support 1362,000 1460,975 168e,975 
4. .Among the urgent problems which make dif'ficul t the working 
of the budget is the availability of raw material. The only 
solution to this problem is a stock reserve for a period of 
not less than two years. This does not imply that there is 
an actual probab:i.li ty that the Company will not obtain the 
raw material either because of the inability of the supplier 
to provide the material for unforeseen reasons, or because 
of non-fulfilment of his obligations for cammeroial or other 
reasons. The likelihood of such a case is in fact low, but 
if it did occur, it would lead to stoppage and failure to 
reach the production target. If the Company is unable to 
\ 
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obtain a:ny materiaJ that it needs, the result is either no 
production, or a material di~~erent ~rom ~pecificationso 
This means additional effort and high costs. The following 
meastu:-es are suggested by the Manager of the Commercial Office 
to avoid such an occurrence: that the office have a~~hority to 
obtain the relevant raw material when necessary, up to a total 
of I.D. 10,000 for each credit opening instead of the I.D. 
1 ,500 limit now in force; that this be accomplished without 
the need to invite tenders, but with the approval of the 
Consultative Committee. It is suggested that this procedure 
be worked for both internal and external purchasing. The final 
point is that the solution of technical problems is basically 
dependent on two ~actors; the existence of technical cadres and 
experience in the exercise of technology. 
B.5 The r~blic Vegetable Oil Coppany in Baghdad 
As there is a tendency in the Ministry of IndustrJ and 
Mines-· . to-wards the amalgamation of companies with identical and 
complementary products, I have asked the Industrial Relations 
Summary. of the Como any( 2 5) 
The Company is the result of the amalgamation of the vegetable 
oil extraction Company, established in 1940, with the Cotton 
Seed products Company established in 1953. It was amalgamated 
with the Rafidan Detergent Company in 1967 and with the Indus-
trial prj !lting Company in 1969. The nominal capital is I.D. 
3,367,612. (26) 
The Company's Products & Capacity 
Products 
. 1 o Margarine 
2. Liquid vegetable oils 
3· Toilet soaps 
4. Washing soaps 
5. Detergent powders 
6. Cosmetics 
(116) 
Capacity in Tonnes 
90,000 
9,000 
11,000 
11,700 
20,800 
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Manager why this is so, and why each Company does not work 
in a free competitive market. His answer was as follows 
The first two Companies were nationalised on 14th 
July, 1964, and the other two concerns had been 
under state ownership since their establishment, 
the sales and distribution policy and price 
limitation being issued by the Legal Office, which 
is part of the State Organisation of the Food 
Industry., Since each of the four Companies has 
technical expertise, in production, sales, distr-
i1Jution or the purchase of raw materials in inter-
national markets, we can clearly use this to 
mutual advantage. It was also felt that after 
amalgamation the individual Companies could 
become more efficient in fulfilling both their 
internal and external market obligations than 
i.f they had remained independent. It would also 
be possible, after amalgamation, for a Co:rrpany 
to reduce its staff and to direct advertising 
expenditure to the foreign market which it could 
then supply. 
He added that the co-ordination of activities will serve the 
consumer through t~e development of the products of the 
amalgamated Company. 
When meeting the Managers. of the Organisation and Productivity, 
and Personnel Divisions, and the Cost Accountant, I found that 
some of their answers showed a tendency to hesitate and displl:lyed 
evidence of a lack of experience. Indeed the answers were n<?t 
very different from those given by other Companies. The most 
~ortant information, given by the Manager of the Organisation 
and Productivity Division, was as follows : 
( 117) 
- Essentially the Company objectives originated from the Consult~ 
ative Committee in co-operation with middle managemento For 
instance, when sales objectives have to be drawn up, they are 
formulated in a general way by the Assistant to the General 
Manager of Commercial Affairs in co-operation with the Marketing 
Division and the Head of the Sales Departmento These objectives 
are presented to the Technical Manager (Assistant General Manager 
for Technical Affairs)o The prcduction objectives are established 
with the co-operation of the production departmentso Then the 
plan is forwarded to the State Organisat::.on for study and to the 
Consultation Council for Industrialisation for approvalo 
The information used in preparing sales plans is in this form 
a) The previous year 1 s saleso · 
b) The production capacity of the Company 
o) Received statistical information from the Central 
Statistical Bureau, which is a subsidiary of the 
Ministry of Planning, about the interest in the 
Company products and purchasing power of the Iraqi 
Constnnerso 
d) This information is analysed by specialists to help the 
preparation of a plan. 
- There are several methods of submitting a plan, which are used 
depending on the objectives of the Company a 
a) The Historical Method (Time Series)o 
b) The average sales figures for previous yearso 
c) The traditional method of adding 1o% to last year's 
sales figureso 
The method followed in this Company is the historical methodo 
- Almost 9o% of the raw materials for various processes is imported, 
especially crude palm oil and soya oil, which mainly come from 
( 118) 
Malaysia and other South East Asian countrieso 
= This company used to accummulate profits of between IoDo 1! 
2 million until the year 1972/73 (See Table l4)o The fiscal 
year 1974/75 ::Jaw a loss by the Company of LD o half a millionp 
the reason being a sudden increase in raw material prices on 
the world marketo Since one of the major objectives of the 
Company is to maintain reasonable prices for the Iraqi consumerp 
some of its prices have not been raised since 1964o The loss 
suffered by the Company was subsidised by the Treasury Office 
of the !1inistry of Finance~ 
= There is no complete information system except that used for r 
stock controlo . The Divisional r1anagersll therefore, depend, 
~nen takit~ decisionsp upon routine information acquired by 
keeping in touch with the Departmental Heads and the rest of 
middle management, and by using personal efforts and skillo In 
other words, the information system is not based on scientific· 
studyo 
- The Organisation and Productivity Division working with special-
ists from the National Centre for Consultancy and Management 
Development, has prepared a system to exploit the machines in 
all the Company factories (see Table .l5) o This tabJ.e. shows the 
conclusion of the monthly reports on hovt the machines in the 
Company0s factories should be exploited~ 
=There are no job descriptions for the administrative posts, but 
there is information on job evaluation for the workerso 
= There is a l''ollowing Cormnittee whose purpose is to follow up 
the execution of managerial decisionso 
=The Company's problems, as outlined by the Organisation and 
Productivity Divisional !"Tanager are as follows: 
(119) 
1 o The Selection of senior managerial staff from 
competent people with the required level of 
eff'ioiencyo Or to put it another wa:y, getting 
the right man for the right jobo 
2o The State Organisation has to allo'N for planners 
in the Company to initiate a planning scheme which 
also incorporates the suggestions of workers and 
foremeno This means that planners at dift'erent 
levels have to be in practical touch with the real 
p1·oblems of' the workerso 
3o Utilising modern systems for increasing production 
before considering expansiono 
4o The need to realise that a flex:!.ble attitude towards 
changes of ideas is necessary among senior managemento 
5o Serious consideration of technical and managerial 
training at all levelso 
·6o Material Ir.centives might be advantageous, but before 
they are established, a real figure ( stG:ndard) for 
productivity must be arrived ato 
7 o The essential need to provide modern managerial aids 11 
such as canprehensive job a·escriptionso 
\ 
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Bo 6 The Iraqi Public Spinning and Weaving Company in Baghdad 
I was able to obtain information after meeting the ACting 
General Manager of the Administration Affairs Office in the head-
quarters of tl&e State Organis~_tion of Spinning and Weaving .. · I 
also met the Cost Accountant and the Head of the Maintenance 
Depa..-tment, whose answers to the questions in -Exhibit .. 1 were 
as follows : 
= Before nationalisation one of the essential objectives of the 
Canpany was profit making, but now its chief concern is to 
fulfil th~.: Country's demand for its products at reasonable 
price so 
= The purpose of any profit made is to finance expansion .. 
= The Company has no prepared Organisational Stl""~ctureo 
Summary of the Companv ( 21) 
The Company was established on 18th January, 1945 as a limited 
Company with a capital of I.D. 150,000, then increased to I..D .. 
1,200,000 in 1959. The Company was nationalised, in 1964 and 
attached to the Medical Cotton Company in 1968 with a capital 
of I.D. 212,796. During the last few years a great many 
expansion and development projects have been undertaken, the 
most important being the expansion of the Company factory and 
the installation of the majority of spinning and weaving machines, 
as well as the replacement of the old machines by new ones.. The 
capital of this Company was I. D. 1,657,504 on 31st March, 1974. 
Company Production and Capacit/ 23 ) 
a) Spinning and Weaving Factory: 
1. Different garments 
2. Cotton spinning 
b) Medical Cotton Factory 
1 
2 
3 
Product 
Medical cotton 
" bandages 
" muslin 
4 white and boric lint 
5 paper tissues 
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19,000,000 metres (2 shifts) 
4,177 tonnes (3 shifts) 
Capacity 
120 tonnes 
250,000 dozen 
3,500,000 meters 
30 tonnes 
4,000 boxes 
= The Consultative Committee is responsible for the carrying 
out of the Company's objectives and it is this Committee which 
implements the planning in a practical way., 
= There is no information on the limitation of official dutieso 
= Each Divisional Manager is responsible for the preparation of 
his own forecast budget~ using the unified accounting system. 
The actual accounting and preparation of the final balance sheet 
is done by the Accounting Division {see Table 16) o 
= Maintenance Forms which act as control documents for cost 
fixing a:;,:e used in the Maintenance Department, for all Company 
repaiz-s (see Table t7). 
This last fonn is sent from all the factOI"'J departments which are 
requesting repairs and renewals to the Maintenance Department o It 
is usually sent daily, and Table 18 shows the calculation of 
repair a.."ld renewal costs carried out in the Maintenance \Vorkshopo 
This sheet is sent from Maintenance to the Accounts Department 
(Costing) after re:oairs and renewals have been carried out., A 
copy is sent to the Technical Office Manager, the Organisation 
and Productivity Manager and to the Cost Accountanto The result 
of the Account Department's stu~ is presented to the Consultative 
....__ 
Committee for emendation and approval. 
= The Company does not use standard costing but actual costing. 
- Non-accounting control is still not integrated" 
-:- The Con:g;>any does not export, since all its products are 
consumed by the home marketo 
= The Companyv s problems are summarised as follows by the Acting 
General Managero 
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io Lack of co-ordination between divisions and between divisions 
and departments., 
2o No information system exists, preparing such a system is 
part of the duties of the Organisation and Productivity 
Division, but the inefficiency of this Department makes it 
impractical to ask them to perform such a task .. 
3.. Lack of correct co-operation among divisions and departments 
because of a tendency for some strong individuals to impose 
their influence on other members of the Campanyo This would 
mean that an infonnation system even if it did exist, would 
become inefficient or would prove impossible to apply in . 
practice .. 
= The abcve-mentioned Manager ascribed these 1 and other problems 
which af'±'ect the efficiency and effectiveness of the Company's 
productivity to "personnel factors".. The availability of an 
efficient Cadre, in the sense of a body of educated and 
experimentally minded people who have a real interest in serious 
work would be invaluable in overcoming problems and in achieving 
the Company's objectives., He believes that the appointment of 
productive cadres is dependent on the Administration Offices in 
the State Organisations, which are responsible for appointing 
suitable personnel. The inefficiency of the personnel officers, 
or their personal prejudice and lack of fairness in treating 
employees, will inevitably create an atmosphere of dissatisfaction 
• 
and jealousy, and a sense of under-privilege among workers. This 
t. 
situation will reflect on the control system ana finally on product-
ivity and efficiencyo The dependence of_the system of appointments 
( 123) 
on personal bias and favour bas also lead to a lack of trust 
between top management and the working force on all levels. 
This means that every instruction from top management will be 
questioned and not always accepted. This situation is one 
which would impede efficiency in any working environment and "" 
--
thus impair industrial success. 
Bo 7 Iraq Cement Public Company 
My visit to this Company was not the last on the schedule, 
but I have recorded it last in order to co-ordinate the sequence 
of information in this study of the obJectives, control systems 
and organisational structures of the seven industrial companies. 
Since this Company will be the subject of concentrated analysis 
in later chapter~, concentration will now centre an information 
received .from the questions (_ Exhibl.t 1). Info:r:mation about its 
establishment has alrea~ been given in Chapter I. 
The .following answers were received. .from the Assistant 
General Manager for Administration Affairs, the Accounts Divisional 
Manager and the Controlling Engineer. 
~ The CompaQY has clear objectives; the most important is to 
increase and develop production in order to satisfy the home 
demand for different cement products, and secondly to satisfy 
international demand for Iraqi Cement. 
~ The Company has not made a profit for two years because the 
prices of the products have remained the same since nationalisation. 
= As this Company is part of the public sector the profit motive 
is considered as secondary to the need to supply the market at a 
reasonable price. 
(124) 
= The Consultation Council for Industrialisation in the f'li.nistry 
of Industry ana Mine.; 9 which consists or Presl.dents of State 
Organisations and two Deputy Ministers and i!'l chaired. by the 
Ministeri is considered to be the highest managerial authorityo 
It has the power to determine short-term general objectives for 
the whole public industrial sector, after considering the reports 
of the Board's of Directors of the State Organisationso These 
Boards consist of the General Managers of public industrial 
companies belonging to the Organisation concernedp and each is 
headed by the President of the Organisationo Each board draws 
up its reports according to the views and ideas of the Public 
Industrial Committee's Consultative Boardo This Committee repre= 
sents the senior managerial level in the Company and consists of 
the General Managerp his two assistants and Divisional Managersp 
and representatives; one for the workers, another for the managerso 
The Consultative Committee crystalises its reports after combining 
its views ~.th the views and ideas of the Company's middle manage= 
ment levelso 
=The Company's objectives do not usually change rapidly - perhaps 
once a yearo 
= The revi~~ng of the Organisational Structure whenever there are 
changes in divisions and departments of the Company resulting from 
the current expansion (see Chart No. 5)o 
= The Organisational Structure exists to co-ordinate the work of 
the different managerial levels and the departments on each levelo 
It also exists-to limit and define the responsibility and authority 
of each positiono 
= In the Organisational Structure responsibility for success rests 
with the Consultative Comrnitteeo 
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= The Company prepares two kinds of account statements, a 
forecast (planning) at the beginning of each calendar year 1st 
Jan~ - 31st December), and a final general balance sheet at 
the end of each fiscal year (1st April = 31st March; see Table 
19) 0 
- Accounts are prepared by calculating machines, as in other ind-
ustrial Companies; computers are not emplqyed yeto 
= The planning budget is prepared by a committee which exists for 
this purpos·e and comprises the J\ccounts Manager, the Cost Account= 
antj) Chief Accounting Auditor, Productiun Manager and a stores 
official, and sometimes assistance is given by one of the .factory 
managerso This con:mittee takes into account the production 
schedule, sales, reajor machine stoppages, capital expenditure and 
raw material requirementso 
. = The general final balance sheet is prepared by the accounts 
divisiono 
= Every Divisional Manager is responsible for the preparation of 
his own forecast in co=operation with his departments and sections, 
there being no departmental accountanto 
= Table 20 shows one of the control forms, which is sent to the 
general manager dailyo Table 21 shows one of the fonns for raw 
material quality control. This illustrates the activities during 
each hour of the day's work and is sent daily to the Factory Manager 
with a copy to the Cost Department in the Accounts Divisiono 
- The Company does not use st~~dard cost procedures, but forecast 
accounting for comparison with actual costo 
= In order to control engineerir~ costs, there is a special form 
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for giving the energy consumption of each machine and its raw 
material consunption and this is filled in weekly by the 
Controlling Engineer, with a copy to the Technical Manager and 
General Manager. The Laboratory Department exercises quality 
control in line with International Standard Specifications, which 
are mainly taken fran British Cement Specifications. This depart-
ment presents its report daily to the Production Manager. In the 
event of a product batch not meeting the specifications, the 
Production Manager is asked to canbine this batch with another 
satisfactory batch, so that the result will be satisfactoryo 
- There is no manual which sets out the objectives of. each 
division. 
- There is no manual explaining to the foremen and supervisors 
how to achieve their objectives. 
~ Foremen and &upervisors are not responsible for the costs of 
their sectionso 
It is noteworthy that there are few cost department employees 
and their experience is Bmited since the department is less than 
three years old. 
- There is no written system to help supervisors, Department Heads 
or Division Heads to find out what is required of them. The daily 
work sequence together with specialised and general information, 
is sent occasionally from the organisational headquarters. This 
infar.mation, together with the general social development of the 
co1.mtry will define what is expected of each officer. 
( 127) 
Answers to General Questions 
- The easiest costing to control is actual costing or the 
comparison of the actual cost with the forecast. 
- Coeting is most difficult costing to control when purchase 
prices var,y, especially when the accounts department attempts 
to standardise them. 
- Much in1~ar.mation is available in magazines and publications 
issued by the llinistry of Industry and TIIines or the State 
Organisation. There are seminars, meetings of managers to 
exchange expertise, and in several cases information has been 
exchanged between all factory managers engaged in producing sim-
ilar items, since these are under the su.pervision of one State 
Organisation., 
-up to 1971 exports exceeded homecons~tion, but now the opposite 
is true, despite an increase in production. The reason for this is 
that home demand has increased faster than production. 
- Exports are not controlled by the sawe infor.mation system as that 
used in t:1e home market. Control is carried out by the State Export 
Organisation, part of the Ministry of :Tra.dee_: 
The Final QuestJ0n 
These :are, in conclusion, the problems which are suffered 
by the Company, and which are considered obstacles to affecti veness 
and efficiency. 
1 • There is a lack of capable technical and managerial staff 
on all levels. 
2. Raw materials frequently fall short of the standards required. 
\. 
\ 
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3. The need to keep machines working to meet home demand, 
often means that the maintenance department is unable 
to carry out routine maintenance work at the correct 
times, so that delays take place when overhaul becomes 
necessary. 
4e Sometimes suppliers of raw mate.rials, particularly of 
limestone, fail to fulfil obligations in terms of both 
quantity and quality. 
5o Shortage of financial incentives far workers leads to a 
decrease in enthusiasm for hard work. 
\ 
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SUMMARY OF CHAPl'ER II 
This Chapter is the result of field research carried out 
in Iraq. The research was carried out by interviews using a 
checklist of questionso The responses to the questions dis-
closed information concerning the current objectives of the 
Company, management structures, budgets, control reports, cost 
control, information systems, and how problems concerning the 
efficiency of the organisation were investigatedo This inform-
ation was obtained from all of the seven companies visited. 
In order to give an accurate picture of Iraqi industry as a 
whole, the researcher selected seven different industrial comp-
anies, which are representative of all the five state qualitative 
organisa~ions of industry in Iraq. 
In the first part of this Chapter l) I reviewed the structure 
and functions of' the Ministry of Industry and Mines in Iraq, 
which is specifically responsible for the implementation of object-· 
ives and the designation of Management Control Systems in the 
public industrial sector. 
In the second part I described how I collected information 
fran the field research on seven state industriel campanieso One 
of the purposes of this field research was to gain further inform-
ation on which to base more detailed questions in the later 
questionnaire (as shown in Chapter four). 
Respondents were selected so as to give a fairly wide range 
of answers to the questions. The following procedure was followed 
in order to conduct this part of the study. 
\ 
'· 
,··. 
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Firstly, I compiled a brief account of each industrial 
company, including information on its capital, location, products, 
productive capacity, and whether it had decided to expand its 
existing faotorieso 
Secondly, after preliminary analysis, the information I 
obtained fram ~ field research showed serious low productivity 
and an accumulation of losses in almost all the companies studiedo 
This was related to the lack of skilled manpower in the technical 
and managerial sides of the business, inefficiency in cost contol-
ling and iL the information system and the use of generally 
inefficient systems of controlo 
Thirdly, the writer expressed his personal observations and 
analysed the problems that presented obstacles to effective 
management in each company visitedo 
The aim of this Chapter was to present an accurate picture 
of the cur-,,ent managerial situation and the standard of the 
Management Control Systems followed in Iraqi state industry as a 
wholeo 
\ 
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The next chapter will contain two parts, the first 
part is to present an analytical survey of literature 
which is based on management control systems thaory 
and practice e The material of this part is drawn from 
literatur6 written by British or American authors. Part 
two will explain the managerial processes of the UoK. 
nationalised industries, and shows ideas and experience 
of management in state=owned enterprises in Eastern 
European countries. 
\ 
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CHAPTER III 
MANAGErY!ENT CONTROL SYSTEMS IN GENERAL 
The main purpose of the first part or this Chapter is to 
present an analytical survey of the literature, based on 
accepted views of management control, cost control and training. 
In the second part, the survey is extended to preBent some ideas 
from British Nationalized industries and also to draw on Eastern 
European experience, which has some relevance to the managerial 
situation in Iraq. This will enable inferences in Management 
Control theory and the practices established by the two field 
researches carried out in Iraq in the manner described in the 
second and fourth Chapters. One of these investigations con-
cerned the Iraq Cement Public Company, and its results will be 
analysed in Chapter four, while the other, dealing with selected 
Iraqi public industrial companies, was discussed in Chapter two. 
The resUlts of these investigations and the differences between 
accepted theory and actual practice should point the way in 
which the Iraq Cement Public Company, in particular, and Iraqi 
State Industries in general, ought to develop. This conclusion 
will be formulated in Chapter five. 
The material in part one of this Chapter is drawn from 
literature written by British or American authors. The ideas 
represent the practices of western developed ou~tries regarding 
Management Control Systems. Part two considers ideas and 
practices of Management in Nationalized industries in the U.K. 
and in S~=owned enterprises in Eastern European Countries. 
\ 
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PART ONE: The Experience of Western Developed Countries with 
Management Control: 
1.A What are Management Control Systems? 
If we accept the simplified definition of management as getting 
things done through people, of control as the monitoring of plans 
to achieve objectives, and of a system as the procedure used to 
achieve end results, then the term "Management Control System" is 
necessaril.f defined as: The procedure for monitoring plans to 
achieve objectives through people. This means that such systems 
cannot simply spring into being, but must be designed to meet the 
needs of individual organisations. Many writers connect control 
with planning, i.e. there can be no control without at least the 
recognition of the need for a plan to achieve objectives, although 
the opposite is not true.( 1) Management control therefore depends on 
the simple principle of producing a plan, monitc=ing performance 
against the plan, and then making decisions and taking action. This 
is a continuous process carried out in each centre of responsibil-
ity, and provides data for improving future plans. R. Ackoff says: 
It was incorrectly assumed by many that planning neces-
. sarily implies a strong centralised government or management 
and it has only recently been understood that planning, 
like problem solving, can ·serve any political or organis-
ational philosophy. It can increase the effectiveness of 
either a decentralised democracy or a centralised auto-
cracy. (2) 
The question is, do the control systems at the various units and 
sub-units of the ors~isation meet the needs of the overall plan? 
R. Anthony(3) postulates that the Management Control System operates 
within the given conditions determined by strategic planning, and 
that the management.control process is intended to make possible 
\ 
the achievement of planned objectives as effectevely and effie-
(136) 
iently as possible within this framework. According· to his 
definitionjl Management Control System is : 
The process by which managers assure that resources 
are obtained and used effectively and efficiently 
in the accomplishment of the Organisation 1 s objectives a 
Anthony believes that Control Systems must, therefore, be derived 
from the needs of the total organisation and are intended to 
influence managers to actions which are both in their own and the 
Organisation's best interests. He differentiates between Management 
Control System and Operational Control on the groWlds that Management 
Control Sy~tem is "people" orientated, has lower scientific standards 
to compare performance, is subjective, being determined by the judg~ 
ment and feeling of human beings, and is appropriate. to the whole 
of any unit, whereas operational control is ~ational" objective, 
is subsumed by Management Control Systems because it is formulated 
in the Mansgement Control process, and is appropriate to individual 
tasks. He includes the topics of information handling and financial 
accounting, which he feels do not form part of the main framework, 
but nevertheless have relevance. Anthony compares the control 
process to the nervous system in living organisms and compares 
management control to the cerebral cortex, finally suggesting 
that his analysis "should be related to systems theory or 
cyberneticsooeo 
Many academics in natural and applied sciences have written 
on general systems theory. No doubt their findings are academic-
ally sound and scientfically rigorous, but whether they can be 
applied in a social organisation is open to serious doubt .. 
Von Bertalanfy--(~) admits that general systems theory has "obvious 
limitations, different approaches and legitimate criticisms." 
(137) 
(5) Boulding, whilst accepting the validity of Von 
Bertanlanffy's approach, nevertheless prefers a second approach, 
which is, "The management of theoretical systems and constructs 
in a hierarch,y of complexity leading to a 'system of systems'." 
He claims that this is more systematic than Von Bertalanffy 0s 
approach, but does not replace it. He outlines nine levels of' 
systems from "frameworks".(The anatany of the Universe) to cells, 
plants, the human level and finally the social organisation. He 
admits that beyond the fourth level we have not the rudiments of 
theoretical systems, in the face of living systems we are help~ 
less, and science does itself a disservice by its unwill~gness 
. "To admit the very low level of its success in systemisation". 
Russel Ackoff( 6) , in trying to clarify a solution for 
management systems, admits that a capable system must perform 
four functions : 
1. Identifying problems 
2. Making the best decisions 
3. Controlling the decisions made, and 
4.. Providing the infonnation required to perform each 
of the first three functions. 
B. Towards a Definition: Some Features of Management Control 
Since the early works of Fayol, Taylor, Follet and Weberll 
writers have been analysing the manager's job and there seems to 
be broad agreement about the functions despite the countless 
definitions. For instance, E. Brech(7) saya, 
The true. nature of control in business is frequently 
misunderstood. He blames this partly on the ambigaty 
\ 
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of the word, and partly on the difficulty of getting 
a comprehensive picture of the way control operates. 
Some believe the word "control" to be frequently 
associated with restrictions or restraint, but he 
considers that control in management has a positive 
meaning. 
Brech defines Management Control as : 
Guiding and regulating the activities of a business 
o.r any of its parts by means of management judgment, 
decision and action for the purpose of attaining 
agreed objectives." · 
Po Drucker in his book Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, 
(8) 
Practices, c1escribed sane features on Management ControL He 
distinguished between the two words "control" and "controls" o 
In his opinion, the two words have totally distin~t meanings in 
the context of social institutions. He said : 
The sy:1onyms for controls are measurement and information ••• 
The synonym for control is direction, contro:Ls pertain 
to means, control to an end. Controls deal with facts, 
that is with events of the past. Control deals with 
expectations, that is with the future. Contr~ls are 
analytical, ccncerned with what was and is. Control 
is normative and concerned with what is exi>ected t<:> be. 
Drucker emphasised that Management Control draws upon many areas 
of management science, which in turn is able to use an increasing 
number of new tools and practices as a result of the computer 
revolution, as well as the longer established skills of accounting 
and finance. These new tools include systems theory, PERT/CfM, 
operations research, decision theory, simulation, information 
systems, Cybernetics, electronic data processing and behavioural 
science. He asked what these improved techniques mean for control. 
It seems that there is a need to beware of too many controls and too 
little control. 
To Jerome's definition of Management Control is that it is ,< 9) 
Some sort of systematic effort to compare current perf-
ormance to a predetermined plan or objective, presmnably 
to take any remedial action required. 
(139) 
I 
I 
I 
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A studied comparison of Anthony's definition with that of Jerome 
shows that they agree in many respects. Mockler ( 10) shows a 
comprehensive understanding of management control as defined by 
Jerome and Anthony, when he de6cribes it as, 
A systematic effort by business management to compare 
performance to predetermined standards, plans or 
objectives in order to determine whether performance 
is in line with these standards, and presumably in 
order to take any remedial action required to see that 
human and other corporate resources are being used 
in the most effective and efficient wa:y possible in 
achieving corporate objectives. 
2.A Analysis of Managerial Behaviour in an Open System 
Recent attempts to apply aspects of general systems theory 
to the study of organisations have provided a useful context for 
the analysis of managerial behaviouro This is not the place for a 
complete review and analysis of "systems theory'•, but certain 
characteristics of open systems have useful implications in regard 
to managerial behaviour in organisations. 
Numerous authors have elucidated the general characte1·istics 
of open systems (Katz and Kahn, 1966; Litterer, 1969). The follow-
1ng list of dimensions has been liberally adapted from Litterer 
(1969, pp. 3 - 6)( 11 ): 
1. A system is comprised of interrelated subjects, 
attitudes and events. This interrelatedness has 
clear implications for organisational members in 
general and for organisational leaders in particular. 
Since "a change in any one (objects, attitudes or 
events) means sane adjustment or change in the others", 
\ 
See Anthony's definition on page 137. 
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survival of an individual or group within a system 
is dependent on a certain min~al sensitivity to 
the activities in other parts of the organisation. 
2o The whole (a complete cycle of events) is greater 
than the sum of its individual parts. Wholeness 
implies that effective behaviour within an organ-
isation may require some understanding of how the 
whole system, as opposed to its components, resp-
onds and reacts to internal and external stimuli., 
The direct implication of this wholeness is that 
even complete understanding of a single subsystem 
will not necessarily contribute to the under-
standing of how the interrela~ed parts of the larger 
system impinge on one another and on the system as 
a whole. 
3. A system seeks an equilibidum around a goal or a set 
of goals., As Buckley( 12) pointed out, system equil-
ibrium is dynamic rather than static. Goals and sets 
of goals change in time, and the system responds to 
changes by establishing a new equilibrium. As Litterer 
argues, the apparent stability of systems is a character-
istic of the whole rather than of its parts. 
4. A system is essentially self-regulating, individual 
properties or elements can be changed to move towards 
equilibrium. The internal components of a system are 
constantly in a state of flux as a result of the dynamic 
equilibrium and of their own interdependence. This 
suggests that adjustment, control, and learning are 
( 141) 
crucial processes within an organisation, and that 
organisation members are routinely afrected by the 
movement within the system. 
5o Systems receive inputs from other sy~tcms and produce 
outputs needed by other systems. In other wards, 
systems are dependent on one another. Not only are the 
components of.larger systems interrelated, but systems 
are interrelated with other systems as wello This 
suggests that the boundaries between systems are 
etten Un.clear and that members of one system will, to 
varying degrees, have to respond to the activities and 
events transpiring in adjacent systems. 
6. The output of a system differs :from the inputs. The 
cycle of events produces a trans..:'onnation. The trans-
:formation process approximates to the more trad~tional 
definition of the work :flow in an organisation. 
1. The systems are nested within systems, creating a 
hie.:archy. ·.rhis kind o:f hierarchy should not be confused 
with formal organisational hierarchies , which rigidly 
derine authority and function. Subsystems are nested within 
larger systems, and they m~ be isolated for convenience 
in analysis, but in reality the open system consists of 
interdependent components. 
8. Open systems receive inputs of information and energy 
from the environment, and they have a teno.ency to run 
down. Negative entropy can be accumulated, however. 
The more differentiated the elements of a system and 
\ 
the more systematically they are arranged, the greater 
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is the negative entropy. There are two very important 
aspects to this characteristic: firstly, increasing 
infozmation decreases entropy (as does the importation 
of energy), hence the tendency of systems in genercl 
to seek to gather reserves of information, and 
secondly, increased differentiation and integration= 
9. An initial state can yield several possible final 
states, and the same final state ~ be preceded by 
several possible initial states (equifinality). 
Equifinality suggests a certain amount of flexibility 
in terms of causality. That is, uncertainty will 
flourish in an open system unless, as Kats and Kahn 
(1966) suggest, regulatory mechanisms are generated 
for the purposes of control. 
1 0. Systems typically become more differentiated and 
complex over a period of time. Simply put, special-
ised units appear, over a pericd of time, to take 
care of different problems that the system faces. 
If the organisation is viewed as an open ~stem possessing 
these ten characteristics, the vital nature of information about 
the system becomes apparent. A system must somehow translate 
variety into order. So it engages in an encOding process and 
develops rules for reducing variety to a usable commodity. For 
individuals within the system, however, 
Norms and values, and hence rules and institutional 
structure in general, do not specify concrete behav-
iours; t.hey are more or less general rules or guides, 
\ 
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and do not contain enough 'information' to specify 
the detailed operation of the system or to 'map' 
more than a small part of the 'variety' of the 
environment or the internal system. (13) 
In a formal organisation the "manager" is a "head" or 
designated leader. ( 14) By virtue of his role as a forrnal control 
point in an open system he must deal constantly with information 
of various types and in some way come to grips with his organ-
isation as a system. Visualising the manager as a member of an 
open system is not newo The Caveat attached to many research 
efforts based on the leader-group dimension is that leadership 
must be vie~ed in the context of the system. Unfortunately, this 
is seldom done, probably because of the difficulty of measuring 
the properties of a system. Nonetheless, theoretical statements 
about the systemic nature of the manager's job are prevalent, 
and A.K. Rice in his book, The Enterprise and its Bnvironment, 
provides some stimulating explanations. The job of a manager is 
analagous tu a "control centre" in the cybernetic model( 15) (see 
figure 3, p, 145). Each manager attempts to maintain the perform-
ance of his ov.n subsystem by taking actions and assessing the 
effects of those actions in relation to his goal parameters. A 
crucial component of such assessment is "Information gathering 
on output effects." As A. K. Rice( 16) put it, 
The primary task of leadership is to m~age the 
relations between an enterprise and its environment 
so as to permit -ontimal·performance of the primary 
task of the enteXprise~- For an enterprise the 
environment consists of its total political, social 
and economic surrounding, for a part of an enterprise 
the environment includes the other parts and the whole. 
Secondly~ -because the organisation is a set of interdependent 
parts, the maintenance of the activity of a subsystem is dependent 
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upon the behaviour of other subsystems (and indeed other systems). 
"A manager rarely controls all the resources needed to do whatever 
has been assigned to him,< 17) especially as regards other subsystems. 
It is therefore logical that most formal leaders must maintain many 
relationships throughout their system and its environment. As 
Sayles pointed out, these relationships are not "optional, extra, 
or necessary as good human relations, they are an integral part 
of the administrative task." (iB) Thirdly 11 as Buckley, indicated, 
nor.ms and institutional structures in general are inadequate to 
specify concrete behaviours within a syst.em. A manager (Leader) 
in a system must, then, specify much of his activity for himself. 
Sayles( 19) put this succinctly: 
The individual manager does not have a clearly bounded 
job with neatly defined authorities and responsibilities. 
Rather he is placed in the middle oi a system of relation-
ships, out of whicll he must fashion an organisation that 
will accrnnplish his objectiveso 
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I Goal 
Control I para.11eters 
( ,~-----Centre sl . Feed back 
: Test(4) 
(2) 
(5) 
Action outputs 
. » 
Corrective actio~J 
Information 
gathering on 
~-----------• output effects 
(3) 
Figure 3 
The general cybernetic model of the Error -
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Effects on 
system 
and 
Environment 
Be The Formal Leader (Manager) as a Monitor of Information 
in Organisations. 
It is a basic assumption that information is a crucial 
component in an organisational system and that information gather-
ing is an essential part of the manager's job. Buckley ( 21 )(1967), 
in his discussion of systems theory, said, 
whereas the relations among components of mechanical 
systems are a function primarily of' special and temp-
oral considerations and the transmission of energ$ 
from one component to another, the interrelations 
characterising higher levels (of organised complexity) 
comes to depend more and more on the transmission of 
information - a principle fundamental to modern 
complex system analysis. 
Katz and Kahn( 22) argued that leaders (managers) at various 
levels in the organisational hierarcny engage in different leader~ 
ship procese.es which require different cognitive and effective 
abilities and skills, specifically top ecl1elon managers deal with 
the organisation of structure (change, creation and elimination 
of structm·e) and utiJ.ise a "system perspective", managers at 
inter.mediate levels engage in the interpolation of structure ' 
(supplementing and piecing out of structure) and utilise a ''sub-
system perspective", and managers at lower levels engage in ad.min-
istration of structure (use of existing structure) and utilise 
technical knowledge and their understanding of systems of ruleso 
(23) Allen and Gerstberger have shovm that, for engineers, 
the perceived accessibility of information channels is related to 
their utilisation. Technical quality was related to acceptance 
of the information. The implication is that the longer a manager 
has been involved with the system, the more likely it is that 
new information channels have become accessible, and that some 
channels have been eliminated because of low quality. 
( 146) 
They admitted thatg 
The fundamental paradox facing a formal leader over 
time is the establishment of causal networks without 
closing himself off from new kinds of informationo 
Resolution of this paradox by the individual manager 
may be the clue to effective performanceo 
Katz and Kahn argued that multiple comnnmication channels 
and check procedures provide the manager with a mecr~nism, 
with which to avoid corrupting or being corrupted by his own 
information serviceo Many theorists have tried to analyse the 
effects of uncerta.inty on organisation9 aogo Lawrence and 
Lorsch 9 1967, Thompson, 1967, Perrow, 1970o Uncertainty in the 
environment affects organisations through the organisational 
members who respond to it 9 usually the managerial personnel firsto 
The cognitive approach to leadership would suggest that a 
manager could experience uncertainty, in any or a11 of the spheres 
of the leadership process, he may be uncertain about what to 
monitor, he may not lmow what effects changes in his environment 
will, have, or he may not know what actions he should take in 
response to changes (or he may not be able to take the actions he 
feels are necessary)o One might see the effects of environmental 
uncertainty in shorter cycle lengths for information monitored 
in the environment and increased cognitive differentiation in 
regard to the uncertain informationo This in turn might cause 
measurable organisational increase in sub-unit differentiation and 
\ 
( 147) 
more formal attempts at subwlit integration (Lawrence and Lorsch, 
1967). It might also be reflected in leas structuring of the 
formal organisation in order to permit more experimentation in 
action. The si~e of sub-units, may have important consequences 
for leadership. To the extent that increased size also increases 
the difficulty of accurate causal mapping and the amount of 
information about the group that the manager must monitor, it may 
reduce the ~bili ty of the manager to deal with the larger system 
adequatelye If the task is routine, size may have no serious 
consequencen, but for complex tasks the impact of increased 
cognitive wnrk on the part of the manager m~ be dramatic. The 
quality of relations between the manager and his group, may also 
ha~e detrimental effects on managerial effectiveness. If poor 
relations force the manager to depend on bureaucratic eources of 
information and to rely on documents, or to attend to information 
about the group at the expense of other kinds of inf'CII:'mation, then 
the manager cannot cope effectively with the management system in 
which his group is embedded. 
C. Designing the Overall System 
From the discussion in the previous sections it is apparent 
that the information and behavioural subsystems are mutually depend-
ent. This dependence arises from the feedback relationship exist-
ing between them. Any changes in one will have repercussions on 
the other, and vice versa. The critical factor, from the point of 
view of the overall system, is the nature of the feedback relation-
ship between the two subsystems, that is, whether it is complementary 
or conflicting. A complementary relationship enhances the chances 
for the increased effectiveness of the system, while a conflicting 
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relationship will cause bottlenecks within the system. 
There is nothing new in the idea that the increased 
efficiency of the system is dependent upon how well its parts 
are integrated. Systems theorists have long maintained that 
the effectiveness of the whole depends upon how well the parts 
of the whole perform together, that is, the system ae a whole 
performs best when its component parts are in a compatible and 
harmonious relationship to each othero 
Although the idea of the internal consistency of parts is 
not new to general systems theor,y, its application to organis= 
ational systems has been steadily iv~reasi~g in ~ecent yearso 
Writers on organisation theory are today taking into consider-
ation a number of factors and their relationships in predicting 
organisational effectivenesso This system's view of organisational 
effectiveness is called the "Contingency approach". It is embodied 
in the writings of people such as Joan Woodward, Lawrence and 
Lersch, R. Boyce and D. Ne'Wlllan. ( 24) 
Each of these writers has pointed out the importance of 
considering factors such as technology, environment, and task 
structure, and their interaction with other organisational factors, 
in predicting organisational effectiveness. The need for consist-
ency or compatibility in the variance control system means 
designing the system so that the infonnation and behavioural 
subsystems are in a harmonious relationship. Changes in one of 
the subsystems without. requisite changes in the other may not 
lead to the desired results. For example, no matter how sophia= 
ticated the information system, it will not be effective if 
introduced in a non-responsive behavioural climate. Likerti for 
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example has pointed out the need for intenally consistent control 
systems as follows : ( 25) 
Experiments in organisation must involve internally 
consistent changes •••• Every aspect of a managerial 
system is related to every other part and interacts 
with' ~t. The results obtained by altering a 
single variable or nrocedure while keeping all 
others the same usually will lead to q_uite different 
results from those obtained when that variable is 
changed along Vv-ith simultaneous and compatable 
changes in all other aspects of the management 
system. The true influence of altering one aspect 
of a system cannot be determined by varying it and 
it alone. 
As Boyce( 26) pointed out~ there are a number of distinct 
stages involved in developing a fully integrated control system~ 
viz: 
i. Design of the control system. 
2. Analysis of the "capabilities" of the enterprise. 
3. Development of standards. 
4. Preparation of the overall financial plan. 
5. Establishment of dynamic control. 
Although the importance of the first stage has already been 
discussed, it is worthwhile to place it in its logical seq_uence, 
which is as follows : 
(a) Establish the information and control needs. 
(b) Ident~ the key factors. 
(c) Study the control system in relation to the Company's 
organisational structure, and vice versa. 
(d) Desi~ the overall reporting system. 
(e) Evaluate the preliminary design. 
(f) Design individual control reports. 
(g) Design data collection procedures. 
(h) Instal, de-bug and operate. 
( 150) 
AsP. Drucker( 27) put it, to give the manager control, 
controls must satis~y seven specifications. They must be: 
economical" 
= meaningful" 
appropriate, 
congruent, 
timely, 
simple, and 
= operational. 
He added:( 2B) 
In designing controls for an organisation one has to 
understand and analyse the actual control of the 
business, its people's decisions. otherwise one 
designs a system of controls which does not lead to 
control. One has to realis~ that even the most 
powerful 1 instrument board 1 , complete with computers, 
operations research, and simulation, is secondary to 
the invisible, qualitative control ~f any h~an 
organisation, its systems of rewards and punishments, 
of values and taboos. 
So ~~y successful manager must lea~n to depend ~~on his own 
judgment in setting objectives and goals, upon his ability to 
request thP- most needed feedback or control infonnation, upon his 
ability to interpret and utilise this up-to-date information for 
sound decisions. Without proper control information, all the 
planning and vigorous direction of an intelligent executive will 
be ineffective. 
3.A. Management Accounting Techniques 
The ever increasing demands of economic and technological 
achievements place a heavy burdon on the men who manage t odey- 1 s 
business enterprises and on the· management accounting systems 
upon which they depend. The latter have had to develop from the 
simplistic techniques o~ 20 years ago into a far more profound 
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and science-based approach to administrationa Eo Caplan( 29 ) 
indicated the logical objectives of management accounting, when 
he saw that its two major functions should be: 
1 o That Management Accounting should be related to 
fiduciary responsibility, which is concerned with 
"keeping track of' things", and answering such 
questions as, "Did we get what we paid for?" and 
i 
He added, that costing "Do we still have it?" 
0 
techniques which are primarily designed to provide 
c0st and inventory data for financial statement 
purposes might also be included under the heading 
of' fiduciary accountingo 
2a That Management Accounting should furnish inform-
ation which is useful as a basis for decision -
making at all levels of the organisation. This 
function provides managers with the data required 
for planning, co-ordinating, and controlling 
activities. But it also includes the operation of 
a system which assists in motivating individuals to 
make and implement those decisions that will lead to 
the accomplishment of the organisation's goalso 
He concluued that Management Accounting plays an important role 
in influencing behaviour at all the various stages of the manag-
ement process, including 
(a) The se~ting of goals, 
(b) Inf'onning individuals what they must do to contribute 
to the acccmplishment of these goals, 
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(c) Motivating desirable performance, 
(d) Evaluating perfonnance, and 
(e) Suggesting when corrective actions must be takeno 
Recent i.rends by business towards decentralisation and 
profit centres have accentuated the need for better and more 
timely information as a basis for management decisionse 
Since traditional aecounting techniques have alw~s satisfied 
this management requirement, the role of accounting, during 
the last few years has begun to ohangeo R. Ca.Dij!)bell ( 30) made 
the foll<ming observation about the changing role of accounting: 
In the last decade we have seen a decided change in 
the role of accounting. At one ti:ne accounting was 
primarily a technique for measuring income and fin-
ancial condition, while this objective has not 
become any less broadened in recent years to include 
oth1.r objectives. The scientific management move-
ment in industl"'J has placed emphasis upon factual 
accounting information as a basis for management 
decisions. This is sometimes referred to as manage-
ment accountL~g. 
In an article written approximately 10 years after Campbell's 
observation, R.L. BrU!IUllet(3i) contends that the role of management 
accounting is related to management objectives. He s~s 
The conventional role of Management .Accounting is 
one of assisting in the articulation of Management 
objectives, and then of providing feedback of perf-
ormance information to assist in monitoring progress 
toward such objectives. 
B. Responsibility Centres 
While the profit centre concept is used primarily for profit 
making organisations in private indust~, it is only one of a 
number of responsibility centres. According to ~ Anthony(32 ) 
'\\ 
e1s3> 
.A responsibility centre is simply an organisation unit 
headed by a responsible person. The centre is responsible 
for performing some function, which is its output, and for 
using resources, or inputs, as efficiently as possible in 
performing this functiono 
Anthcmy further states that there are three types of responsibility· 
centres: 
io Expense Centres 
2., Profit Centres, and 
3o Investment Centres, which can be defined as follows 
ExPense Centres 
If the control system measures the expenses incurred by an 
organisation unit, but does not measure the monetary value of 
its output, the unit is an expense centreo 
Profit Centres 
If the performance of a responsibility centre is measured in 
terms of both the revenue it earns and the cost it incurs, it is 
called a profit centre. 
Investment Centres 
Centres where the supervisor is responsible not only for profit 
but also for the assets he useso 
In identifying expense centres, Anthony puts fozward the 
argument that managerial cost control techniques can be as affective 
in Governmental operations as they are in private industry. 
J.,L. Brown and L.R. Howard(33) distinguished between two 
methods of cost accounting: 
1 o The calculation of the cost of a product after it has 
been _c;::_ompleted; this can be referred to as historical 
costing. 
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2. The detailed estimation of the cost of a product 
before it is manufactured, so that expenditure can 
be controlled during production; on completion, the 
actual result can be compared with the estimate, and 
variances ascertained and investigated. This method 
oan be referred to as pre-determined or standard 
costing. 
C. Standard Costing and Budgetary Cont:&;·ol 
Before arriving at a definition, Brown and Howard argued 
that when historical cost figures are analysed carefully they 
may be useful in relJledying past results, but mistakes and 
inefficiencies are not discovered until after the damage is done. 
They considered that information of· this type is an aid to 
management, but is not as valuable as it might be for the 
follov>i.ng reasons 
1. ~ne data are not presented to management until 
some considerable time has elapsed, so that 
management is unable to take the necessary 
corrective action at the proper time. 
2. No suitable yard stick is provided by which 
management can measure actual perfonnance.(34) 
Standard costing is one of the most recently developed 
refinements of cost accounting and has been widely adopted 
because it is so effective in providing the info~ation needed 
for control. It may be defined basically as : 
A teclmique of cost accounting which compares the 
'standard cost' of each product or service with the 
actual cost, to determine the efficiency of the op-
eration, so that any remedial action may be taken 
immediately. (35) 
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The 'standard cost' is "a predetennined cost which detezmines 
what each product or service should cost under given circum= 
stances." 
'Variance' is "the difference between a budgeted or 
standard amount and the actual amount during a given period. " 
As Brown and Hmvard said - st~~dard costing involves : 
1. Setting standards. 
2. Ascertaining actual results. 
}o Comparing standards and actual costs to determine 
the variances. 
4. Investigating the variances a.zY-1 taking any approp-
riate aotion. 
The writers concluded that although budgetar,y control and 
standard costing are similar systems by virtue of their forward 
looking nature, a major difference between the two is that while 
budgetary control is concerned with comparison of estimated and 
actual re.sul ts in a department, company, or larger unit, standard 
costing is concerned with comparison of the estimated and actual 
results of manufacturing a product or providing a service. Never 
theless both systems are clearly valuable to management cost control 
procedures., 
A bud.get is uaually defined in accounting literature as a 
"financial plan for the future". Some writers in the field 
describe the following :principal; steps in what is referred to as 
the "budgetary control 11 process. (36) 
1. Preparation of a plan consistent with the goals of 
the business. 
2o Review, discussion, and adjustment of the plan as 
needed to facilitate its accomplishment. 
\ 
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3e Communication of sub-sections of the plan to 
responsibility centres within the organisationo 
4o Comparison of actual performance with planned resultso 
5o Analysis and explanation of variances from the plan. 
6o Corrective action where significant unfavourable 
variances occur between planned and actual perfannanceo 
Budgeting is a method of translating the goaJ.s: of an organ-
isation into operational terms, disseminating these goals to the 
appropriate decision-makers, and facilitating, co-ordinating, and 
controlling the actions of the various sub-units within the organ-
isation. We have noted in the previous sections, that control 
includes the measurement, evaluation and correction, where necess~, 
of the contributions of organisation participants. Budgeting cont-
ributes to control by providing objectives against which performance 
results can be measuredo For example, the perfonnance of a depart-
ment head can be evaluated in terms of' his ability to achieve certain 
desired results as specified by the budgP.t and within the cost 
oonst:-:-~ints imposed ?Y the budget. 
J. Machin, (37) described the functions of a budget, as, 
a necess~ management control system in an organisation 
of' any size but it is not sufficient. In any department 
where every input and every output cannot be satisfactorily 
quantified and shown in a common time span {;md that is, 
in fact, every department of any organisation), it is less 
wholly relevant. In any department where the majority of 
inputs and outputs cannot be satisfactorily costed or valued, 
a budgetary control system may well induce dysfunctional 
decision making by the manager in charge of the department 
if used for the wrong purpose. 
Dew and Gee(38) suggested six conditions for effective 
budgeting control, as follows : 
\ 
\ 
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'i o In so far as the managers are expected to act on 
the in!' ormation provided, management, authority 
and responsibility must be clearo 
2o AB the system depends on predetermined standards a."'ld. 
budgets, and the periodical measurement of perf~ce 
for comparison with such standards 11 the managers must 
have accepted the standards as being reasonable and 
attainableo 
3o Budgetary control information must be understood by 
the managers, and, hopefully, understood as it was 
meant to be by the individuals who produced ito 
4o As some training or education in the use and value 
of budgetary control systems is req,uired, whether 
gained on formal courses or simply by experience, 
this training must be adequate o 
5o As the budgeting control information flow will be 
affected by the suitability of the management 
accounting organisation, this organisation must be 
appropriate o 
6o Managers must understand the purposes of the budgetary 
system in order to take appropriate action on the basis 
or the ini~ormation providedo 
Do Responsibility Reporting 
The trends towards decentralisation, responsibility centres, 
etco, created the need for new accounting measurement systems to 
identif,y the expenses and revenues of various organisational units 
within the firmo Anthony adroitly distinguishes between tradition-
( 158) 
al product cost accounting and re~onsibility accounting when he 
In product cost accounting, costs are accumulated in ter.ms 
of products or programs. In responsibility accounting, (~ ) 
costs are accumulated in terms of managt:ment responsibility-;9 
~ Campbell describes responsibility reporting as a method 
for providing information for management control. He writes 
One concept that has received a great deal of attention 
is responsibility reporting. The objective here is to 
identify results with the executive responsible for 
producing them. Responsibility involves performance 
measurement, in which actual results are compared with 
pre-determined standards. This can be accomplished by 
introducing account classifications that parallel the 
Comp~1Y's organisation plan in order that reports m~ be 
prepared to shew, in fin~cial terms, the results of the 
operations for which each individual is responsible. (40) 
J. Stallman also describes responsibility accounting as a 
means of providing information for man~ement control, when he 
states : 
Industrial accountants generally perceive the control 
of operations of- their firm to be a significant part 
of their accounting systems procedures and reports 
which together are variously kncwn1 as 'responsibility 
. accounting' - 'performance reporting' - 'budgetary 
control' and so forth. (41) 
In their book entitled Management Control Systems, 
Anthony, Dearden, and Vancil contend that management accounting 
techniques can and should be utilised in Government operations. 
Non-profit making organisations can use many of the 
control practices described in this book, although 
they so far have been slow to do so. They can adopt 
the concept of the responsibility centre. They have 
many opportunities to create 'profit centres' that 
sell products or services to other units within the 
organisation. They can use flexible budgets (although 
many of them do not need to do so because of the relative 
certainty of their volume estimates.) They can use 
standard-cost, and can segregate efficiency variances 
\ 
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from the variances attributable to price, volume, or 
mix. They can set selling prices by estimating full 
costs including, in same circumstances, the cost of 
capitaL .Above all, they can intrCiduce the spur of 
competition among similar units within the organis-
ation and between an internal unit such as, a 
maintenance department, and its counterpart in the 
·private sector (42). 
From the top management and middle management point of view, 
it is essential that results be expressed in financial terms ancl 
related to the overall plans of the Companyo It becomes the 
responsibility of' the accounting section, therefore, to convert 
the accumulating daily information into financial terms in so far 
as these are valuable for guiding management decisions. Although 
most f'inancial reports are on a weeJdy basis, decisions rm.lst depe!Jd 
upon the immediate needs of the sit~ationo 
4.A Organisation 
Organisational ability has always been a feature of mankind 
and ha3 been responsible for many of man's achievements. The 
magnificent constructions of the ancient world, the pyramids 
and the hanging gardens of' Babylon, for instance, clearly required 
the organisation of large bodies of' men. Creat armies like those 
of Nebuchadnazzar, Alexander the Great, and Julius Caesar were also 
superbly organised, and further evidence of man's organisational 
ability is offered by the Churches, the military and political 
states. With the passage of time this accumulated experience 
was held on record to guide those who came after. 
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During the Industrial Revolution, management organisation 
was planned in an increasingly systematic way. Writers on 
scientific management, such as Taylor, Gant., Gilbraith and their 
successors, assembled the information into a usable body of know-
ledge, which today has widespread application. This body of 
knowledge, created both from personal experience and individual· 
theories, enables the organisational problems arising from both 
economic and non-economic objectives to be solved with increasing 
success. 
The s~orvival and -prosperity of a commercial unit have come 
to depend on increasingly complex factors, no longer remaining 
simply the problems of an ov.ner, or manager adjusting to the 
demands of a market. Modern management, although largely 
separate from ownership, has nevertheless to take the owners' 
interests into account as well as market fluctuations, competitors, 
technolog:r, labour unions and international politcs, when : making 
its 4ecisions. Clearly only a sophisticated planning organisation 
makes it possible to deal with this multitude of factors. 
The importance of ,organisational planning increases with the 
size of the compahy as the head of an operational unit becomes 
further removed from his headquarters, i.e. as his control over 
the policies which affect him is reduced. Similarly, headquarters 
staff responsible for policies and procedures are increasingly less 
aware of the feel of the situation. Incre~sing size has also meant 
the introduction of the staff specialist, possibly with long chains 
of command behind him, and the divergence between his advisory 
position to the line a;~d the need to get his iG.eas accepted and 
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carried out 9 puts him in a dilemmao Finally 9 more systematic 
organisational structuring is required to make a success of increasing 
executive participation at all levels tr~ough the delegation of 
decision-makingo 
Bo What is an Organisation? 
Co Barnard defined organisation simply as: 
A comprehensive system of co~operative human activities. (43) 
Eo Dale's definition of org-d..nisation planning is: 
The process of defining and grouping the activities of the 
enterprise so that they may be most logically assigned and 
effectively executedo It is conc~r~ed with the establish-
ment of relationships among th~ ~its so as to further the 
objectives of the enterpris.e. \44) 
Koontz and O'Donnell (1959) in their book 9 Principles of 
Management, considered Organisation to be the establishment of 
authority relationships 9 with provisions for structural co-ord.= 
ination both vertically and horizontally, between positions to 
which have been assigned specialised ta~ks required for the 
achievement of enterprise objectiveso 
It is thus the structural relationship which binds an 
enterprise together 9 and is the framewo~k within which individual 
effort. is co~ordinatedo If we examine the above definitions we 
find five points that are common to all oTganisations: 
1 o An organisation always includes persons. 
2o These persons are involved with one another in some way = 
that is they interacto 
3o These interactions can always be ordered or described 
by some sort of structureo 
4o Each-~erson in the organisation has personal objectives, 
some of which are the reasons for his actions, He expects 
'\ 
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that participation in the organisation will help to 
achieve his_ objectives. 
5. These interactions can also help individuals to 
achieve compatible joint objectives, perhaps diff- (45 \ erent from· but related to their personal objectives. 1 
The nature of the structure and the particular processes of 
interaction will vary from one organisation to another. However, 
persons interact fo~ objectives in every organisation, and this 
interaction can always be described by some type of structure. 
Where formal organisations are concerned, structure is likely to 
be recognised as a primary feature, but in the case of informal 
organisations the structure is likely to be less important. No doubt 
the working elements determine the quality of ineractions. Members 
interacting make an organisation, but the working elements make it 
effective o~· ineffective. Or as Hicks ·. so ne~tly observed: 
The working elements of an organisation consist of its 
human resources_, its members' abilities and their 
personal influence; its non-human resources, free and 
economic goods, and the conceptual resources of a 
particular group of its members - the managers. The 
degree to which all members of an organisation employ 
their abilities and iru~luence in the effective util-
isation of resourc,o:s depends upon how well the managers 
of the organisation understand and perform their job. (46) 
Writers like M. Barnes, . .:. • l''ogg, C. Stephens and L. Titman~47 ) 
argued that a great deal of attention had been given to the subject 
of objectives without relating it specifically to organisation 
structure, and stressed the importance of defining the objectives on 
their own merits first. Obviously the defined objectives will affect 
the organisation structure, but the process should not be allowed to 
be reciprocal, i.e. objectives must not be defined simply because 
an existing organisation structure will facilitate the achievement 
of these objectives, rather than other objectives which m~ make a 
greater contribution to success. Nevertheless, a time will clearly 
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come when the investment in ·a particular structure is such that 
no change should be made until a sufficient return has been 
received from ito The primary objectives of a business organ-
isation are survival, growth and profit. To achieve these, a 
company must define its secondary objectives, especially in the 
areas of marketing, innovation and efficiency. Since an organ= 
isation is an open system» a company needs to secure a contin-
uing supply of human and material resources by ita operations. 
They concluded that the objectives of a company would affect its 
organisation structure by highlighting ~he various areas of 
activity and decision-making. These would provide the skeleton 
of the structure. 
D. Newman(4B) emphasised that the general way in which 
people behave and relate to one another, the style of management 
and leadership, the attitude to problems and inadequacies, are 
all elements of the general organisation style that have a direct 
relationship to the particular form of organisation structure and 
to the way in which that form is communicated to the people who 
operate within it. He said: 
The life, the action in an organisation comes from the 
people in it, acting individually and in groups. The 
organisation's structure should give a framework, a 
degree of consistency, to this action. At the same time, 
this structure is itself affected by those people who 
work in the organisation. 
c. Modern Organisation Theorr 
The results of researdh into traditional theories have high~ 
lighted their __ limitations without producing a more viable and 
equally simple alternativeo For this reason the old framework 
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I. 
•' 
must still be used as a point of departure, although supplemented 
by creditable research and new concepts which may throw new light 
on organisation behaviour.. A major trend in modern thinking about 
organisation is the joint treatment of groups of managerial 
functions .. 
Studies tend to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, so 
that human organisations are treated as systems of interdependent 
human relationships directed towards common goals. Advances have 
been made, however, despite the lack af a unified approach, and 
some of tne more important new concepts will be discussed below. 
D.. Authority, Influence, Power and Bureaucracy 
Probably one of the most important and controversial contrib-
utions male by mod~rn theorists involves the concept of authority. 
The theory of Bernard and Simon(49) which proposes that a conmun-
ication carries a.uthori ty only if accepted by the receiver, upset 
traditional assumptions about the flow of authority from the high 
point of a hierarchical structure. The controversy that has followed 
may not have shed new light on the subject, but it has resulted in 
two distinct schools of thought. One way of reconciling the two 
theories is to consider that a right to act, although delegated from 
above, to be effective, must be matched by a willingness and capacity 
to act on the part of those below. Another view has been put forward 
by Mary Parker Follet ( 1941), who sees authority as b~longing to and 
staying with a job. 
J. ltiner (1973) argued about influence concept as: 
Behaviour on the part of one individual which alters the 
behaviour, attitudes, feelings, and so on, of another. One 
person may influence another by virtue of control over 
sanctions, by persuasion, by playing upon attitudes held 
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toward him, by exercl.sl.Dg control over significant 
aspects of the other person's environment, or as a 
consequence of an exchange agreement which provides 
for influence as one part of the bargain. Influence 
may be attempted by whatever means and, in some inst~ces 
·still fail of success. (50) 
An organisation can be described by determining the flow of 
influence in the decision-making process. Organisational behaviour 
~ also be observed by examining an organisation's power centreso 
These are not invariably centres of authority, since power is 
personal and not institutionalised; this implies that control is 
by reward and penalty. In a book called, Company Organisation: 
Theo~ and Practice (1970), a group of writers states that, 
One of the greatest sources of power in the business 
world is the "entrepreneur", and much of the psych-
oli:Jgical strength of the entrepreneur lief'. in the 
fac~; that the satisfaction of his individual needs, 
euge for power, security, etc., and the objective~~ 
the organisation are very closely linked indeedo 
They go on to say, that 
the healthiest organisation with greatest potential 
for growth and the greatest success in human terms 
will be the organisation which can integrate its own 
objectives with the needs of the people and groups in 
it. (51) 
This concept is applicable to organisational units of any size, 
Those in positions of authority should realise that in order to 
remain in powerful positions, they must understand and apply this 
concept. 
A. Tannenbaun (1968)(52) related control to other factors 
in organisational effectiveness.. His findings illustrate that 
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the overall amount of influence in the organisation correlated 
substantially with performance and satisfaction. 
Moreover~ the application of this relationship has been 
extended to include highly skilled persons performing a variety 
of complex tasks. He maintained that the degree of control by 
an officer over his subordinates was positively related to the 
control they exercised over him. He cla~ed, t~~t the total 
control, performance and satisfaction were all relatively high 
in the case of an office manager whose leadership was perceived 
as resting largely upon his skill and expertise (expert power) 
and upon the attractiveness of his personal qualities, (referent 
power). Conversely, a less effective office manager tended to 
rely more heavily on the use of rewards and sar..ctions, as well 
as the formal authority of his position. 
Max Vleber(5.3) in his historical study of social behaviour, 
noticed three areas of influence on organisational behaviour: 
1. The traditional taboos of society 
2. Personal leadership of great men (which he called 
charisma, and 
3. The concept of bureaucracy. 
The characteristics of the third area of influence have been the 
subject of study b~ social scientists and offer a model for a 
~o~al theory of organisation. Webster's New World Dictionary 
(1958), defined bureaucracy as,"The administration of Government 
through departments and subdivisions managed by sets of officials 
following an inflexible routine." 
M. Crozier elucidated the term bureaucracy by saying that, 
\. 
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Planned co-operative action is possible only if one 
can rely on a great deal of regularity of behaviour 
on the part of all the participants. In other words, 
any organisation must obtain from its members a 
variable but always substantial amount of conformity. 
Members will confonn partly voluntarily, partly because 
of coercion. 17hatever the proportions, the achievement 
of the necessary conformity will be the central problem 
of an organisation's government.(~) 
E. Identification, Loyalty, Responsibility and Accountability 
The concept of identification, whereby an individual 
participates in an organisation by accepting its goals as his own, 
is useful to our understanding of organ:i.sation, since it admits 
the importance of self-involvement in organisational adtivitiee. 
Identification of this sort removes the problem of continual 
reappraisal of value judgments when decisions are made. 
In the Aame way, loyalty to an organisation strengthens 
the relationship between individuals and groups, and by allowing 
predictability of reaction, assists in the co-ordination of 
decisions. Problems may, however.~~ arise when loyalties are 
divided, say, between a department of a company and the company 
itself, when the goals of the two units do not seem to coincide. 
Responsibility, the obligation or duty of a person to act, 
has always been an important feature of organisation. C. Barnard 
(1938), described it broadly as the power of a personal code of 
morals to control the conduct oi' an individual. The behaviour of 
an organisation is affected by the individual mor~ code of those 
active within it. 
A theory of accountability, in addition to that of respons-
ibility, has been developed by some writers, notably Koontz and 
... 
O'Donnel (1959), who view it as the pre-requisite for the proper 
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discharge of duties by the subordinate. M. Barnes (1970) and his 
associates describe it as the obligation to produce results in 
terms of objectives achieved, often associated vdth profit centres. 
F. The Functioning System of an Organisation 
Dalton (,55.) suggested that six essential elements were necess-
ary to fulfil the requirements of a business organisation's 
functioning system. The first requirement is the production of 
goods or services. The second is a sales effort to ensure that 
those goods and services reach the individuals for whom they are 
designed» and also to regenerate demand when necessary. Thirdly, 
a. design and development effort is required to ensure that the 
products meet consumer demands and are adapted to any changes in 
those demands. In order to bind these three elements together, 
a fourth element i6 necessary, a system of administration and 
control which relies on effective camw~~ication ~~d decision-
making. The two final elements, a system of rewards and punish-
menta» and a company philosophy, are important beuau3e of their 
effect on the individuals within the organisation. The rewards, 
e.g. status» money, etc., must ideally be highly valued by the 
members of the organisation, so that they can be used in a way 
which will encourage activities for the continued health and growth 
of the company, whilst discouraging activities which hamper the 
attainment of the company's objectives. 
A company philosophy is necessary to generate appropriate 
attitudes in the individual members and to reinforce the motivation 
given by other means, e.g. by rewards and punishment. The ultimate 
\ 
aim is to develop a philosophy which will generate in all members 
of the organisation a loyalty to the purposes of that organisation. 
If any of these six elements are completely absent, then the system 
will have difficulty in maintaining itself'. In addition to survival 
the characteristic of growth is present in an organisation, just as 
it is in any other system. Growth is seen not simply in terms of 
increasing size but :..lso in terms of increasing ability to cope 
with the circumstances of its environment, e.g. markets, suppliers, 
Government instructions, etc. Where this growth potential is not 
realised in an organisation, it will become inflexible and deter-
iorate, unless changes are made to revitalise it. An example of 
this would be a one-product canpany whose product demand changes. 
Decline is not only seen in the product, it is reflected in 
the organisation as well. Burns and Stalker(Sq) have given an 
example of a company which failed to take advantage of new tech-
nology because their old system was not flexible enough to assim-
ilate it. An organisation must be open to new ideas and be capable 
of integrating them even when they conflict with existing policy 
and philosophy, and for this reason flexibility is essential. 
G. Management by Ob,jecti ves 
Good management must be developed in such a way that its 
objectives appeal to the individual members of the organisation as 
meaningful. A useful approach, suggested by P. Drucker(57) is 
n, 
management by objectives, in which objectives are supplied ~ 
"ever,y area where performance and results directly and vitally 
affect the s~~ival and prosperity of the business ... (5a) In 
management by objectives, an executive must concentrate the 
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attention of each person in the organisation achieving definite 
and measurable results that are felt by each individual to have 
a clear meaning for himself. Each part of an organisation can 
contribute towards the company's objectives if it sees its own 
specific goals clearly, and can detennine, through meaaurement, 
how well it is doing. The selection of the proper factors for 
measurement is important, because it is the factor that is 
measured which usually receives attention. 
The overall objectives of a firm are generally established 
by top management, but it is desirable for each subordinate 
manager to have a say in setting his own objectives.. If each 
manager is to understand the relationship between his own 
organisational objectives and the broader objectives of the 
company, he will need to partioipate in the goal-setting process. 
If he is involved in establishing his own objectives, he will 
feel that these objectives are the right ones and he will work 
to.vards them more readily. In this wa:y, each part of the organ-
isation will strive in a joint effort towards the recognised 
organisational objectives. Drucker continues, that objectives m~ 
be set as ideals or idealistic expectations. Whether the objectives 
are idealistic or realistic, they should be stated in terms of 
definite results. The statement "reduce costs 11 , sounds fine, but 
it is vague and lacks precision. Even if a conscientious manager 
sincerely strives tmvards this vague objective, he will never 
know whether he has reached it. The statement "produce at costs 
10 per cent l~ss than last year" is better because it states 
the specific results that are desired. 
·, 
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H. The Organisation and its Environment 
The relevant environment can be conceptualised in these three 
different layers: 
A. The o~gariisational environment can be conceived as the 
environment existing ~ithin the closed systems that marks 
the boundaries of the organisation. This layer of the 
environment is largely under the purview of the managers 
or decision-makers. Size, technology, organisational 
climate, and the human and capital resources of the firm 
are some of the important variables located in this 
environmental layer.(59) 
B. The task environment. This has been defined· by Dill as, 
"That part of the total environment of management, which 
is potentially relevant to goal settings and goal 
a·~ tainment" • ( 60) 
c. Lastly, one can conceive the third layer of environment, 
which is the societal environment, as the macro-environ-
ment (economic, political, social, cultural, legal) in a 
given nation. 
5.A Conc~pt of Training 
Go Odiorne, admits that: 
Training involves a programme designed to change the 
behaviour of employees. A well-designed training programme can-
not be constructed in isolation from the organisation in which the 
change in behaviour is necessary. The assessment of training needs 
must begin with the determination of the difference between the 
desired conditions and the current conditions within a particular 
organisation. The factors causing this difference must then be 
identified and the training centred on those factors that it can 
change. (61 ) 
The first principle of training is to begin by producing a 
process of 11ur£reezing11 • ( 62) Before training can effectively 
change behaviour, ~he trainee must feel a need to accept the train= 
"-, 
ing and to change his behaviour. In practice this means that the 
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old habits and practices must be brought into question by 
focusing on situations that are not satisfactorily met by 
existing behaviour patterns.(63) 
There are four forms of action training that appear to be 
applicable to training in managerial skills: discussion 9 cases~ 
problems and role-playing. One cautiun is necessary on the 
use of these methods. The trainee cannot be expected to make 
a proper response during action training9 unless the response 
is in his repertoire. This means that some method of preparatory 
training9 such as assigned readings or lectures, is necessary 
in order to provide an intellectual basis and establish an 
initial level of skill 9 which the action training will then 
improve. The discussion method of action training is part-
icularly appropriate for managerial skill. The use of discussion 
allows a considerable degree of feedback to the instructor 9 
so that he can assess how the training programme should be 
spaced out and how effective the training is.(64) 
As a method of practice, the use of a structured rather 
than an unstr~ctured discussion can also be used in combination 
with one of the other forms of action training-case studies 9 
problems, and role-playing. This combination is normally an 
effective way of allowing the trainee to participate actively0 
while retaining the possibility of immediate feedback in response 
to his performance. 
One other method that might be effective in this kind of 
training is a derivation of the "syndicate" system. (6S) Under 
\ 
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this system a 'syndicat'P or group of traineesp usually number= 
ing ten or less 9 is assigned a general tasko This group makes 
a comprehensive study of documents and meets with various 
expertso Finally the group gives a full report and has this 
report criticised by all of the traineeso 
There are a number of other factors that will influence 
the exact methods used in managerial training. They include 
the physical facilities and budget available for the training 
effort, the geographical location of the training prograrnmep 
the reaction of the trainee to the methods used, and the 
interests and skills of the instructors involvedo(GG) It seems 
obvious that an effective programme of training will use a 
combination of methods, assigned readings, lectures, discussion, 
case studies, problems, and role-playing to reinforce one another 
when necessaryo 
One aspect of the mechanics of training deserves 
mentioning. There appears to be an ~dvantage in having trainees 
from as homogeneous an environment as possible in each 
separate training session. This is because the more closely 
the training effort is tied to the work environment, the more 
the behaviour change carries over into the work situation. 
If a relatively homogeneous group is trained together, then 
the cases, problems and role-playing can be sleectively drawn 
from situations that approximate more closely to the actual 
working conditions of the trainees This could help both the 
speed at which he assimilates the material and the extent 
to which he realises its applicability to his personal work 
~ 
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situationo 
The report by the management training and development 
committee, giving recommendations on managerial training 
programmes, states that: 
The Committee wishes to emphasise certain general 
considerationso These are: (67) 
The signiricance for effective management devel-
opment of the "climateli within the firmo 
The need for the senior executives to give the 
leado 
The ract that all managers have a responsibility 
for t~ining; and 
The need to give scope for the individual manager's 
own efforts, to develop himselfo 
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PART TWO: Nationalized Industries in the U.K. and Eastern 
European EJcperience with Management 
1o Nationalized Industries in the U.K. 
A roport of the Labour Party on industrial democracy, 
published in June 1967, concentrated on the urgency of an extension 
of workers' participation in workshop and industrial affairs, and 
on the nature of the needs that such an extension must set to meet. 
The report concluded by stating that: 
A continuing strand in British Socialist thought has been the 
argument that no system of public O\~ership and administration 
can be regarded as, even approximately satisfactory, unless 
it offers those engaged in itan effective voice in the 
control of policy and administration. We have sought to 
define a way in which positive participation by workers and 
their trade unions could develop in a way beneficial to the 
wholE community, so that the public sector could, garner (~B) 
the benefits of such a development whilst [WOiding its dangers,. ~.; 
The report discusses the contribution to industrial efficiency 
that can come from an extension of workers participation, backed, 
of course, by improved union servicing and industrial training, and 
by provision of relevant information by management. Amongst many 
possible aspects of this improvement in efficiency, the report 
mentioned: 
The direct contribution from workers representatives and 
individual workers to improvements in work routines, 
layouts, :rrocesses and products. • • • The alternatives 
to participation, in the shape of misunderstanding, 
resistance, low morale and suspicion, are all too 
prevalent. ( 69) 
In the Lindsay Memorial Lectures given at the University of Keele 
in 1964, it vms pointed out that the pragmatic approach was not 
overlooked by the main liberal writers, all of them being prepared 
to accept as proper to the statep those functions that passed the 
'\ 
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following tests: 
1o Where a given expenditure would bring an even 
larger economic return to the community, but would 
not be undertaken by any private individualo 
2o Wher~ a given expenditure, although not necessarily 
yielding an economic return in the narrow sense 9 could 
nevertheless be shown to be "really important to the 
general interest." 
3o Where the individual in striving9 in apparently rational 
fashion, for some benefit or the avoidance of some harm, 
would normally be led to take action which would 
frustrate his own purpose. 
4o Where it could be shown that the state, for one reason 
or another, would be able to produce goods or services 
more cheaply than private enterprises.(?O) 
Grah~ Reid and Kevin Allen, when discussing the nationalized 
industries in Britain, admitted that most of the nationalized 
industries were not taken into public ownership primarily for economic 
reasons, though there has often been an attempt to include an 
economic rationale 5.n the decision to nationaliz~ a particular 
industry. Because they are publicly ornaed 9 the nationalized indust-
ties are accountable to parliament and are subject to political 
influence and controlo The nationalized industries in Britain in~ 
elude the electricity industry, the gas industry 9 the coal industry9 
the railways, the nationalized road haulage industry and the air= 
lines, and although the re-nationalization of steel in 1968/69 
and the proposed nationalization of the docks in 1970/71 were 
designed ostensibly to rationalize the industries and to make 
them more efficiento The authors, nevertheless, put this open 
question: 
Whether this aim, to make the nationalized industries more 
efficient, could not have been fulfilled by a different 
method of control rather than by outright public 0\mership. (71) 
\ 
Alec Nove,argues that t~ere is no point in nationalizing 
industries, such.as the chemical or sugar giants, unless powerful 
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special reasons for doing so existo He asserts: 
It is, of course, possible to urge nationalized enterprises 
to operate in a competitive envirornnent. Competition can 
be between nationalized industries (for example, coal, gas 
and electricity in Great Britain), or between nationalized 
firms and private firms ln the same industry (such as 
Renault and Simca car plants in France). Under these 
conditions, nationalized management does have a powerfulL 
impetus towards efficiency. (72) 
The French premier in ~~ interview with Time Magazine declared 
his views on nationalization in France: 
If our nationalized industries perform well, it is because 
they are managed in a spirit that respects·their autonomy 
and because those in the i~dustrial sector, like Renault, 
are subject to competition from private enterprises.(73) 
Arthur Knight rega~s the whole Whitehall machine as having no 
hope of influencing and no capacity to understand the management 
of business, but he emphasizes that: 
Firms survive and make profits generally by making 
things which t.he public will buy at costs which reflect 
the value in ~lternative uses of the resources which are 
employed. Earning adequate profits to sustain business 
in fields in which the U.K. has a comparative advantage 
is in the social interest, as is investing in new · 
technology which will ultimately benefit consumers. 
Thus the chief reasons why governments in tho U.K. 
usually have policies towards industry is in order to 
hold the ring.(74) 
Arthur Knight stresses two further points: 
First, goverrnnent has to make its assessment of which 
industries should be helped to survive, where the doctrine 
of comparative advantage appears to be relevant. Second, 
goverrnnent has to deal with possible divergences between 
public and private interest.(75) 
Basic facts about the nationalized industries in the U.K. 
are taken from "Nationalized Industries" 1970.(76) 
In the U.Ko the nationalized industries, although similar to 
private enterprise in their basic aim, differ in other respects, 
as they are very much larger than the average privately owned 
company and often have a considerable degree of monopoly power. 
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Also, the political background against which they operate cannot 
be ignored. 
The nationalized industries occupy a key position in the 
economy not only in themselves, but also because of the profound 
effect they can have on the efficient operation of the rest of the 
economy. There were strong political pressures for the maintenance 
at relatively low prices of services which were unprofitable but 
thought to be "socially desirable"o This was particularly the case 
with rai1ways, coal and airlines. The control and appraisal of 
capital investment was inadequate. Some of the industries were 
capable of absorbing enormous amounts of capital, most of it raised 
by Government loans rather than through the capital market. The U.K. 
Government has formulated a series of rules or guidelines within 
which the nationalized industries ought to operate in order to 
achieve an efficient use of resources. These guidelines are a 
partial substitute for the market constraints which affect a firm 
operating in a competitive environment. They are quite specific 
about the tYPe of pricing policy that the industries should use, 
the minimum rate of return which new investment projects should 
show and the method of evaluating such projects, and the overall 
rate of return on net assets which the whole operation of an 
industry should achieve. 
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2. Eastern European Experience with Management: Exploring how 
]est8rn European Countries tackle their managerial problems; 
Starting with one of the experts on this field from Czechoslovakia. 
Ota Sik in his book, "The Third Way" (1976), commenting on 
J.K. Galbraith's book, "The New Industrial State", notes that 
Galbraith is one of the few recent non-Marxist theorists to lend. 
support, in a sense, to official Marxism's rejection of the marketo 
Sik took a closer look at Galbraith's attitude, when he said: 
He is primarily concerned with demonstrating that, with 
the so-called "technostructure" now controlli11..g 
production, the market and the goal of profit maximization 
are no longer of first importance for the giant corporation 
in the west. The corporation plan, he argues, has taken 
over; the market is acco~~odated to the plan, and goals 
of planning have little in common with profit-seeking by 
the technostructure. 
Sik continues: 
From his highly complicated and, to my mind, unconvincing 
line of argument we can extract two main stays. First, 
the market is subordinated to the planned goals set by the 
firm. Second, the behaviour of the corporation is adapted 
to the motive of the technostructures.(??) 
Regarding profit optimization, Sik stated that: 
First, it is necessary to distinguish between profit 
as the concentrated manifestation of economic effect and 
the manner in which this profit is appropriated.(78) 
In an other place he argues: 
In the real-worlcl. economy, profit, while an objectively 
necessary money form of mrrplus value, also serves as an 
indicator of the social effectiveness of industrial 
performance, the extent to which it approaches the optimum.(79) 
His ideas on marketing and planning in the Eastern bloc countries 
are summarised in the following statement: 
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In recent decades, however, especially in the light of postwar 
events in the "socialist" countries, there has been a move · 
among specialists on the subject towards a realization that, 
in the long term, neither the market alone nor planning with= 
out the market can ensure that growth will be effective, 
above all, in tune with the public inte~est.(80) 
His personal experience on the same subject is that: 
The actual experience and the analyses made of the plaru1ed 
economies in several socialist countries over the recent 
decades have demonstrated that enormous losses have been 
caused by suppression of the market mechanism, including 
its prices and market-related earni~g, and by abolishing 
competition and consumer choice. In Poland, Czechosolovakia~ 
Hungary, especially, and to some extent in the U.s.s.R., 
there have been periods when the irrationality, the 
contradictions and the wastefulness of command planning 
have ,een frankly admitted in hard-hitting debates.(81) 
In his article "Economic planning and Management in 
Czechoslovakia", Ota Sik admitted that the existing s;ystem of 
central planning and management had failed to lead to intensive 
development and greater efficiency. It became obvious that the 
existing system of management could not ensure the needed radical 
and lasti~~ upswing. He said: 
_There are times, in particular the transition from 
capitalist of socialist economy, when some degree of 
strict centralized management is necessary. Centraliz-
ation helped us to accelerate the social and structural 
reconstruction of the economy and to ensure progress 
along socialist lines at a time when the class 
composition of the managerial personnel was undergoing 
a radical change, and it facilitated rapid equalization 
of the economic levels in the various parts of the country. 
But as socialist economic development gradually got 
into its stride , the rigid centralized planning and 
management became the main impediments to greater 
efficiency. (82) 
Sik admitted that recent developments in economic thought in 
Czechoslovakia and the other socialist countries had maue it 
easier to draw the correct conclusions from a critical analysis 
that aimed at getting to the root of the negative phenomena evident 
in these countries. Thus it was clear, not only that the existing 
system of planned management had proved unable to overcome the 
contradictions between production trends, but also that the very 
system of central management itself, through greater and gre~ter 
reliance on purely administrative methods, was deepening the 
discrepancies between the structure of production and the structure 
of requirements. He stated that: 
The one-sided drive for more output, for quantitative 
targets, was inevitably accompanied by a lack of incentive 
to technical and technological advance, to use modern 
materials and turn out better and mere up-to-date goods. 
That js to say, that now obsolete methods of management 
have unavoidably resulted in neglect of the qualitative 
aspects of economic progress in the widest sense of the 
term. One-sided and insufficiently realistic plans 
and the material interests of the enterprises and their 
personnel have retarded technological progress, perfection 
of use values and rationalization of production.(83) 
On the fixing of prices in Czechoslovakia Sik said: 
The fact is that the proceeds from sales should cor= 
respond to the actual created and realized value. In 
short, prices should harmonize with the socially necessary 
expenses of production.(84) 
As he noted the new system underscores the role of prices, which 
should help to channel production along lines expedient for the 
whole of society. 
The centralized model of planning devised 5.n the U.S.S.R. was 
adopted in other Eastern bloc countries, in the period when all of 
them, regardless of size, traditions, or resource endowment, copied 
all things soviet. In all these countries this model is now being 
questioned and, in varying degrees, changed. For instance, improv-
ing the forms and methods of planning will make it possible to 
tackle the problem of strengthening and developing the system of 
\ 
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cost accounting in a new wayo Ao Kosygin, asked what would have 
to be done in order to strengthen and develop cost accounting in 
the new conditionso He said: 
Firstly, condition must be created under which the 
enterprises will be able to solve their problems of 
improving production independently, and that they will be 
interested in utilizing to the utmost the fixed assets 
assigned to them for increasing output and the amount of 
profit they received'~ It is therefore, necessary to leave 
to the enterprises more of the profits which they deriveo 
Secondly, it is necessary to strengthen the cost-account-
ing system in inter-enterprise relations and to guarantee 
that enterprises adhere strictly to consignment deliveries 
as stated in concluded contracts, and to increase their 
material responsibility for discharging their obligationso 
Thirdly, on the basis of the cost-accounting system, it is 
necessary to provide material incentives for the entire 
collective and every shop and section of the enterprise 
to make them interested in fulfilling not only their own 
individual assignments but also in improving the over-all 
resul~s of the enterpriseo In doing this, incentives 
must be organized so that enterprises will 1e interested 
in working out and fulfilling higher planned assignments, 
and in the better utilization of internal resources.(85) 
In the same report Kosygin explained that under the existing 
system capital investements are almost exclusively allocated 
according to the central plan, and in the main are devoted to 
the construction of new enterprises. In many cases operating 
enterprises do not l~ve the necessary means at their disposal 
and thus cannot replace obsolete equipment quickly enough. The 
result is a tendency to retard the growth of labour productivity, 
to retard improvement in the quality of the goods and to emphasize 
cost-accounting in production. He therefore proposed the following 
economic and management reforms: 
It is proposed that at every enterprise there should be 
established a.production development fund which would be 
formed from its profits. Such funds will also be supple-
mented by part of the depreciation fund which is intended 
for the complete replacement of fixed assets. At present 
this part of the depreciation fund is used wholly for 
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centralized financing of capital construction, and enterprises 
cannot use these means at their own discretion.(86) 
The report tackled money incentives in the U.S.S.R. 9 emphasising 
that in 1965 new methods of planning and economic stimulation had 
been introduced in a number of enterprises in the garment, footwear 
and textile industries: 
Recently a new system of bonus payments to managers, 
engineers, technicians and office worke:::s we.s 
introduced at enterprises in a number of industrial 
branches, aimed at raising the workers' interest in the 
growth of production and quality of the goods. The 
first results which we have at our disposal already 
confizm the correctness of the roa0. choseno(87) 
The presidium of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. in 
the beginning of the 1960's started to delegate more authority to 
some of the enterprise managers. They ware granted considerable 
powers to use any profit above the planned level, as well as savings 
in the wages fur1ds, for the material stimulation of their workers, 
for improvement of socio-cultural conditions and for the develop-
ment of their own production base~ 
The presidium of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. 
recently examined the first results of their work and 
heard the reports of the directors of two of the Moscow 
road=transpo:::t organisations. Already the first 
results of their work have shown that the introduction of 
the new system of planning and material stimulation 
yields a considerable effecte(88) 
Regarding the calculations of prices in the U.S.S.R., the report 
stated: 
At present, when wholesale prices are determined for 
industrial gooas, it is becoming absolutely necessary to 
substantiate scientifically the calculated level of 
profitability in the branches of industry. Normally 
functioning enterprises must obtain their profit from 
the realization of their produce at wholesale prices; in 
this way they must derive an opportunity to set up stimula-
tion funds and to dispose of the necessary means for 
expanding their activities, for paying for their assets 
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and for making other transfers to the state budget. 
Price must also play a major role in tackling the 
problems connected with the raising of the quality 
of goods, and improving the length of service and 
durability of goodse Thus when prices are det= 
ermined for new improved model, they must reflect 
the additional expendit,xres made by manufacturers and 
the benefit which the customers will get from using 
better quality goods.(89) 
David Granick, in his book 'The Red Executive' (1960) points 
out that in any advanced industrial society, regardless of its 
social system or traditions, much the same sorts of problems are 
involved in operating the complex industrial structure. The 
solutions to these problems 9 as Granick admitted may, of course 9 
be different. But the differences are limited by the fact that 
some basic problems must be tackled. His book discussed both the 
similarities and differences between the American and Russian 
approaches. He round that in many fundamental respects, British 
management is much like American9 and there are other respects in 
which British management has much in common with, both American 
and Russian. For example: 
In all three countries, there has been increasing concern 
with decentralization of management, and various 
experiments have been undertaken in trying to achieve 
it. Functional departments such as research and cost 
accounting have grown in importance. There has been 
the problem of the reduction of the role of the 
foreman to the extent that functional specialists have 
become more important in management.(90) 
He found that had even greater importance as a pre-requisite for 
middle and top management in the U.S.S.R. than it did in the 
United States. Another area of similarity is the regard in which 
the industrial manager is held by society in generalo 
He is kingpin in both of the two giant economies 
described in this book, while he holds a much more 
modest role of esteem in Britain.(91) 
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He concluded that in both countries (the u.s.A. and u.s.s.Ro), 
it would be very difficult indeed to carry on nonnal business 
activities strictly within the lawe As a result, the top manager 
is a "risk taker" in both these societies. In Britain, on the 
other hand, the business man seems to find law breaking much less 
necessary and less soci.ally acceptable. 
About the centralization of authority in the u.s.A. and U.s.s.R. 
the author said: 
The modern American corporation had outgrown the 
organisational form of one-man authority. '~ecentral­
ization" became the slogan of the day, by the 1950's, 
it was firmly imbedded in the folkways of management 
• • • • The soviet approach to administration is 
sloganized in the concept of centralized planning 
combined with decentralized operational decisions.(92) 
Soviet theory has always called for decentralization of 
operational decisions to a local level: 
But the tenn "decentralization" n.a.s· never had. the 
mea11.ing in soviet parlance which is given to it in 
American business: that middle managers should have 
quite explicitly, reserved to themselves the right to 
meddle directly in the detailed affairs of even the 
smallest organisations.(93) 
Granick added: 
In actual fact, plant directors have posseGsed great 
authority. But in theory, they have not; and so they 
have constantly struggled to legitimatize their 
power.(94) 
The year 1957 saw a new type of industrial reorganisation in 
the U.S.S.R. At the end of March, Khrushchev pub1ished his "Theses" 
advocating the abolition of industrial ministries. Accordingly the 
Industrial Reorganisation Law ended the former system of grouping 
industry by product and technological process into national 
ministries. Instead,,~, one hundred or so regional councils were 
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formed to administer all types of industry and construction 
within their respective regionso 
Administration had shifted from organisation by type 
of product to organisation by geographic regiono(95) 
What made this reorganisation appear so drastic is that virtually 
all of the industry administrations had previously been centred 
in Moscow, while the new regional administrations were, in the 
nature of things9 to disperse to the four windso 
The indoctrination problem is one key reason for the low 
mobility of American managers between companies. Moving from 
plant to plant, subdivision to subdivision, but always remaining 
within the company, the upward-bound executive gains breadth with-
out losing his touch for the individual peculiarities of his 
corpora tio·.i 1 s personality o In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party 
plays this indoctrination roleo 
Rare is the axecutive of stature who is not a party 
membero For a non-party executive has not been 
subjected to the full strength of the traditions of the 
soviet administrative "personality" and so in a real 
sense is not fully trained for his jobo Those few 
executives who are "non-party Bolsheviks" as the 
term goes, are presumably men with other vital 
qualifications who are judged to have also imbibed 
enough of the party personality to make them 
acceptableo (96) 
One aspect of the communication problem in the U.S.S.Ro, is 
the need to bring lower- and middle-management personnel into the 
process of planning and decision-making. As Granick argued, the 
value of such partic1pation has been well recognized both in 
American and in Russian industry, It has been viewed as improving 
the quality of_final decisions and, of at least equal importance, as 
giving these executives a great psychological stake in the fulfilment 
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of the programmeso 
As an epilogue to the subject of the organization man in 
Russian Industry, Do Granick concluded: 
The Russian manager is a man with yower 9 but he is 
no independent decision-makero He is an organisation 
man, filling a slot in a industrial bureaucracy which 
has lines reaching to the very heights of Soviet 
power. His production goals 9 his cost 9 and even his 
industrial research objectives are set for himo 
Moreover, he must establish and maintain suc.cessful 
contact with the members of other powerful bureauc~ 
racies = and in particular with that of the Communist 
Party. But if the manager's goals are established for 
him 9 their achievement is his personal responsibilityo 
Often, the drive to meet quotas will force him into 
ille~l activities; this cannot be helpedo It is a 
basic part of his task to determine what is necessary 
in order to "succeed"; in this sense, the Red Executive 
is very much an independent businessmano The Soviet 
Manager is orientated. to production. Volume of output 
is the acid .test of his work. Marketing is no problem; 
finance is atrivial concern. But the purchasing 
department is the rock on which the factory organisation 
stands, for supply shortage heads to production shortages_(97) 
The S~ptember (1965) Plenum introduced the following major 
reforms ( 9 S) : 
1. The management of industry was reorganised on a sectional 
rather than a regional basis. Whereas under the 1957 
reorganisation industry was mar~ged by regional economic 
councils 9 under the 1965 reform it is managed by 
industrial ministers, one for each industry. 
2o Greater indipendence was granted to the enterprises. The 
number of indices in enterprise plans fixed from above 
by the central planners was drastically reduced. Now 
an enterprise will have prescribed from above only nine 
indices. Sales, the quantities of the basic items in the 
product mix, the wages fund, the total of profits, the rate 
of profit, payments to and grants from the state budget, 
centralized investment, the introduction of new tecru1ology 9 
and the plan for material-technical supply. The importance 
of the profitability index was to be greatly increased; 
Ko=sygin remarked in his speech to the Plenum that the 
volume of profit was largely responsible for determining 
the size of the contribution made by each enterprise to 
the net income of the country, and thus to the extension of 
production and the improvement of the welfare of the peopleo 
Prior to the September Planum, profits and the rate of profit 
were not basic indicators, and there were many planned-loss 
enterprisedo 
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The basic idea was that in order to eliminate the flagrant 
disregard for the requirements of consumers when enterprises were 
interested only in fulfilling the plan prescribed from above, 
directions from above would be greatly reduced, and enterprises 
would direct their efforts to the satisfaction of consumer demand 9 
guided by profitability. It was hoped to create a situation in 
which what was advantageous for society would be advantageous for 
individual enterprises. Whereas producers formerly produced 
bulky iron bedsteads in order to fulfill plans in tons, now it was 
hoped that in order to make profits the;y would produce modern beds 
which consumers would prefer. Under the new system much greater 
emphasis than before is placed on financial levers ahd an 
economic approach, and much less empnasis than before on natural 
idices and an engineering approach. The two chief indices for 
judging the work of industrial enterprises under ·~he new system are 
sales and profito 
3o Enterprises are to pay the state interest on fixed 
capital employed. 
4o In the sphere of material-technical supply Kosygin 
stated that it was i~tended to develop wider connections 
between capital goods, enterprises and consumer goods 
enterprises. It is essential gradually to make the 
tranition to wholesale trade in separate types of 
material~ and equipment. 
Ellman made several comments on the 1965 reform, of which 
the following three seem critical: 
1. A major feature of the reform was increased emphasis 
placed on the incentive funds of enterprises. 
2. The reforms so far adopted have been far too limited to 
eliminate the problems of the old system. " 
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3. It is widely believed that the present generation of 
enterprise management does not have the training and 
experience necessary to ~perate a system in which 
enterprises have more autonomy than formaly, and that 
management education on the American pattern is a 
necessary complement to a system that increases the 
autonomy of enterprise management. The taking of socially 
rational decisions by enterprise management is a matter 
not only of education but also of motivation. 
Ellman believes that ~he major social problem of the U.S.SoRo is, 
The irresponsibility of the administrative apparatus, 
leading both tc an unwillingness at all levels to take 
responsibility for decisions, and to an arrogant treat-
ment of the population by all officials from petty 
clerks upwards. (99) 
Increasing atte.::.tion has been given to management as the 
central force and the critical factoro In India and in many Latin 
American Countries, in the newly iridependent countries of Africa, 
in the Middle East, and in Southern Asia, management associations 
were formed, management schools ca.11e into being, and management 
began to become a major focus of governmental as well as of business 
concern. Eventually the management boom reached the Communist world. 
One Communist country after another in Eur·ope, starting with heretical 
Yugoslavia and then Poland and Hungar,y anc ultimately even the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia set up management schools and management 
institutes, began to translate western, especially American and British, 
management books, and began to teach management as the solution to 
economic stagnation. 
What we have learned since the management boom of t.h.ree decades 
ago? P. Drucker answers: 
The first thing is that management, that is, the organ of 
leadership, direction, and decision in our social institutions 
and especially in business enterprise, is a generic function 
which faces the same basic tasks in every country and, 
essentially, in every society. It has to think through the 
institution's mission, has to set its objectives, and has to 
organise resources for the results the institution has to 
contributeo ( 100) 
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Management in the Soviet bloc, especially after the developments 
of the sixties, can largely be explained in terms of the dynamics 
of management and their impact on Communist ideolo~ and organis-
ation. In the Eastern bloc countries management was to a large_ 
extent the rallying cry of those who opposed impositions from an 
alien source. 
The Communist reformers, first in Yugoslavia, then in 
Hungary, and finally, in Czechoslovakia, demanded 
auto11omy • • • • In part of course, their motives 
were economic. But in equal measure, they looked to 
management as a force to reform government 
society.(101) 
T. Ganl'uling, in his study of the application of accounting in 
the U.S.S.R., found that: 
The prices of most major commodities in the U.S.S.R. 
are fi..xed by law, and are supposed to reflect the 
socially necessary costs of produc·~ion, Leo 
standard labour costs. ( 10 2) 
Gambling argued that one of the major reasons for the introduction 
of the Economic Reforms in the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist 
Countries, is that centrally-directed and detailed physical plan-
ning can no longer provide for the satisfaction of the 'ideal whims' 
of an affluent society: 
Once accounting in these countries ceases to be used as a 
control system, in support of a detailed physical plan, 
the enterprises start to use their accounts in much 
the same way as their capitalist counterparts. ( 10 3) 
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SUMrt.P.RY OF CHAPrER III 
This chapter has been divided into two partso The first 
part contains an analytical survey of literature and is based on 
Management Control Systems theory and practiseo The material of 
this part is drawn from literature written by British or American 
authorso Their ideas represent the concepts and practices of western 
developed countries with regard to Management Control Systemso This 
part has been divided into five major sections: 
Section one explains what Management Control Systems are~ 
it attemp·La a definition, and describes some features of management 
controlo 
Section two consists of an analysis of management behaviour 
in an open system, the role of the form~l leader (manager) as a 
monitor of information in organisations, and in the designing of 
the overall systemo 
Section three concerns management accounting techniques~ 
responsibility cent~es~ standard costing and budgetary control, 
and also responsibility reportingo 
Section four explains what an organisation is, modern organis-
ation theory, authority, influence, power and bureaucracyo It goes 
on to describe the meaning of identifications, loyalties, respons-
ibility and accountabilityo Some features of the functioning of a 
system of organisation, and management by objectives, are then 
explained a 
Section five concentrates on the concept of trainingo From 
the information compiled in the first part of this chapter, it may 
be concluded that lli.nagement Control situations are diverse in 
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nature. They may call for the designing of a new control system 
or the developing of new standards, the analysing and measuring 
of deviations between actual performance and the standards 9 the 
developing of a qualitative basis for determining where to invest 
limited capital resources 9 the taking of corrective action 9 or 
simply the examination of a situation to determine exactly what 
the control problem iso 
Part two has been divided into two major sections: 
Section one explains the managerial processes of the U.K. 
nationalized industries. It is observed that competition between 
nationalized industries in the U.K. could produce a powerful 
impetus towards efficiency in their management. 
Seciion two considers ideas 9 experience and practices of 
management in state~owned enterprises in Eastern ~~opean countries. 
The Soviet centralized model, which is adapted by other 
Eastern European countries , is based on central assessment of need 
and on 'directive' planning9 in which this assessement is trans-
lated into action by a system of instructions via the economic-
political hierarchy. Criteria for management are predominantly 
related to the fulfilment of the directive plansp However, during 
the last two decades, Eastern European reformers, have been trying 
to change the central plans relating to major investments, and have 
moved towards a flexible centralization and money incentives 9 rather 
than 'directive' methods to attain desired goalso 
(193) 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE CURRENT ¥u\NAGEHENT CONTROL 
SYSIDTS USED IN THE IRAQ CErifENT 
PUBLIC COl'·:PANY 
Befor.a analysing the current :t-ianagement Control System, 
Cost control and training programme, a general account of 
the company is needed: 
1 oAo A Note on the Company 
The Iraqi Cement Public Company which forms the subject 
of our study, and has been mentioned, in some detail, in 
chapters one and two ... The Company was establi~hed in 1936 
in Baghdad cityo Production started in 1950 with one kiL~ 
and with an annual production of 75,000 tonneso The capital 
of this company in 1974 amounted to LD .. 7,7CJ7,694, and .on 
the 14th July, 1964 the company was nationalisedo (l) This 
is one of the associate companies of the State Organisation of 
Construction Industries, which in turn, are attached to the 
Ministry of Indust~J and Mines, in accordance with the decree 
of this Ministry concerning the setting up of specialised 
enterprises published in 1970o 
\ 
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Production Capacitz 
The Company runs and manages four cement factories with a 
total annual production of 1J090,000 tonnes, distributed as 
follows: 
1. The Baghdad Cement Factoryo This factory has four 
kilns with a total annual production capacity of 
about 450,000 tonnes. 
2. The Falluja Cement Factory. The annual capacity of 
this factory is 200,000 tonnes. This is all produced 
by its one kiln. Production started before the end 
cf 1975. 
3. Seddat al-Hindiya Cement Fa~tory. The annual prod= 
uction capacity of this factory is 240,000 tonnes, 
produced by two kilns~ 
4• Kufa Cement Factory. Productic.n in this factory started 
in 1974 with a11 annual capacity of 200,000 tonnes. The 
factory has one kiln~(2) 
The Company has a factory at Baghdad for making cement 
filling sacks with an annual production capacity of 27 million 
sacks~ 
Types and Specifications of the Output 
The Company produces the following kinds of cement: 
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1. Ordinary portland cemento This kind of cement 
is produced according to the following specifications: 
(a) Iraqi specifications Noo 5, 1967. 
(b) British specifications BeSo Noo 12, 1958. 
(c) American specifications No. AST0-1 C 150 ~ 62, 
Type 1. 
2. Salt -resistant cement.. This kind of cement is very 
soft and produced according to the following specifications: 
(a) Iraqi specifications No. 6, 1968 
(b) British specifications, B.S. 4027, 1966. 
(c) American specifications, ASTII c150 - 62, Type 5o 
3· Moderate Salt-resistant cement. This kind of cement 
is used ·.-~h~n little resistance to salt is required, and 
it is produced according to ~erican specifications: 
AS'll>I Cl50 - 62 Type 2; 
4• Quick-hardening cement. This k~d is produced for 
special orders. (3) 
Exoansions Decided Unon 
1. Expansion of the Falluja cement factory. This is to be 
achieved by adding two more kilns to produce 400,000 
tonnes of clinker annually, bringing the total annual 
output to 600,000, starting from tr.e beginning of 1977• 
2· The new Kufa cement project ivith a production capacity 
of 2,000,000 tonneso This project will be set up near 
the present factory. Production will start in the 
\ 
beginning of 1978. (4) 
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l~B 1.\IETHODOLOOY 
Difficulties with QuestioQnaire 
After preparing the questionnaire, which was designed as 
a means of collecting data and then to assess the current 
management control systems in the Iraq Cement Public Company 
(See Appendix A), the researcher travelled to Iraq at the 
beginning of September, 1976. The Iraqi Ministry of Higher 
Education and Scientific Research wrote a letter to the Co~pany 
permitting the researcher to submit the questionnaire. Before 
using the questionnaire, a pilot test was carr.ied out with 
six individuals, two technical experts at the State Organis-
ation for the Construction Industries, which supervises all 
the Iraqi Cement Companies, and four others who v1ere members 
of the National Centre for Consultancy and Na."'lagement Devel-
opment; of the latter four, two occupied specialist positions 
in management and two were assistants to specialists in manage= 
ment. A visit was then paid to the ~ompany administration in 
Baghdad, and subsequently to the Baghdad factory, the Falluja 
factory, situated some 45 miles from Baghdad, the·Seddat al-
Hindiya factory, situated 60 miles from Baghdad, and the Kufa 
factory, 90 miles from Baghdad. It was found that translation 
of the questionnaire into Arabic vms not easy. Some difficulties 
were encountered in rendering managerial terminology in a 
different language,- as the respondents must understand the 
same thing from the questions, if the comparison of responses 
-is to have significance. 
\, 
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The respondents in the Company administration were given two days 
to answer the questionnaire; those of them who misunderstood certain 
questions were dealt with personally and their difficulties removedo 
Managers in the Baghdad and other factories were met personally as 
soon as the questionnaire had been distributedo Each meeti.ug with the 
managers in every factory lasted between 2 and 3 hours. 
Distribution of the questionnaires directly to the subjects, 
rather than being sent by mail, gave the researcher an opportunity 
to explain any questions which proved diff'icult to understand, and 
the purpose of the questionnaires and the study, to the subjects and 
to emphasise the confidentiality of the informat iono This approach, 
certai~y~ increased co-operation to a greater extent. The researcher 
resorted to this rather tedious Md time consuming approach for a 
number of Ieasons. 
First of all, a large number of the questions which are included 
in the questionnaire involve evaluation of superiors and the company 
performance of ma."lagement control by subordinates, which is rather 
a sensitive matter. In order to solicit co-operation from the respond= 
ents it was neces~ary to conviix:e them about the confidentiality of the 
information they were asked to give. Any involvement of their organ-
isation in distribution of the questionnaires would have attracted some 
suspicion. As a U'.atter of fact, several managers in the Company suspected 
the researcher's intentions, since he was authorised by the Ministr,y 
of Higher Education and then by the General Manager of I.C.P. Co. 
Immediately after distribution of the questionnaire to the respondent managers, 
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the researcher explained to them his title at Basrah University 9 
and the reasons for doing this researcho After the subjects 
were assured that each respondent answering the questionnaire 
should not simply give the researcher the answer they think 
he wants to hear 9 they were requested to give their answers on 
the questionnaires individually without letting anybody inter-
fere while writing their answerso 
The researcher's experience in lecturing and conducting 
courses in Iraqi industrial organisations, gave him access on 
how to handle the Iraqi managers' way of thinking and gain their 
confidence, and then obtain the required resulto 
The actual result was so frank and accurate, that it exceeded 
optimistic expectationso The researcher believed that the 
respondents had given at least 9~~ correct and honest answers, 
after they had b.;an convinced that the researcher and his 
research was under no influence of the MinistrJ of Industry and 
Mines, and that the information obtained via the questionnaire or 
oral interview, would be treated in ths strictest confidence, and 
in such a manner that it would not be traceable to any one 
individual a 
All the data obtained from the respondents in Io·C.P.Co .. 
were computerised according to frequency distribution processes 
in the Computer Unit at the University of Durhamo An initial 
examination of the frequency tables produced from the data of 
empirical research, enabled the user the ensure that each variable 
had sufficient variability to be used in subsequent relational 
analysiso FUrther more, it permitted the user to check the 
'· 
validity of the data to ensure that it had been coded 9 punched 
and input to the desired specificationso 
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The Population 
All persons who occupied managerial positions, from General 
Manager down to Supervisors, were asked to answer the questionnaire. 
It was found impractical to ask foremen 9 although they are res-
ponsible for the jobs of other people, because of their illit-
eracy and inability to grasp the real meaning of the questions, 
and because their reluctance to answer, despite offers of help. 
Seventy two manP.gers com~leted the questionnaire, distributed 
as follows: 
1. Baghdad Cement Factory 13 managers 
2. Falluja Cement Factory 15 II 
3. Seddat al-Hindiya Cement Factory 13 II 
4. Kufa Cement Factorf 10 " 
5. Administration office 21 II 
Total 72 managers 
In the questionnaire there were 169 questions and sub-
questions, the total numoer of responses being 72 x 169 = 12,168. 
out of this total only 102 answers or subquestions were considereQ 
lacking in relev-ant data (less than 1%). 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Questionnaires 
There are advantages and disadvantages in using questionnaires 
in management resear~h. In their favour is the large number of quest-
ions which can be put to a large number of people. This would be 
impossible with other methods of research such as interviewing 
and observation. Secondly, they give the respondents flaxibility 
in the time spent on answering. Finally, the data collected lends 
itself to oojective analysis, whether statistical or otherwise. 
On the other hand\ questionnaires are always open to response bias. 
If the questions are slanted, then the respondents may answer in a 
certain way, regardless of the real point. Also, if respondents 
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do not h~ve m11ch time, then answers will be hasty and ill-
judged. Furthermore, if the respondents are left alone to 
interpret the questions, their interpretations may vary. In order 
to minimise the effects of such response problems, a wi~e selection 
of responses is necessary. 
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\ 
-1·.C., Empirical Research in Iraq Cement Public Company 
The questionnaire was divided into four main sections: 
1. Basic questionnaire 
2. Questionnaire about training 
3. Questionnaire about cost control 
4. Questionnaire about management control systems. 
The aim of the field research is to examine the current 
practices of :Management Control Syste!II5, in order to find out 
deficiencies in application. Comparison can then be made with the 
principles cf management control, to find otit ways of overcoming 
the deficiencies. Among the several deficiencies which became 
apparent during tr..e analysis of the responses, the following four 
types have considerably influenced the creation of the current 
Management Control Systems in the Company~ It was therefore 
decided to use the last three sections of the questionnaire to 
assess these four by ascertaining: 
1. The extent to which there was a difference between 
authority and perceived influence. 
2. The extent to which lack of appropriate training 
had led to inattention to the improvement of management 
information systems. 
3. The degree of satisfaction with current control systems. 
4. The relationship bet-..veen the influence exerted by personnel 
--
and the obtaining of information~ 
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2~Ae Analysing the Current Management Control System, Cost 
Control and Training Practices in the Companyo 
Introduction 
The aim of this Chapter is to explore the current 
practices in fv!a.nagement Control Systems, Cost Control, and 
Training, at the Iraq Cement Public Companyo In order to do 
this and to reach a better understanding of these three areas, 
practical empirical field research is necessaryo A suitable 
questionnaire, therefore, has to be designed in order to 
investigate and collect the right kind and amount of data 
with which to examine these three areaso Together they 
should give a greater understanding of the actual current 
application of Hcmagement Control Systems in the Ccmpanyo 
Cost Control is considered one of the major tools (especially 
for developing countries) in the management control processes 
and training in management is considered a realistic ::nathod 
of understanding and applying properly, the processes of 
Management Control Systemso These considerations made it 
imperative to explore the two areas of cost control and management 
training in addition to and within the framework of Management 
Control Systems. The questionnaire was specially designed to fit 
the managerial situation in the Iraq Cement Public Company, and 
to suit the Iraqi environment in gene~al, 
' \ 
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in order to give a picture of the actual practices of Manage= 
ment Control Systems, cost control and training that were in 
useo This would enable a comparison to be made between the 
principles held by the U.K. and u.s.A., to apply to these three 
areas and the actual practice discovered in the Iraq Cement 
Public Companyo (This comparison will be the aim of Chapter 
five). 
Chapter two was based on field research in seven different 
companies (one of them being I.c.P. Co.), selected from the five 
qualitative state organisations, \1hich supervise and control the 
whole of Iraqi State Industry, and its purpose was to produce a 
comprehensive understanding of l\!anagement Control Systems in the 
state industry in generalo In this field research I compiled a 
check-list of questions. Only those questions relevant to a 
particular respondent were asked. Respondents were selected so 
as .to give a fairly wide range of answers to the questions .. 
The re~ponses to the questions in the first field research 
project, which took place during Nay and June, 1975, together with 
the replies to the questionaire in the second field research 
project, which concentrated on I.C.P. Co. and took place in 
September and October of 1976, have been aids to accuracy in the 
investigation of the general subject of this researcho 
B. Basic Questionnaire 
The first part ·of the questionnaire, consisting of five 
'\ 
questions, was aimed at discovering basic information about the 
respondent manager's grade, his length of service in that grade, and 
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in the Company, his academic qualifications and the category 
or work he performed. 
This information provided a basis for understanding and 
interpreting the responses to the rest of the questionnaire. 
The first question of the preliminary section concerned 
the grade or the respondent managers, and it was found that 
most of the respondents occupied supervisory positions: of the 
72 managers who replied to the questionnaire, 33 were in super-
visa~ positions. The other respondents, who held higher 
positions in the Company, were distributed as follows 
13 Managers of Departments, 19 Managers of Divisions, 
4 Facto~ Managers, 1 General Manager, 1 Assistant General 
Manager for Technical Affairs, and 1 Assistan~ General Manager 
for Managerial Affairs. Although the number of Managers of 
Divisions was greater than the number of departments, this did 
not reflect the real situation in the Company. The researcher 
attributed the discrepancy to the poor definitions of the 
responsibilities and authority of the two levels of management. 
Because of this, a small number or managers who performed the 
job of Departmental Manager were able to categorise themselves 
as Managers of Divisions. 
The next question concerned the nmnber of years each respond-
ent manager had spent in his present grade. It was found that the 
majority, 38 of the 72 managers, had held their positions for 
more than six years. This indicated that the 
turnover of_managers was rather slow. The responses to the 
.\ 
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next question, about seniority in the Company, showed that 46. 
managers, 63.9% of the total, had spent more than six years in 
the Company. This means that the Company had an almost stable 
managerial situation. The replies to the question concerning 
the academic qualifications of the respondent Corr~any Managers, 
showed that about half, 45.8% held B.sc. or B.A. degrees. The 
percentage of managers who had a second~ education, Diplomas 
or higher degrees, was 37.5% These percentages show that a 
considerable proportion of the managers of this Company were 
well qualii'ied. It is v1orth noting in this context that about 
50fo of the population of Iraq was illiterate at the end of 1976. 
The last question in the preliminary questionnaire concerned 
the work category of managers. Forty managers were found to be 
involved in production, 18 managers were involved in services to 
management (i.e. ac~ounting, personnel, etc.), while only 11 
managers were involved in marketing or sales. As the Cement Ind~s-
try is considered one of the oldest and largest industries in Iraq, 
with the greatest home demand and a flourishing market abroad, this 
figure reflects inadequate marketir~ activity. 
Rank and pay in Iraq depend largely upon scholastic attainment, 
which according to Lord Salter( 5) 
Bears little relation to merit or aptitude. At one end 
of the scale young persons who may not be fit for any 
other employme~t are able to enter the Civil Service 
at a fixed sal~ because they have spent the requisite 
number of years in a primary, intermediate or secondary 
school. On the other hand, students who have spent 
many years studying abroad and have gained high educat-
ional qualities are discouraged f'rom entering the service 
because they will receive the same low salary as a person 
who, for examp~e, has passed four years in the Law College. 
\ 
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C •. Training Questionnaire 
Aim: This was the first area of the questionnaire, which had been 
compiled to examine the current training situation in the Iraq 
Cement Public Company. The analysis of the answers was intended 
to reveal the actual level of training followed by the Company. 
From this information, it was hoped to discover how far the training 
had led to the use of better control systems., 
The first question in the training section, revealed that 
(54.~) or those managers who responded had not attended any 
training programme. This means that more than half of the managers 
had learnt their jobs by trial and error, involving considerable 
waste and low quality work, as well as tense relationships with 
superiors. This lack of training I considered one of the major 
reasons for low productivity and the high cost of production. The 
second part of the question indicated that the majority of these 
managers who had attended training programmes had been to between 
1 and 3 programmes during their time with the Company. These facts 
emphasise that top management were not appreciative of the benefits 
of training programmes. 
Question 2 concerned training programmes. Most of the managers 
who answered had attended the training programmes either as a 
result of the advice of their supervisors or on their own initiati've; 
none mentioned any arrangement by a training office, because there 
was none in the Company. 
The responses to question 3 revealed that only 10 Managers 
had attended a general management course, and only 13 Managers had 
attended a management information systems course, which reflects 
'·· 
on the poor appreciation of managerial tools. 
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Question 4(a) ooncerned the type of course currently needed; 
23 managers indicated that they needed a general management course, 
14 managers indicated that they needed a manEJ.gement information 
syste1ns course, and 44 managers wanted a specialist technical 
course that would apply to their present dutieso Thirteen managers 
felt they were in need of a course, although the kind was not 
specified. This result demonstrates that all the managers felt 
they needed to attend a training course 1 and some felt themselves 
in need of more than one type of training programme. 
In part (b) of the same question, about the required length 
of any course chosen, 36 managers, (exactly 50}~) , preferred the 
course to last more than one month, but less than six months. This 
gives emphasis to the need and importan;::e of training. 
Experience indicates that the fil'st step in a.11y management 
development programme must be to find out how the individual in 
that company relates to the organisation. As F. Dinsmore 
put it in his book of 1975:(6 ) 
It is necessary to detennine and analyse the mnst fund-
amental sources of power and satisfaction for the 
individual and for the organisation. There are many 
factors which enter any such equation, and these must 
be carefully culled with emphasis on maximum simplicity. 
The fundamentals are those factors which are inherent 
in all individual ar1d organisation performance and which 
most directly determine the level of results achievement. 
These basic factors can be grouped into four categories, 
which will be called the four R's -requisites, resources, 
responsibilities and results. 
Question 5(a), dealt with the country in which the managers 
would prefer the training to be held. Twenty eig~t preferred to 
receive their training abroad; 10 of these 28 managers stated 
··~ --- .... 
that they would pre~er to have their training in &lgland, 5 in 
\ 
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Denmark, 1 in Japan, 5 in West Germany, and 5 in any European 
or developed country. This means that at least 21 managers out 
of the 28 v;ould have liked their training to be held in western 
block countries, while only 2 would have preferred to be trained. 
in an Eastern block country. or these 2, one named Poland and 
the_ other Czechoslovakia. or the 41t- managers who preferred to 
be trained in Iraq (Section b), 8 wanted to be trained in their 
o~~ company, 20 in the National Centre for Consultancy and 
Management Development, and 13 in any other training centre. As 
the (N. C.C.M.b.) is considered to be the biggest, most experienced 
and best equipped centre for managerial training in Iraq, the fact 
that only 20 out of 72 managers preferred to be trained b.v the 
organisat.ion shm~s that the Centre's performance is not highly 
valued. 
The researcher was in fact one of the first specialist staff 
who had worked in this Centre, and he found froL'l his experience 
that it needed to take a real lead in Iraqi management if it was 
to minimise the complaints about its performance and fulfil its 
objectives.(?) The Centre could only do this if all its staff, 
from the level of the assistant specialists up to the General 
Manager, had both the morale and the ability of leaders in 
management, since the purpose of the Centre is to lead and 
develop other managers. The Centre would also have benefitted 
from having specialised personnel with plenty of experience local-
ly and internationally, who had acquired a good grasp of manage-
ment skills and the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. 
In order to achieve success, the Centre must also reward its 
specialised personnel with more authority and material incentives, 
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so that posts in the specialised fields attract the right people. 
In Questions 6, 7 and 8 the respondents had to tick 
particular scores between 1 (none) to 5 (a great deal), or to 
answer yes or no. These questions attempted to determine the 
extent to which managers experienced a difference between authority 
and perceived influence. As the assessment of this difference is 
the first finding from the analysis of this field research, some 
detail is essential. 
Question 6(a) aimed to determine how much influence managers 
could exert to obtain the training they required. If the process 
of cumulative frequency distribution is used as a statistical tool 
to illustrate how much influence the managers had, the results 
shov.n in Table No. 22 are obtained. 
Degree of Number of Percentage Cumulative ll 
influence Managers of percent age ! 
F.D. of F.D. 
1 26 36.1 36.1 
2 9 12.5 4-8.6 
3 19 26.4 75.0 
4 12 16.7 91.7 
5 6 8.3 100.0 
Table No. 22 
The cumulative f.d. fran degree 1 to the degrees of influence 
between 2 and 3 was exercised by the managers as shov.n in Table 22. 
The result is : 36.1 + 12.5 + 13.2 = 61.8,%. Thus, if we calculate 
the scores of influence that start between degrees 2 and 3 and range 
up to 5, 38% of the ~espondents are found to have possessed enough 
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influence to decide on the training programmes they felt they 
required. Moving to Section (b) on whether the respondent 
managers had the. authority to arrange for the training outlined 
in Questions 4 and 5, the answers could be either yes or no. 
Table 23 shows their answers as a percentage of frequency distrib= 
ution, as follows: 
Number of Percentage Cumulative 
Code managers of percentage 
f.,do of fod .. 
Yes 27 37o5 37o5 
No 45 62o5 100o0 
Table No. 2-3 
Twer ;;y seven managers ( 3,1 o 5%) answered 'yes' implying that 
they had the authority to arrange for the train~1g, but 45 managers 
(62.5%) answered that they did not l:1ave authority to do this. In 
order to show the extent to which there was a difference between 
authority and perceived influence, the 37.5% of the respondent 
managers who had authority was compared with the 38. Z'/o of the 
same managers who had a perceived influence. The comparison indio-
ated that there was only a very slight difference. (o.r;s). 
The same procedures were applied to Question 7 section (a), 
on whether the respondent manager's superior had the authority to 
arrange for training as· outlined in Questions 4 and 5, and the 
cumulative f. d. of their answers is shown in Table No. 24. 
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Number of Percentage Cumulative 
Code Managers of percentage 
fodo of f.d. 
Yes 19 26.4 26.4 
No 15 20.8 47.2 
Do not 38 52.8 100.0 
know 
Table No. 24 
26.lt~ of the respondents believed their superiors to have that 
authority. Section (b) determines how much influence the 
supervisors had. 
Degree of Number of Percentage Cumulative 
influence managers of percentage 
f.d. of f.d. 
1 8 11.1 11.1 
2 23 31.9 43.1 
3 31 43e1 86.1 
4 4 5.6 91.7 
5 6 8.3 100.0 
Table No. 25 
The cumulative f .d. ranging from between 2 and 3 degrees of' 
influence up to 5 degrees (a great deal), as shovm in Table No. 25, 
·is: 21.5 + 5.6 + 8.3 = 35.4/100. This signif'ies that 35.4% of 
the respondent managers believed that their superiors had the 
influence to make decisions on training. The comparison between 
the percentage of the actual authority of the superiors (26 • .470 
'\, 
(2.18) 
and the percentage of their perceived influence (35.4%), shows 
that managers tended to believe that their superiors exercised 
more influence than was in keeping•with their actual authority • 
. This belief waB largely imaginary and is probably related to the 
"cultural structures" of the country. It could, however, be true 
in certain circumstances, when the superior is in the first ec~elon. 
Question 8 deals with the respondent manager's authoritv to 
arrange fo1· his subordinate's training. The answers were either 
a simple yes or no. Since only 20 managers answered yes, we 
find that -a mere 27 •· 8% of the total respondents had enough auth-
ority to order the training of their subordinate::;. Looking at 
Section (b) of the same question, regarding the manager's influence, 
we see tha~; there were also 20 managers (if one cotmts half of the 
managers who gave their degree of influence as 3) who indicated 
' 
that they had enough influence (see Tables26 and 2-7.) 
Number of Percentage Cumulative 
Code managers of f .d. percentage 
of f' .d .. 
Yes 20 27.8 27 .. 8 
No 52 72.2 100.0 
Table No •. 26 
Code Number of Percentage Cumulative 
managers of f .d. percentage 
of f .d. 
1 31 43.1 43.1 
2 16 22.2 65.3 
·-. 
3 10 13.9 79.2 
'\ 
'· 
4 7 9.7 88 .. 9 
5 8 11.1 100.0 
" 
Table No. 27 
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The conclusions from the last three questions, proved that 
there was only a slight difference between the authority and the 
influence of managers in this Company. This means that perceived 
influence was not higher than actual authority, except at the level 
of the General Manager, his two Assistants, and members of the 
Board of Directors. This established the first finding about the 
relationship between authority and influence in the Iraq Cement . 
Public Qompa.ny.(see Figure 4) .. Moreover, it was also found that the in-
fluential managers always occupied the upper line of management as will be 
demonstrated in the coming stages of this analysis. 
Question 9 deals with the manager's feeling about :training •. 
Fifty four managers said a training programme would be useful in 
the future, but 36 managers said a training prograrrme would be of 
immediate use to them in their present job. Only 10 managers said, 
that as many of their colleagues had attended training progra'1lllles, 
they thought they should do likewise. This means that 75% of the 
respondents felt that training would be useful in the future, 
because they knew it would help considerably to>v.ards their promotion. 
They also realised that training would increase their aptitude for 
any new position they might expect to hold in the future. The 
ru1swers to the next question (No. 10) proved this expectation. 
Here 39 managers (54o1%), who scored from 3 to 5, agreed that, 
"staff who have attended training programmes are promoted more 
quickly than those who have not' attended them." 
Question 11 asks whether the respondent's superior was in 
that position because 
(221) 
A. He was rnore experienced than the respondent 
B. ·~~ II 
" qualified II " II 
c. II II older than the respondent 
D. For other reasons. 
In answer, they were allowed to tick one or more possib-
ilities, with the following results 
A. was ticked by 4 7 managers 
B. II II II II 
c. " II " 11 II 
D. " II II 23 II 
The last figure means that 31.9.% of the total respondent 
managers felt that their superiors had gained their position for 
"other reasons" with or without the first thre~ reasons. This 
. , 
indicates that quite a high proportion of the managers felt that 
their superiors had got their positions, (a) because of their 
political attachments or (b) because they had connections vnth 
one or more influential individuals in the Ministry of Industry 
and Mines or in other corporate bodies, or (c) because they 
had a channing personality. It seems then, that the principle 
of "putting the right man in the right place" was not always 
strictly followed. This kind of situation is likely to create 
bitterness in the others, which ~~11 have an effect on the level 
of job satisfaction, ·which in turn will greatly influence the 
level of productivity in the Compar~, and ultimately the level of 
profitability. 
F. Jalal wrote in his published Ph.D thesis: 
No doubt seniority, in the sense of :naturity and cumulative 
experience is a relevant consideration in promotion, but in 
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Ira~ s3niority meant merely ti~e spent in the service ••• 
/u"lother wasteful practice was the misplacing of' people, 
it takes luck, influence or both for a person to be 
assigned where he can make the best use of specialised 
training. Moreover, officials were frequently shifted 
from one position to another without regard to their 
qualities and experience. This was partly caused by 
political instability, and after each cabinet change 
a number of senior Civil Servants were removed.(8) 
S. al-Samawi, admits that: 
Partisan attachment, or the appearance of it, should 
not be a pre--requisite in selecting; a responsible 
leading m~~ager; the task of building a new society, 
is the task of all nationalist progressive subjects. 
It ~hould not be allowed to detract from a:rw serious 
ant. true ability to participate in any subject who has 
the required managerial responsibility. ( 9) 
He adds that: 
The person who is not partisan, but is efficient and 
sympathetic to the party and the revolution, is 
be·.;ter and more useful than the person who is part-
isan, but does not have the knowledge that is needed 
for the place he occupies. and relies on empty 
talking and appearances.(10) 
Question 12 concerns the information available for judging 
which training programmes are the best. Forty six respondents 
answered in the affirmative, indicating that they had the info-
rmation need~d to judge which would be the best or most suitable 
programme for their needs. This means that 26 managers (36.1%) 
did not have the necess~ information to enable them to decide 
which programme would suit their needs. One can therefore 
conclude that trdning in general was not highly valued by top 
management. 
In answer to Question 13 on whether other people in the 
Company had_better information on the subject, 21 managers 
answered "No" and'25 managers answered 11 I do not know". This 
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means that 63. ~ ~~ all the respondent managers believed that 
other people in the Company had no better information upon which 
to base decisions on the beet training. This reinforces the 
previous conclusion. 
Question 14(a), on whether it was somebody's job to decide 
on the best training for the re~pondent managers, produced the 
following responses: 4 7. ~ said "yes", 11 .1% of them said "no", 
and 41 .. 7% said "I don't know". These figures indicate that 
making decisions about the best training for the managers was in 
the hands of specified people iri the top echelon. Consequently, 
the lower and middle levels of management had very little power 
to decide on their own training. 
Section (b) asks (if the answer to the previous section was 
"yes"), how often :loes the person with this authority discuss 
training with the respondent? The results sho~~d that the person 
in authority who took decisions on training, never discussed the 
subject with them. This indicates that the Ccxnpany followed a 
highly authoritarian policy. 
As there was a lack of appropriate training, and as only 13 
managers had attended management information programmes (which was 
clear from the replies to Question 3) one can easily understand 
' 
why there was also little stress on the improvement of management 
information systems. This instances the second type of causal 
relationship, viz. that the lack of appropriate training had led 
to a lack of attention to the improvement of management information 
systems. 
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To conclude on the training situation in I.C.P. Co., and 
in the Iraqi State Industry as a whole, the Government has 
emphasised the importance of vocational and management training, 
but the development of the country has been hindered by a lack 
of technical cadres and competent managers, especially l.n middle 
management. This situation is reflected in low productivity and 
a low rate of growth. In order to overcome this problem, which 
increases daily as the rate of development increases, intensive 
effort is required at the political, executive and trade union 
levels. A solution could be arrived at through the establishment 
of central training institutions with the task of assembling all 
training f'acili ties and establishing new organisations for this 
purpose. The cent~al body would co-ordinate plans for present 
and :future trai...'l:L-.g to meet the needs of different projects. In 
addition emphasis would have to be placed on submitting policies 
for the retraining of manpower to bring their management skills 
and technological awareness up to date. This task ought to be 
the responsibility of the executives of the organisations, and 
should be considered a pre-reqUisite for the efficiency of the 
top management structure. 
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Do COST CONTROL Questionnaire 
Aim: The aim of this part of the questionnaire is to explore 
one of the funda~ental tools of Management Control Systems, 
which is cost control. It concentrated on obtaining inform-
ation about the system used by the Iraq Cement Public CompaQYe 
Understanding budgetary control, standard costs and reporting is 
essential to good management controle 
The first question in the Cost Control questionnaire asked 
which costs the respondent managers d~·ectly controlled. They 
were supposed to tick one or more possibilitieso The categories 
of cost were as follows : 
Labour: 
Material: 
Machine use: 
Administration 
overheads: 
others (specified 
by respondent: 
41 Managers ticked this. 
39 
33 
15 
14 
" 
II 
" 
It 
II 
" " 
II II 
n 
" 
8 Managers specified; station ry 
· and :furniture 
4 Managers specified; factory building 
2 Managers specified; printing 
It seems that the first three cost control areas were under 
the most immediate control of the majority of respondents, since 
most of them worked in industrial factariese 
Question 2, Section (a), asked whether the managers compared 
the actual costs incurred with a standard cost which had been set 
\ 
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before hand. 
Their answers were as follows 
2 Managers answered Yes 
70 " " No 
Section (b) asked the reasons for negative ~~swers to (a) 
50 Managers answered that there was no standard 
14 " " II " II " available information 
about the fixed standard. 
8 Managers answered that information was available, but that 
they had not seen it. 
The answers gave a clear ~icture c~ the accounting situation 
in the Company. As only one of the three reasons given in 2(b) 
could be ticked, the results indicated that there was no standard 
accounting procedti.i.~e in the Company approved by the Accounting 
Division Manager, simply because no such system had been prepared, 
and this was due to the lack of competent cost accountants. 
Question 3 asked how well managere controlled the costs for 
which they had direct responsibility. Here they had to tick a 
score starting from 1 (very badly) up to 5 (very well). A total 
of 40 managers ticked 4 and 5 degrees, and this is 55.5% of the 
total number. Question 4 dealt with the source of the information 
used by the managers in assessing their own performance in answer 
to the previous question. Most of the managers (47) ticked a 
sentence which said, "my own experience of doing the job". Only 
28 managers (38. 9Jb) ticked the sentence which said, "Information 
supplied by other departments, i.e. Accounting, etc.". One can 
therefore assume tha.t the managers had to rely mainly on their own 
judgment, rather than on other persons in authority. They showed 
little trust in the judgment of others and this reflects the absence 
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o£ agreed objective standards and fair control measurements. 
Question 5(a) asked whether the managers had all the 
necessary information to enable them to control the costs 
efficiently. · Thirty nine managers answered "Yes". Sect ion 
(b) asked, what sort of additional infonnation would be useful 
if the answer to (a) had been "Non. Most of the answers to (b) 
indicated that the respondents needed information about Indust-
rial Relations, Job Specifications, Management Principles, 
lnventor,y Processes, the cost of each step of production, Cost 
Accounting, Work Study and that they Plso required training in 
the English Language. They believed that knowledge could be 
acquired from ~.heir superiors or from the National Centre for 
Consultancy and 1!anagement Development, or f'rom training abroad. 
This is yet another instance of the inadequate supply of inform-
ation, and the respondents' consequent desire to acquire more 
information to enable them to control the costs for which they 
were responsible. 
Question 6(a) asked how often the respondent managers 
prepared a report on their cost control. The f.d. showed that 
25 managers never prepared reports, and 9 managers did not know 
how often a report was prepared. These figures indicate the 
level of efficiency in the cost control systems of the Company. 
Section (b) asked for whom the managers prepared a report 
on their cost control. Fourteen managers prepared a report for 
their General Manager, 3 for their immediate Boss's Superior, 
29 for their_ boss, and 1 did not answer. 
\ 
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Question 7 asked how often the respondent's superior prepared 
a report on his control of cost. The answers were distributed as 
follows : 
7 respondents said their superiors prepared a report daily 
2 " " n n n n n weekly 
12 n n 
" 
n n 
" 
II monthly 
8 " " II II II II II annually 
12 " n II II never prepared a report 
31 n II they do not know. 
Question 8(a) asked whether someone other than the respondent 
or his superior prepared a report on their control of cost. 
35 managers answered Yes 
37 II " No 
If the answer was Yes, Section (b) asked whether the managers 
received a copy of that report. 
23 managers out of 35 ticked Yes. 
The answers to the last two questions support the comment 
on Question 6(a). 
Question 9(a) and (b) asked for the positions held by those 
who expressed views on the respondent's control of costs, and for 
the degree of influence actually exerted upon the respondent's 
control of costs by the views of each different catego~ of people. 
Respondents could tick more than one answer to (a), and the 
results were as follows: 
41 indicated that the factory man~Jer expressed views 
19 
38 
II 
II 
" members of B.D. 
their superiors 
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n II 
II 
" 
16 indicated that their colleagues expressed views 
13 
16 
It 
II 
II 
II 
II subordinates II " 
other members of the Co. expressed views. 
The first figure shows that the most frequent expression of 
views came from the factory managers; this is only what one would 
expect, since they were in charge of the actual running of the 
facto~. The seco~d figure (19) indicates that the members of the 
B.D. expressed views far less frequently than the factory managersi 
a1 though members of the B. D. are at the same level in the Company 
hierarchy. However, B.D. did include all the Factory :Managers, 
the Divisional Managers from headquarters (the Administration 
Office) and two representatives of the work force. The Board had 
no direct control on the activities of the factories; they exercised 
control and influence through the Factory Managers. Thus most of 
the 19 managers who said that members of B. D. exerted influence 
must have been in the Administration Office. The pers0n who 
exerted the most influence after the Factory Manager was the Factory 
Manager's superior. The 16 managers who ticked "other members of 
the Company" referred to the shop stewards in each facto~ and the 
top management of the Company. 
Section (b) asked for an indication of the degree to which 
the manager's control of costs was actually influenced by the views 
of each category. The F.D. showed the people who were considered to 
have a high degree or influence, indicated by the respondents' 
ticking 4 or 5. 
2lJ. managers ticked factory managers 
14 " members of B.D. 
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36 managers ticked superiors 
13 
10 
13 
11 
" 
" 
11 
II 
II 
colleagues 
subordinates 
other members of the Company. 
A canparison of the figures for 9(a) and (b) shows that 
there was a correlation between the expression of views on the 
control of cost and the degree of influence exerted upon the way 
in which managers actually controlled trreir cost.s. This again 
shows that the difference between legal authority and perceived 
influence was rather small. 
Quest ion 1 0 asked how often the managers prepared a report on 
their subordinates' cost control. Their ans·wers showed that 33 
managers never prepared a report, while 15 did not know how often 
a report was prepared. This means that at least 45. &% of the 
respondent managers never knew how efficiently their subordinates 
handled the costs for which they were responsible and one must 
assume that they had little control over their subordinates' perf-
ormance. All these results were due to the inefficiency of the 
cost control systems in use in the Company. This inefficiency was 
considered partly responsible for a series of losses over the 
preceding four years; the other major reason being that the price 
of the products had remained almost the same since Nationalisation 
in 1964, as profit was not considered a major objective of Govern-
mental Organisations.C11) 
Question 11 (a) asked if budgets were prepared for the depart-
ment in which ~he respondent worked, or if one was prepared to 
cover the activities '9f the respondent himself. 1'he answers were 
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as follows : 
69 ticked that budgets were prepared for the dept. they worked in 
2 II II n " 
II 
" their own activities. 
1 did nvt answer. 
Section (b) concerned the preparation of budgets for the depart-
ment. The answers were as fcllmvs : 
13 managers ticked that the budgets were prepared by themselves. 
11 II " " " 
II II II 
" their boss. 
34 II II II " II II II " themselves 
and their boss together. 
14 II II II II " were prepared by someone else. 
The answers to Section (a) indicated that budgets were 
usually prepared for departments and not for individuals, which 
is consilered to be the right method. 
Section (b) showed who was responsible fo~ preparing the 
budget in each group of managers. The last figure ( 14) is either 
caused by the managers having no authority to prepare their own 
budgets or by their being unfamiliar with this kind of work. 
Question 12 asked to what extent the respondents assisted 
their subordinates, when they were preparing their budgets. 
In their answers they had to tick a score ranging from 1 
(not at all) to 5 (a great deal), and the results were as follows: 
20 managers ticked 1 
11 II II 2 
6 II II 3 
20 II II 4 
15 ,;------- II 5 
'-, 
\ 
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This F.D. showed that more than half of the respondent managers 
(58.5%) gave a great deal of assistance to their subordinates 
(degrees of assistance from 4 to 5). This could be interpreted 
as showing the existence of co-operation between managers and 
their subordinateso 
In reply to Question 13, on whether the managers used budget 
conmittees: 
39 managers ticked Yes 
33 II " No 
In tr~eir answers to Question 14 the respondent managers 
indicated the degree to which their budgets were imposed on them. 
1 manager indicated that the budget was imposed on him 
14 II 
57 " 
said they had a free hand with their budget 
II II II 11 degree of freedom in drawing up 
their budgets. 
Question 15 asked whether ma."lagers used budgeting and planning 
as a means of motivating their staff. 
29 managers ticked Yes 
41 II " No 
2 II indicated that this was to some extent true. 
Question 16 asked whether the respondent managers knew the 
return on its net capital achieved by their Company in the prev-
ious year? 
15 managers ticked Yes 
57 II II No 
The last four statistics show that about half of the respondent 
managers did not use budget committees, from which it may be 
', 
concluded that there were no serious studies on the budget and 
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that the Company's policy tended to be bureaucratic in nature. 
Again as only 14 managers had a free hand to get on with their 
own budget, a high level of centralisation of authority was ind-
icated. Since only 29 managers believed in using budgeting and 
planning as a means of motivating their staff, budgeting and 
planning were presumably not considered important by the staff. 
The small nwnber of managers (15) who knew the return on the net 
capital emDloyed by their Company in the preceding year, would 
mean that only 20. 8:{~ of the Company managers had enough power to 
find this out. The inefficiency of the cost control systems in 
the Company can be ascribed to the following causes:(12) 
1. The lack of specialised technical cadres. 
2. ~o financial incentives. 
3. ~he lack of conviction by top management of the 
~~portance of cost control systems. 
4. Delays by most of the departments in supplying cost 
ac.countants with the required reports and figures, and 
a lack of serious intent to supply them on time. 
5. Insufficient time for the cost accountants to devote 
to cost control purposes, because they have to do other 
acco~~ting jobs for other departments. 
6. No co-operation between the personnel of the technical 
and the cost accounting departments. 
7. Misunderstanding of the importance of cost control; 
there is no cost indoctrination among most of the managers. 
8. No application of the technical processes of modern 
management such as : 
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= Analysing the break-even. 
~ The necessary studies to reduce cost. 
- Job specifications prepared scientifically. 
= Job descriptions prepared sci~ntifically. 
Analysis of the graphic rating scale to assess 
the performance of ail manpower. 
C oncl~1sion: 1he investigation of cost 
control in the Iraq. Cement Public Company, together 
with the research on other aspects of the Industrial State Companies 
(see Chapter II). revealed that the companies were suffering from 
the same poor performance as companies in developing countries, 
a conclusion which was reinforced by my o~n experience. Their 
poor performance could be attributed to ~ failure to collect and 
disseminate necessary information. It will therefore be one of 
the major tasks of all the industrial organisations to develop cost 
systems in order to increase efficiency and productivity levelso 
It is important that top management in the I.C.P. Co. and other 
companies should begin to study the cost control systems now in 
use, to see how they can be improved and developed to serve the 
objectives of planning and controlling performance • Cost data 
would have to be collected, analysed and summarised and then the 
information could be presented to management at the appropriate 
times so that maximum use could be made of it. 
The reports produced by the Cost Accountant for the different 
levels of management would also be important and would enable 
managers to exercise effective control over the cost elements with-
in their own particular fields. For this to be achieved the reports 
\ 
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would have to be submitted periodically, and adapted to the 
management level, for which they were in~ ended. The change would 
require a review of the jobs performed by cost departments at 
present. It is the duty of top management to develop the method 
of traditional accounting so that it becomes an important tool to 
help when decisions are taken about planning and control, thereby 
creating a correct managerial environmento 
Another important point I noticed was the lack of any 
realisation of the importance of calculating costs on the part of 
the personnel in the organisations I visited during my two field 
researches in Iraqo This situation would obviously hinder any 
move towards cost analysis. In consequence none of the managers and 
top management would have great qualms about failing to provide 
information required by the Cost Departments. 
Finally, it was found to be essential, not only for the 
I.C.P. Co., but for all the other industrial companies I visited, 
to employ modern cost systems to improve managerial control. The 
historical production cost system now employed in the companies 
with its attendant deviations and inaccuracies, has become an 
unsuitable basis for pricing and the control of cost. 
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E.. MANAG.8MENT CONTROL SYSTEMS Questionnaire: 
Aim: The aim of this final part of the questionnaire was to 
anlil.yse the Management Control Systems in use in the Iraq Cement 
P..iblic Company, in order to test their levels of performance. 
This would then provide the basis for a conclusion on how to 
develop the Management Control Systems in the Iraq Cement Public 
Company specifically, and the state industry in general. 
The first question in this part of the questionnaire enquired 
how much effort the respondent manager would be willing to make 
to increase the interest of members of his unit who had expressed a 
lack of interest in their jobs. 
Here they were required to tick the appropriate point on a 
scale again. graded i'rom 1 (none) to 5 (a great deal). 
Their scores we!"e as follo1vs 
1 Manager ticked point 1 
3 " " n 2 
4 II II " 3 
15 " " " 4 
49 " " n 5 
This result showed enthusiasm on the part of most of the 
respondents to co-operate with the Company's objectives. The degree 
of co-operation among managers, is in fact acceptable, though not 
as great as the responses indicated. The framing of the question 
obliged almost any manager, whatever his real attitude toward 
responsibility and co-operation, to give a positive answer. 
(237) 
Question 2 asked how much influence the respondent 
personally had in determining the policies and actions of his 
colleagues at the same level of management. In reply exactly 
50}& of all 72 managers ticked degrees 4 and 5. This means that 
there was some degree of exchange of influence among managers at 
the same management level; this could be attributed to the social 
and cultural background of Iraqi employees, who tend to work 
together for long periods, and therefore acquire considerable 
influence with their colleagues. The preliminary questionnaire 
(Q.2.) ~evealed that more than 5~ of tne managers of the Company 
had spent more than 6 years in their present grade, which makes 
it possible to understand how mutual influence could be built up. 
This could be described as group behaviour, rather than specif-
ally managerial influence. 
Question 3 asked how much influence the respondent had on 
certain specific groups or persons in the Company. 
The F.D. shows that 25% (18 respondents) indicated 4 or 5 
as their degree of influence upon the actions of the Factory 
Manager. Seven respondents ( 9. 8%) ticked 4 and 5 to show their 
influence on the actions of the Board of Directors, and 24 
respondents (33.4%) ticked 4 and 5 for their influence on the 
actions of' the members of the Company as a whole. The last 
percentage, 33.,4'}~ underline~ the comment made on the last question, 
that most managers felt obliged to have some social influence on 
the other members of the Company, especially those below their own 
level of management. 
\ 
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Question 4(a) asked how often the following people sought 
advice from the respondent managers or (b) sought assistance or 
(c) asked for instructionso The following are the figures ticked 
in their responses: 
(a) (b) (c) 
Degrees of seeking advice Degrees of seeking 
!\.ssistance . 
Degrees of seeking 
Tnctructions 
-
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Factc ry manager: 
17 5 19 18 12 19 6 17 17 
Membjrs L. B.1D. : 
12 26 9 16 9 11 
46 I 5 
1
13 I 5 3 47 5 9 7 4 54 3 10 5 0 
·Immediate superior; 
13 I 5 
1
24 
1
21 9 19 3 17 22 11 26 9 20 11 6 
Colle_agues: 
11 1 15 27 18 11 3 7 18 23 21 6 13 14 18 I I j 
Other members: 
23 13116115 15 26 6 8 16 16 29 7 7 12 17 
Table Noo 28. 
If we look horizontally across Table No.28, we see that 
under the heading "Colleagues", respondents had ticked degrees 
4 and 5, and that it was most often colleagues who sought advice, 
assistance and instructions from the respondent managers. This 
: I 
I 
indicates that when managers needed advice, assistance or instruction 
they looked to their colleagues, because these were considered 
easier to approach and more trustworthy, and this was partly the 
result of long-standing daily communication9 which had established 
a friendly basis for communication. Thus there was considerable 
co-operation among managers at the same level. On the other hand 
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members of the B.D. were least often approached far advice, 
assistance and instruction. This was related to the fact (see 
Q.9(a), on Cost Control) that all the members of the Board had. 
jobs in the Administration Office, except of course those who 
were Factory Managers. On looking at the figures for "other 
members" seeking instructions from the respondents, we f'ind that 
only 29 managers ticked degrees 4 and 5. This figure is small, 
if we assume that it included the respondents' subordinates. The 
reasons for this are: 
1 •. "~eceiving instructions" implies an obligation to 
carry out the instructions. 
2. The influential people in the Comp~ are rather 
few compared with the number of Company Staff. 
Question 5 asked how often the respondents gave information 
concerning Company matters to the people mentioned in Question 4. 
The numbers of respondents who ticked 4 and 5 as the degrees 
for information given, were as follows : 
37 managers gave information to their factory manager 
12 II II II II " B.D. 
40 II II II " " immediate superiors 
34 " II II II II c_olle~~a 
42 II n II II ·U subordinates 
19 II II II II other members 
Most managers gave information most often to their subordinates, 
then to their immediate superiors and then to their Factory Managers. 
This is considered to be the right distribution of information, since 
it is these three categories of people that are most involved with 
the respondents' performance. Members of the B.D. received the 
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least information from the respondents, because all of them, 
except the Factory Managers worked in the Administration Office. 
The respondents' shannel of communication with members of the B.D. 
was through their Fa.ctorJ Manager, who also received information 
from the B.D. As the Iraq Cement Public Company is one among 
many cement companies under the supervision of the State Organic-
ation of Construction Industries, a distinction is made between 
the B.D. of the companies which is called the "Consulting 
Committee", and the B.D. of the State Organisation of Construction 
Industries, which is called the "Board of Directors"·+ 
Question 6 asked how often the above-mentioned people gave 
the respondents infonnation concerning Company matters. 
The number and distribution of respondents who ticked degrees 
4 and 5 to indicate that information was readily passed on to them 
was as follows: 
30 ma.11agers received information often (indicated by 4 or 
5 degrees) from their factory manager. 
5 n " n from their B. of D. 
35 II II n n " Superior 
23 II II " II n Colleagues 
28 II n II II II Subordinates 
15 II II II " II pther me:nbers 
Most managers received information most often from their 
immediate superiors, then from Factory Managers, then from their 
subordinates, and finally from their colleagues. The answers to 
this question accord with the answers to the previous question, 
+ Sea Chapter II on the Iraq Cement Public Company. 
\, 
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and imply the use of correct channels for receiving information 
from managers of the Company. 
Question 7 asked whether the amount of information received 
by respondents to help them do their job properly was, 
1. Much more than the respondents needed 
2. More than the respondents needed 
3. Exactly what the respondents needed 
4. Le~s than the respondents needed 
5. Much less than the respondents needed 
Answers to this question were as follows: 
4 Managers ticked possibility 1 
7 II " " 2 
27 II " " 3 
33 n " " 4 
1 Manager II II 5 
The largest percentage of ~nagers ticked possibility 4 (45.87~), 
which means that about half of the respon~ents believed they received 
less information than they needed. This indicates that there was a 
serious shortage of vital information reaching managers. This was 
because there was no written studied system of information in the 
Company. 
Question 8 asked how satisfied the managers were with the 
present control systems in the Co.npany. 
The respondent managers had to tick a degree of satisfaction 
ranging fran 1 (not at all) to 5 (very satisfied). 
·--............. __ 
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Their answers were as follows 
Degree of f.d. of Relative percent- Cumulative% 
Satisfaction managers age f.d. of 1•1anagers f.d. of mana~ers 
1 22 .30.6 30.6 
2 35 48o6 79.2 
3 13 18o1 97.2 
4 2 2.8 100o0 
5 0 OOoO 
.,.,_.._ 
Total 72 100.,0 
Table No. '29. 
The frequency distribution of the respondent managers gives 
a ve~ clear picture of the level of satisfaction with the present 
control systems in the Company. Only 2 managers ticked a high 
degree of satisfaction (4) and none ticked 5. If we add up the 
percentages of those who ticked degree 1 (not at all) and degrees 
2, we find that 79.~~ of the respondents were totally unsatisfied. 
MY, experience would indicate the following reasons for this situationo 
1. No canplete, declared and binding specifications 
existed for raw materials, materials in process 
or finished products. There were also no written 
obligatory control systems for use by Company 
Managers. 
2. There was a pressing need for definition and 
confirmation of instructions for the use of 
materials at all stages of production. Upper 
and lower limits of acceptable quality were also 
needed, as were process flow charts and set time 
\ 
tables for periodic inspections. In these 
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operations quality control activities consisted 
simply in corrective inspections rather than 
preventive measureso i'lritten information about 
the process of material handling, storgae and 
transport, both inside and outside the Company, 
was also neededo 
3o There was a lack of co-operation between the cost 
accountants, other controlling departments the 
resL or the departments in the Company. 
4~ There •·ras no adequate and fixed authority for all 
staff with a responsibility for controlo This 
authority should clarify the managers' roles and 
explain their responsibilities to other depart~ 
ments, in order to prevent the overlapping of jobs 
or the omission of vital work because no one is 
clearly responsible for it. 
5. There was no Standard Cost Accounting. Cost 
Accounting should be properly controlled to show 
productivity results in financial terms and to 
indicate the efficiency of managers. 
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The next figure taken from Table Noo 29, assesses the third 
type of relationship, that between the number of managers and the 
level of satisfaction with current systems in this Companyo The 
l~esult is a skewed frequency curve, where the tail of the curve 
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to one side of the central maximum is longer than the one to the 
othere As the longer tail is on the right, the curve is said to 
be skewed to the right, or to have positive skewness trnvards dis-
satisfactiono 
Question 9 concerns the amount of uncertainty which managers 
m~ experience with regard to their responsibilities in performing 
their jobo 
Here the respondents had to tick one of the following altern-
atives : 
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Kind of Uncertainty f.d. of respondents 
a) No uncertainty at any time 15 
b) Occasional uncertainty 23 
c) Some areas of uncertainty, others O.K. 23 
d) A lot of uncertainty 0 
e) The respondent's responsibilities 11 
are not defined at all, so they 
work them out as they go along 
72 
31.9/o of the respondents ticked "some areas of' uncertainty, 
others, O.K.", none ticked "a lot of uncertainty", but 15.3% of 
the respondents ticked that they worked out their responsibilities 
as they went along. This means that 47.?% of the respondents are 
not sure about their area of responsibiL.ty. Thi~ situation can 
also be ascribed to the lack of efficient control systems described 
in connection with the previous questione 
Question 10 concerns the amount of information managers have 
access to vl.1en doing their job which is to co-ordL~ate the efforts 
of their unit. 
The answers were as follows: 
6 respondents ticked (No information at any time) 
28 " " (occasional information) 
11 II II (some areas of inadequate information, 
others O.K.) 
6 
" " 
(A lot of information) 
21 
" 
II (All the information they need) 
The f.d. for the first alternative, which 6 managers ticked, 
shows that as far as''--those managers are concerned, either a) their 
responsibilities are too limited, or b) they believe themselves to 
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be so experienced in doing their job that they do not need 
information, or c) they perform the sorts of jobs which can be 
executed with very little information. But those 21 managers 
(29.2%) who ticked "all the information they need" must be doing 
their jobs conscientiously. 
Question 11 asks how often the managers are held accountable 
for what they do. The results were as follows: 
a) More than once a week: 12 respondents were held accountable formally 
b) Once a week: 
c) Once a month: 
d) Once a season: 
18 
19 
7 
6 
3 
9 
8 
none of 
14 
6 
2 
" " 
II II 
II 
" 
II II 
" " 
" 
II 
" 
II II 
" 
II 
n 
" 
" " 
n 
II 
" 
" 
II 
II 
n 
" 
II 
II 
II informally 
" rormally and 
informally. 
11 formally 
" inf onnally 
" rormally and 
informally 
" rormally 
'' informally 
" formally and 
informally 
" formally 
" inf arm ally 
" formally and 
informally 
The largest nunilier of respondents felt they were formally held 
accountable for what they did, the next largest number informally, 
the last both formally and informally. This means that managers are 
mostly (72.2%) held accountable formally for what they do and that 
66. 6% of the r.espondents are held accountable informally. This 
indicates that 17.8%_ and 33.4% of the total respondents feel that 
they are either not held accountable formally or not held accountable 
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informally. · But the researcher was informed by a senior manager 
that in fact every one who works in the Company is· held accountable. 
for what he does. But, the degree of accountability varies accord~ 
ing to the manager and whether r.a is supported by higher authorities 
or not. Some managers, especially in the lower echelons, who 
believe their job performance is good, do think they should not be 
held accountable for wh2.t they have done, or else they have never 
been held accountable. At least this is how they understood the 
question. 
Question 12 asked whether the managers thought that people 
senior to them in the Company had their responsibility more or less 
clearly defined or as clearly defined as they themselves did. 
18 respondents ticked "More clearly defined th~1 themselves" 
47 II II -·As " II as " 
7 II Q Less II " than " 
Question 13 asks if the managers thought people in the Company 
junior to them had their responsibility more clearly, as clearly, 
or less clearly defined than themselves did. 
13 respondents ticked "More clearly defined than themselves" 
39 
20 
n 
II 
n 
II 
As 
Less 
II 
" 
as 
II II than II 
The major difference between the answers to the last two 
questions, lies in tha number of respondents who thought that 
people senior to themselves had their responsibilities more clearly 
defined than they did, and those who thought those junior to them 
had their responsibilities more clearly defined. (The number of 
respondents who thought the latter was 13 or 18. 1%). This means 
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that there is no clear-cut definition of responsibilities, and 
even some of the managers in the low echelon felt that they 
had their responsibilities more clearly defined than their 
~uperiors. This could indicate that a certain percentage, 
~. 18 .. 1% , have enough influence to obtain a more clear definition 
of their responsibilities than others. Another point which 
emerges from the comparison of these two questions, is that as 
we move down the managerial hierarchy the percentage or "Less 
clearly defined responsibilities" increases. 
Question 14 deals with the questio'l, whether this Company 
would achieve more if individuals' a) formal responsibility, 
b) formal authority and c) formal accountability, were: 
1. More clearly defined 
2. Less clearly derined 
On Section (a) the respondents' answers were as follows: 
70 respondents believed that the Company would achieve more if 
individuals' fonnal responsibility was more clearly defined. 
2 respondents believed that mare would be achieved if it was less 
clearly de:f'ined. 
Answers to Section (b): 
Again 70 respondents believed the Company would achieve more if 
individuals' formal authority was more clearly de:f'ined. 
2 respondents believed more would be achieved if it was less 
clearly defined. 
Answers to Section (c): 
69 respondents believed the Company would achieve more if indiv-
iduals' formal accountability was more clearly de:f'ined, and 3 that 
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more would be achieved if it was less clearly defined. 
If we calculate the mean percentage of the managers' 
answers for the three sections, we find that 96 o 7f:, of the 
total number of respondents believed that the Compnay would 
achieve more if individuals' formal responsibility, authority 
and accountability were more clearly defined. This very high 
percentage gives a clear indication of the lack of proper 
definition of responsibility, authority and accountability, for 
there was no written job description clearly defining these for 
each job, and this in turn meant that a loose organisational 
structure existed in the Company. This is one of the main 
reasons why most of the managers were not satisfied with the 
+ current control systems. 
Question 15(a) asks how often the respondents seek advice 
or (b) seek assistance, or (c) seek instructions from the listed 
categories of people. r.Ta.ljJ:e 30 below gives the figures for 
their responses. 
(a) Table No. 30 (b) (c) 
Degrees of seeking advice Degree of seeking 
Assistance 
Degrees of seeking 
Instructions 
1 2 ~ 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 .-
Factory manager: 
18 3 18 4 28 12 9 15 16 19 14 7 13 14 23 
1.1ember I I of B. D.: 
49 7 8 3 3 44 9 5 9 5 45 6 7 6 8 
I I I Immediate superior: 
14 1 15 15 27 11 9 14 17 21 9 6 10 23 24 
I I I 
Colleagues: 
15 15 10-. 14 18 19 11 15 15 12 27 8 11 13 13 
I I I 
Subordinates: ., 
22 13 9 10 17 21 16 12 8 15 37 9 9 7 10 
I I I 
Other members: 
29 9 11 _2_ 14 30 12 13 8 8 39 10 14 5 4 
+See my comment on Q.8 in the M.c.s. Section of' the questionnaire.p. 242. 
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Looking horizontally across Table No.30, we see that the 
respondents who sought advice from their supervisors, ticking 
degrees 4 and 5, constituted the highest percentage (42 
respondents) a result which indicates a pr~ctical approach to 
' 
getting advice. The next largest groups from whom advice was 
sought were Factory Managers and Colleaguesp each with the same 
percentage. As most of the respondents' jobs are in the factories 
and as the factory manager has the authority to supply fonnal 
information, these figures reflect the importance of his position 
as a sour0e of advice. The reason why the group of "Colleagues" 
scored the same percentage as the "Factory Manager" group, was 
because the cultural norms of most managers who remain on the 
same level of management for long perio.is of time would tend to 
increase their cognitive interconnectedness, and encourage them to 
+ 
seek all kinds of co-operation among themselves. Looking at 
degrees of seeking assistance, we find slightly less assistance-
seeking from superiors and colleagues, but slightly more fran 
members of the Board of Directors. Although the nwnber of 
members of the Board of Directors is small, they possess influence, 
especially in the Administration Office. Looking at the same 
degrees (4 and 5) for seeeking instructions and comparing the 
figures with those for seeking assistance, we find the percentage 
slightly higher in the case of "Factory Manager", much higher in 
the case of "Immediate superior", lower in the caf::e of "Colleagues" 
and exactly the same in the case of "Members of B. D. ". This reflects 
very natural behaviour, as the first thre~ 9ategories of people 
have the authority to give instructions. It follows that the 
',_ 
+ See comment on Q.4. 
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receiver of instructions has an obligation to carry them out. 
Besides these groups of people constitute the normal channels 
to which the respondents would look for instructions. 
Question 16 Section (a) e.sks hov1 much of the information 
used by the respondents in their job is stWPlied by the formal 
information system? Their answers were as follows: 
5 Managers 'ticked less than 10}b 
5 II II between 10% - 25% 
9 II II II 26% - 5ofo 
~1 II II II 51%- 75% 
32 II II II 76% - 100Jb 
These results mean that only 44.4% of the total number of 
~.qtt-~,~;~c 
respondent managers believed that 76% - 10Q?0 of ~heir·:informa.tion 
was supplied by the formal information system. This conclusion 
indicates that there is a lack of formal info~tion supplied to 
the Compa..'lY managers, si:nply because of the inefficiency of the 
information systems existing in the Company. 
Section (b) asked whether the managers considered the 
percentage shown in Section (a) as an indication of : 
a) Too many formal infClt'mation systems. 
b) Approximately the right number of formal infClt'mation 
systems. 
c) Too few formal information systems. 
Their ans•aers were as follows 
9 managers ticked a) 
28 " 
35 lr 
II 
" 
b) 
c) 
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This means that only 12o5% of the respondents believed that there 
were too many formal inf'onnation systems supplying feed-back, and 
thus enabling managers to compare targets with actual performance~ 
and to take corrective action when deviations ocoured. A control 
system is usually designed to tell managers how near they are to 
the course the Company has planned, but if 1 as most managers 
believed, they did not get enough feedback, how could they assess 
their performance in relation to the planning targets set by the 
Company'? 
The researcher found that there were no serious studies to 
provide the Company with fonnal infonnation systems to suit its 
objectives, nor was there ~ serious appreciation of infor.mation 
systems by top management 1 who behave mostly as authoritarian 
leaders 1 and prefer full information to be supplied only to certain 
members of the Company o 
Questions i 7 to 24 deal with the amount of influence the 
respondent managers have or should have over, (a) the development 
and design of the management information systems in their unit end 
in the Company as a whole, (b) the development and planning of the 
policies to be followed in their unit and in the Company as a whole. 
The respondents had to tick the degree of influence on a 
scale running from 1 (none) to 5 (a great deal) degrees 4 and 5 
' 
implying - considerable influence. The respondents' answers were 
as follows: (See Table No. 31) 
-. 
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Table No. 31 
On Section (a) 
No. of managers 
who ticked degrees 
1. Managers answering 
on the amount of inf-
luence they have in 
their unit. 
2., Managers answering 
on the amount of infl= 
uence they ought to 
have in their unito 
3, Managers answering 
on the amount of inf'l-
uence they have in the 
Company as a whole. 
4. ·· Managers answering 
on the amount of infl-
uence they ought to 
have in the Company as 
a whole., 
On Section (b) 
4 
23 
9 
i8 
1.. Managers answering 23 
on the amount of infl-
uence they have in their 
unit. 
2. Managers answering 19 
on the amount of infl-
uence they ought to have 
in their unit. 
3. Managers answering 11 
on the amount of infl-
uence they have in the 
Company as a whole. 
4. Managers answering 18 
on the amount of infl-
ence they ought to have 
in the Company as a 
whole. 
5 
10 
31 
19 
17 
29 
7 
19 
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-
%of f .. d. of 
managers 
who ticked degrees 
4 5 
5.6 
25 .. 0 
It we take a close look at the percent~es o~ the respondents• 
answers to questions in Section (a), we find that 12o 5% and 5o 6% 
of them have a great and even a very great deal of influence 
(degrees 4 and 5) over the devolopment and design of management 
information systems in the Company as a wholeo Taking the mean 
percentage of' the last two figures, we arrive at the conclusion 
that only Wo of the respondents have a great deal o~ influence 
on the Company regarding development and design of management 
information systemso If we follow the same procedure on Section 
(b) ll we find that 15o3% and 9o r;b of the respondents have a greatll 
and very g1·eat deal of influence (degrees 4 and 5) on development 
and planning of the policies and operation of the Company as a 
wholeo Taking once again the mean percentage of the last two 
figures, we came to the conclusion that only 12o5% of the respond-
ents have n great deal of influence on the policies and activities 
of the Compaeyo If' we take the mean percentage of (a) and (b)~ 
we can conelude that only 10o 75% of the respondents have a great 
deal of influence on most aspects of the Company's activitieso If 
we make comparisons between the last percentage and the percentage 
of respondents in the previous question where 12o5%, who believed 
that there are too many fozmal information systems in the Company, 
we can easily find a strong correlation between the percentage of 
influence and the ~ount of formal information available to 
influential managerso 
This result helps us to assess the ~ourth set of related 
:factorsll and to discover whether there is a strong correlation 
between influence and. the ability to obtain informatio~'il as shown• 
in Figure 6o 
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Figure 6o 
i 
I '/ 
···~· 
·Influence Information Available 
Percentage of Influence and the amount of formal 
Information Available. 
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One final point: Almost all of the respondent managers 
felt that they should have had much greater influence than they 
aotually had in their unit and in the Company as a whole, as is 
shown in both 3eotion (a) and (b). This indicates that the 
Canpany needs to reassess its unspecified job descriptions, and 
become more flexible about concentrating authority; in other words, 
top management should adopt a less authoritarian policy. 
Conclusion: This aims at improving management in IoC.P~ Co., and 
other state industry, where poor application of l!anagement Control 
Systems was uncovered by field research. We must first emphasise 
that Management Control Systems are complex, involving much more than 
just comparing, measuring, and taking co:::-rective action. They 
require cu•efully d.aveloped control tools, considerable energy in 
uncovering hidden but significant factors and judgment in determin~ 
ing their importar~e, together with skilful execution to avoid 
negative backlash. 
In solving management control problems and exercising manage-
ment control, the perspective is therefore always that of a decision-
making business manager. Such a manager looks at how and why controls 
are developed, i.e. at the reasoning behind a control system, and 
at possible WS3s of using the control tools to better advantage. 
A proper use of Management Control Systems requires that factors 
beyond the tools themselves are taken into account, e.g. the 
purpose of the objectives of a corporation, the basis of standards, 
the assumptions behind figures, and the methods used in collecting 
and disseminating information. An effective manager does not 
'\ 
restrict himself merely to compliance. He also looks at the many 
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constructive ways in which the control tool or system can be 
employed to improve the use of corporate resourceso 
As we have seen from the analysis in this Chapter, there 
is a need to overcome several factors in I.C.P. Co. and other 
state industry as a whole, which adversely affect the efficiency 
of Management Control Systems, and are the cause of low product= 
ivityo I believe the most important of these factors to be: 
It is vital that management leaders should accept 
responsibility for the development and. growth of their society, 
should understand its histor,y and present state, and should have 
a clear vision of its future. A manage::- should also be a 
specialist, and have an understanding of the burdens this will 
place upon him as he uses a technology and management techniques 
that are new to his own society. Iraq is now experiencing a 
period of social reorganisation, and she has to face the fact 
that the management apparatus at different levels has proved 
inadequate to the demand placed upon it by this transition. 
With regard to the management executives in Iraq, I believe the 
following constitute the major obstacles to developing efficient 
Management Control Systems: 
(a) Top management is considered the monitor of the 
Company's objectives. It is important, that they 
should acquire the skills to judge when environ-
mental conditions require a change in objectives, 
and when and how such changes should be carried out. 
--~ 
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(b) There is a lack of knowledge, on the part of most 
managers, of scientific methods for the management 
and control of work in industrial units. This 
problem is also related to absenteeism and lack of 
the technical specialisation required for management 
control. It is essential in this context to apply 
· the axiom, "Put the right man in the right place". 
(c) Most managers are unable to cope with the problems 
arising from the principles, theories, and processes 
of the Management Oontrol Systems which are suited 
to development and production techniques. In short 
many management tools which could improve product-
ivity are left unused, consequently problems and 
obstacles abound. 
(d) Managers are not vd.lling to carry out their respons-
ibility to discipline incompetent subordinates and 
to apply rules. There are several reasons 'for this, 
the most import ant of which is because of the poli t-
ical influence of those who fail, or whose subordinates 
fail in their duties. This situation creates ill-
feeling among the rest of the manpower, from management 
to trade unions, and it reflects negatively on manage-
ment control, on productivity, and finally on the 
profitability o'f the Company. 
To end this conclusion, we would like to quote the statement 
of S. al-Samawi, which touches the cere of management problems in 
Iraq: \_ 
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We are required to build the state urganisations on a 
basis at once scientific and democratico This objective 
will not be achieved by ignoring the basic principles and 
limitations of the modern structure of a statee Rather 
we must strike a balance between the necessity to organise 
the affairs of the state centrally, and the democratic 
underst~~ding of the job of a revolution~ry stateo (13)o 
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'· 
. SUMMARY OF CHAPrER IV 
This Chapter deals with the main field research in the Iraq 
Cement Public Company. Here the researcher submitted a question-
naire to all managers of this Company from the level of supervisors 
to the General Manager • Their responses showed that the Conpauy 
suffered from a lack of good systems for control, and of suffic-
iently trained personneL As a result of this, most the 
respondent managers showed poor satisfaction with the present 
control systems in the Companyo The researcher's own e~riences 
of the Iraqi environment, as well as an analysis of the economic 
and management climate in Iraq (see Chapters I and II)» indicate 
that the major obstacles to effective management control are not 
always within LC.?o Coo 11 or the government bodies that implement 
planning and policies and direct this Company= s '()roductivityo 
The influence of the enviro11ment can often hinder effective 
controlo Actually negative influences can stem from the 
environment~ whatever its stage of economic evolution. Attitudes 
toward science, the status of technology, the provision of tee~ 
nical and managerial courses in universties, institutions, and 
firms, incomes, prices, regional development, the adequacy of 
transport system and the attitudes of trade unions. - all these 
can play a preponderant part in facilitating or obstructing the 
tasks of Management Control. 
\. 
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CHAPTER V 
A COMPARISON Bill'\'lE::.::t-T PRINCIPLES MID PRACTICES OF MANAGEMENT AND CURRENT 
MANAGERIAL PRACTICES IN srATE-OV.'NED HIDUSTRIES AJI'!D PARTICULARLY IN THE 
IRAQ; CE1v1ENT PUBLIC COI.1PANY. 
1. The Purpose of this Chapter 
This chapter is basically concerned with investigating the 
differences between two cultures with respect to the application 
of managerial principles and practices. The first culture is that 
of the developed industrial countries, including-predominately 
private enterprise economies, mixed economies like the U.K., and state 
managed economies like those of the Eastern European Countriese This 
has been described by British9 American or Eastern European scholars 
on management, as shown in Chapter IIIo The second culture is re-
presented by Iraq itself. In Chapter IV we have investigated the 
actual p1.actice of management in the case of Iraqi Nationalized 
Industries, represented by .the Iraq Cement Public Company, in part-
icuiar, while Iraqi Government policy and practices of management in 
Nationalized Industries in general have been presented in Chapters 
I. and II. 
2o Comparisons and Importance of tfunagement 
Recently, there has been considerable concern about manage-
ment practices in the third world. This concern was induced partly 
by the realisation of the important role management plays in economic 
development, and partly by the growth of international co-operation. 
One of the major concerns of most governments today, especially 
in underdeveloped countries, is the need to increase the standard 
of living of their people. The important role of capital and 
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technical knowhow in economic development has been recognised 
for a long timee Until recently many economists have tended to 
believe that problems of economic development could be solved by 
transfezringcapital and technical knowhow alone. However, 
experience and the natural course of events have shown that besides 
capital and technical knowhow, the human element also plays an 
important role in economic developmento 
The writer, who recognises this fact 9 states in his research 
of 1974 that: 
Economic development could flouriHh or decline depending 
on bCOnomic and technical factors, whose basic ca~se 
is "people". '11he skills of manpower in management 
knowhow, are essential to push the general developing 
processes forward in every country. But the important 
thing is "the attitudes" which will decide whether the 
opportunities for development wil~ be taken or not •• 
We could give a simple picture of the human factors · 
which encourage or hinder development in any country, 
by showing to what extent the ma~~gers or other 
people in control of resources possess the following 
necessary qualities: 
1o A flexible attitude towards change. 
2. Broad mindedness and ability for long term planning. 
3. Education and the required managerial skills. 
4., The ability to function as Managers and still 
integrate with their environment.(1) 
The recognition of the impertant role of management in 
economic development raises the question of whether management 
knowhow, can, like technical knowhow and capital, be transferred 
from developed countries to underdeveloped countries and used 
with similar effectiveness. In general the differences are much 
more fundamental than has hitherto been realised, as we shall see 
in this Chapter. ·t.t has become abundantly clear that management 
\ 
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. is indeed influenced by culture and other environmental factorsp 
for management does not operate in a vacuum. Managers are 
constantly interacting with 9 and influencing their environment 9 
while at the same time being influenced by .ito Culture, education 9 
economic conditions 9 social characteristics 9 the political 
atmosphere, and the legal framework of society most certainly 
affect managerial practices 9 philosophies and valueso Individuals 
bring to their managerial positions their own culture and 
personality traits. Their behaviour and attitudes as managers 
and workers reflect their culture and p~rsonalitieso M. Haire 
and his associates nave made this comment: 
When we look at the overall differences among groups 
of countries with regard to motivations and satis-
factions in the managerial job, we encounter fairly 
large variations in the patterns ~f motivational 
feelings • • • The factors underlying these dif-
ferences seem to be not only the degree of 
economic development of the country 9 but also the 
culture of the country in relation to business.(2) 
Professor Anant Negandhi, in his recent study of cross-cultural 
management, summarised major findings on the subject as follows: 
1. There is no one way of doing things, managers may 
achieve given objectives by various methodso 
2o There is no universal applicability of either 
authoritarian or participating-democratic 
management styleso In general, the United States 
can best be characterised as democratic-
participative in management style, while Germany, 
France, ~~d most of the developing countries are 
authoritarian in their management style. 
Authoritarian style is not necessary dysfunctional 
in developing countries. This may be verhaps 
the'right type" of leadership for them. 
3o There are both similarities and differences among 
the managers around the world. Similarities are 
exPlained in terms of industrialisation or 
industrial sub-culture. Differences are explained 
in terms of cultural variables. 
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4o More objective measures are brought to bear in 
making managerial decisions with respect to 
compensation, objectives, goal-settings, etc. 9 
irt the developed countries; while much subjective 
judgment (emotions, religious beliefs) enters · 
into the decision-making processes in developing 
countries.(3) 
3o Transferability of Management Knowhow 
From the controversy surrounding the transferability of 
management lmowhow 9 two schools of thought have emerged, the 
universalist and the environmentalist. The "univ~rsalists" 
claim that management is universal: managerial practices, 
philosoph:es, and principles are basically the same in all 
nations. There is no obstacle to transferring management knowhow 
from one country to another; environmental factors, such as 
culture, do not have much influence on management.(4) 
The "environmentalists", on the other hand, recognise the 
influence of environmental factors on management. They argue 
that manc.gerial practices, philosophies and principles are 
different in different societies because of the many constraints 
imposed by the environment on those societiesa Management is 
basically "culture bound". As this writer put it in his research 
publication of 1966: 
Managers from developed countries, have to overcome 
real problems in order to conduct the managerial 
affairs in underdeveloped countries in proper 
situational harmony without moving away too much 
from the situational aspects in their homeland.(5) 
Therefore, managerial knowhow from Britain or any other developed 
country cannot be transferred easily to underdeveloped countries, 
or British subsidiaries located abroad, and be used as effectively 
as in the United Kingdom •. 
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It would seem futile to argue and try to prove the universal~ 
ity or otherwise of management. Instead, comparative studies 
in management should try to discover the differences in the 
various aspects of management, concentrating on Management Control 
Systemso A review of the available literature on·the subject 
reveals the various ideals of Management Central Systems, and 
these then provide a standard for comparison with the current 
Management Control Systems in the Iraq Cement Public Company, in 
order to discover deficiencies in aspects of Management Control 
Systems in the Iraq Cement Public Company and the State 
Industry in generaL It is this that forms the aim of this 
Chaptero 
4o Statement of the Problem 
The main purpose of this chapter is to investigate the 
differences between Iraqi managers and those in developed 
countrieb, (particularly the U.K., the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R.) 
witn reference to the following three major features: 
1o Training 
2o Cost Control 
3 o Management Control Systems 
Beside their obvious meaning, these terms also involve questions 
of: central planning, profitability, environment, influence, 
authority; responsibility 9 infonnation, and satisfaction etco 
This has been demonstrated within the framework of Management 
Control Systems (see Chapter III) by a comparison of these 
features with Iraq.i Government Managerial and Economic Policy 9 by 
the interviews with several managers in seven Nationalized 
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Companies, and by the replies of the 72 respondent managers (see 
Chapters I, II, and IV). 
These factors have therefore, to be taken into account when 
we consider the differences and similarities between what is 
written on these subjects by British, American and Eastern 
European authors, and what the researcher discovered to be current 
practice in his research with the Iraq Cement Public Company in 
particular, and the Iraqi State Industrial Companies in general. 
The differences and similarities between the practices in Iraq 
and the principle and practice of developed countries are' con-
sidered on two levels, the first being that of management 
performance in the factories, and the second being the level of 
state owned industries. The survey on this second level in-
valves a comparison of management policies and practices. 
First: Differences in Management Performance at Factory Level 
A. TRAlliiNG 
With reference to the findings of Chapter III, I would like 
to quote G. Odiorne: 
Training is a programme to be followed to change the 
behaviour of employees. A well-designed training 
programme cannot be constructed in isolation from the 
organisation in which the behaviour change is necessary. 
The assessment of training needs must begin with the 
determination of the differences between the desired 
conditions and the current conditions within that 
organisation. The factors causing this difference must 
then be isolated and the training needs built around 
those factors which training can give. 
The British report by the Management Training and Development 
Committee emphasised the following factors: 
\ 
- The significance for effective management development 
of the "climate" within the firm. 
(268) 
= The need for senior executives to give the lead~ 
=The fact that all managers have responsibility 
for training, and 
The need to give scope for the individual manager's 
own efforts to improve his own performance. 
Looking at the questionnaire about training in Chapter IV, 
especially the answers to questions 19 29 39 4, and 59 we find a 
lack of training, a lack of appreciation of the benefits of train= 
ing programmes by top management, the non-existence of a training 
office in the Company and a poor appreciation of managerial toolso 
The answers also pointed to a need for more than one type of train= 
ing pro~amme for all the respondent managers, and most of the 
respo~dents themselves emphasised the need and importance of 
training, whether this was undergone in Iraq or abroado 
When comparing what has been written on this subject in dev-
eloped countries and to the actual situation in the Iraq Cement 
Public Company, we soon discovered that there is a big difference 
between what should be done in training and what is actually being 
don~ in the Company where the research was carried out. There is 9 
of course, a deficiency in the training programme not only in the 
above Company, but in almost all industrial companies in Iraq.(6) 
This deficiency can be considered one of the major obstacles to 
productivity in Iraqi industry as a whole. 
The Ministry of Industry and Mines recently realised this 
fact and started making serious efforts to overcome this deficiency. 
As Patrick Cockham put the matter in his recent analysis of the 
Iraqi economic situation: 
There is a chronic shortage of skilled manpower, especially 
at Middle Management Level • • • The Iraqi Government 
is particularly intent on increasing vocational training 
and raising the low level of productivity. This year's in-
vestment pro5Tamme shows an increase of B~fo in allocations 
for education. (7) 
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Bo COOT CONTROL 
The subject of cost control has been dealt with in Chapter 
III~ under the heading of Management Accounting Techniques 1 
Responsibility Centres, Standard Costing and Budgetar,y Control, 
and Responsibility Reportingo As all the information concerning 
cost control is considered to have applicability both in developed 
and underdeveloped countries, whatever their stage of economic 
evolution, so all the techniques of cost control could be 
considered stable points of reference f.arcomparison with current 
practice in either developed or underdeveloped countrieso Obviously 
each company has to design an accounti.."lg system that will reflect 
its own needs and objectives, according to up-to-date principles 
of cost aocountingo 
As we have discovered in Chapter IV, the use of accounting 
systems; especially cost control, is inefficient, and standard 
cost accounting has hardly come into use in any of the industrial 
companieso In addition, there are big differences between what 
is considered to be an efficient procedure in theory, and what 
really is one in practice, not only in the Iraq gement Public 
Company, but in all industrial ccmpanieso This deficiency can 
mainly be put down to the lack of appreciation of cost accounting 
tasks i<l industry as a whole, and the lack of specialised technical 
adr in . d "al . (B) c es most ~ ustr~ compan~eso 
Research which has been undertaken by team~:> of experts in 
the National Centre for Consultancy and Management Development 
in Iraq concerning cost systems in Iraqi industry, lerui to the 
following conclusions: 
. \ 
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6ofo of all the industrial companies claimed to be 
operating cost systems, but it is noticeable that 
all but 5{o of these systems employed simple and 
traditional methods~ characteristic of scientific 
infancy. These have not kept pace with teclmological 
and scientific developm~nt, and they employ mainly 
historical processes in calculating costs oooo 
If there is no integrated scientific system for 
costing in an industrial company, then there can 
be no integrated system for reporting and analysing 
any deviation in these companies. (9) 
As we have found, I.C.P. Coo, like other industrial companies, 
still applies actual costing, and only one compapy uses standard 
costing. · This means that the cost cor..trol system is not able to 
discover mistakes, and inefficiencies are not discovered until 
after the damage has been done. 
C. MANAGEi·lENI' CON'l'ROL SYSTEMS 
Her~ our coi!Ij_)arison will deal mainly with f~ctors which 
affect the efficiency and effectiveneos of Management Control 
Systems, as follows : 
1. Influence and Authority 
Chapter III reviewed the discussion of influence and authority 
by authors from developed countries. We see that J. Miner, for 
example, vli'ote about influence: 
A behaviour on the part of one individual which alters 
the behaviour, attitudes, feelings, and so on, of another. 
One person may influence another by virtue of control over 
sanctions, by persuasion, by pl~ing upon attitudes held 
toward him, by exercising control over significant aspects 
of the other person's environmenteaooo 
The theory of Bernard and Simon about the concept of authority 
namely, that a communication carries authority only if accepted by 
'\. 
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the receiver, upset traditional assumptions about the flow of 
authority from the highest point of a hierarchical structure. 
They added that the right to act, although delegated from above, 
must be met by a willingness and capacity to act on the part of 
the subordinate in order to be effective. 
As the definitions in Chapter III have a general application, 
and are part of management principle, they are re~_:lily applicable 
to the Iraqi environment. To check the responses of the managers 
in I.C.P. Co., relating to questions about influence and authority 
the follaNi~ procedure was adopted. The responses of the man~ers 
to all questions regarding influence and authority, i.e. questions 
6, 7 and 8 in the training part of the questionnaire, and questions 
2, 3 and 17 to 24 in Management Control Systems pE>rt of the question-
naire were reviewed together. The responses showed that the majority 
of managers felt that there was a slight dii'ference in degree between 
authority and influence in the I .. C.P. Co. In general this means 
that the degree of influence is not higherthan the degree of actual 
authority, except to a minor extent at the highest level of the 
organisation structure •.. This result ind.icatea that there is not 
much difference with regard to these two aspects of management 
be~Neen principles formulated by authors in the developed countries 
and the practices current in the Iraqi environment. The answer to 
questions 2 and 3 on influence and authority, in the Management 
Control Systems questionnaire, indicated that half of the respondents 
exercised influence among_ managers on their own level, ani 34;b of 
the respondents influenced the other ~~bers of the organisation 
\ 
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as a whole. However, this influence can be ascribed mainly to 
the social and cultural structure of Iraq which encourages people 
to work together for long periods.~~ so that we can describe this 
relationship as group behaviour rather than managerial influanceo 
Managers' answers to questions 17 to 24. indicated that only 10o 75% 
lbf the respondents exercised a "good deal of influence" on most 
of the Compa.ny' s activi tieso This proves that the majority of 
this Company's managers do not have enough authority or perceived 
influence to perform their jobs properlyo 
The c0mparison of the manqgement principles formulated by 
authors from developed countries and held to be applicable in 
every environ:nent, with the practice in IoC.P. Co., shows that 
there are real differences between the two and that the practice 
in :the CarrJ?any is les3 than efficient. These were our findings: 
i. Most of the managers did not have autho1•i ty equal 
to their responsibility. 
2. Authority was centralised by top management and 
perceived influence even more so. 
3o Most of the .Middle and Lower level managers felt 
that there was no equal distribution of perceived 
influence. 
2. Satisfaction 
R. .Anthony believes that control systems must derive fran 
the needs of the total organisation and are intended to influence 
managers to perform actions, which are in both their own and the 
organisation's best interests. P. Drucker wrote on management by 
objectives as folloNs: 
The overall objectives o~ a ~irm generally are 
established by top man~ement, yet it is desirable 
tor each subordinate manager to have a voice in 
setting his own objectives~ •• If he is involved in 
establishing his objectives, he will feel that the 
objectives are proper once they are set and will 
tend to accept them more readily. 
M. Barns and his associates admitted that: 
The healthiest organisation with the greatest potential 
for growth and the greatest success in human terms 
will be the organisation which can integrate its own 
objectives with the needs of the people and groups in it .. 
Question 11 in the training part of the questionnaire and 
Question 8 in the Management Control Systems part concern the level 
of satisfaction of the managers in I.C.P. Co. The responses to the 
first question indicated that 31.9.% of the respondent managers felt 
that the :principle of "putting the right man in the right position" 
was not always followed. The answers on question 8 showed that 
79.2.% of the respoudents were wholly dissatisfied with the current 
control systems ;n their Company. Actually there are many reasons 
for dissatisfaction, as mentioned by authors from developed countries, 
but it is usually assumed that one major and practical way of creat-
ing satisfaction is through the integration of the objectives of 
the organisation with the needs of the people and group within it. 
Although this principle is considered to have universal application, 
the rese~1er does not entirely agree, since the needs of the 
people within the organisation differ so very greatly. The implement-
ation of this inadequate solution in order to create satisfaction 
is the general trend in Iraqi management today. 
In conclusion, we can sa:y that the practice in the Company 
is Wlsatisfactory. 
(27 4) 
3o Information 
Allen and Gerstberger expressed the view that: 
The fundamental paradox facing the manager over a perioq. 
of time is the establishment of causal networks without 
closing himself off from ~ew kinds of information. 
Resolution of this paradox by the individual manager 
~ be the clue to effective performance. Effective 
use of information depende, in partP on the ability 
to integr~te the informationo 
Katz and Kahn argued that, multiple commtmication channels 
and checkil".g procedures provide the manager with a mechanism)) 
with which to avoid corrupting or being corrupted by his own 
information serviceo 
Lawrence and Lorsch admitted that: 
If poor relations force the manager to depend on bureau~ 
crati0 sources of information and t~ rely on documents, 
or to attend to information about the group at the 
exper~e of other kinds of information)) then the manager 
cannot cope effectively with the management system in 
which his group is embeddedo 
Although these ideas are supposed to show how to handle 
information in developed countries, they nevertheless reflect what 
is even in moat developed countries simply an ideaL L"'l Iraq, 
these ideas are seldom if ever applied in management performance, 
even though this would lead to a healthier situation. 
As we have seen in Chapter IV, in the responses to questions 
12 and 13 in the training part, 4 and 5 in the cost control part, 
5, 6, 7!) 10 and. 16 in the Management Control Systems part, most 
of the respondent managers canplained of the lack of sui table 
information and adequate feedback to enable them to i.rnprove their 
own job performance, either because they had little trust in the 
judgment of others, or because of the absence of honest judgment 
and fair control measurementso Most of the respondents claimed 
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that they needed information about industrial relations, job 
specifications, management principles, inventory processes, the 
cost of every step of production, cost accountSand work studyo 
Although most of the managers in I.C.P. Co. suffered from an 
information shortage, their answers to questioru; 5 and 6 in the 
Management Control Systemsopart showed that there are correct 
channels for receivir.g and giving information from or to members 
of the Company. The answers to question 7 proved that there is an 
inadequate supply of vital information reaching managers, simply 
because there is no written, studied systPm of information in the 
Company. Answers to questions 10 and 16 showed that in general 
there are too few formal information systems, as no serious studies 
have been made to pr~vide the Company with a formal information system 
to suit its objectives, nor was there real appreciation of information 
systems by top management, who behave mostly as authoritarian leaders, 
and prefer full i.nf'onnation to be supplied only to certain members of 
the Company. These findings make it clear that the information systems 
in this Company are largely unsatisfactory. 
4. Power and Bureaucracy 
As M. Barnes and his associates put it: 
The healthiest organisation with the greatest potential 
for growth and the greatest success in human terms 
will be the organisation which can integrate its own 
objectives with the needs of the people and groups in it. 
This concept can be applied to organisational units of any 
size, if only those in positions of authority recognise its import-
ance .. 
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Mo Weber noticed that a third influence on organisational 
behaviour is the concept of bureaucracyo Webster's New World 
dictionary~ defines bureaucracy as, "The administration of 
government through departments and subdivisions managed by sets 
of officials following an inflexible routineo" Mo Crozier 
elucidated bureaucracy by s~ that any organisation must 
obtain from its members a variable but always substantial amount 
of conformity. Members will conform partly voluntarily~ partly 
becauae of coecion. 
The responses to questions 13, 14~ 15 and 16 in the cost 
control part indica.ted that about half of the managers do not 
use budget committees, only 14 managers have a free hand to get 
on with their own budget~ and only 29 managers belieYed in using 
bud.getir.g and plan..11:ing as a means of rur,tivating their staff o 
This results in an indication that the Company's policy tends 
to be bureaucratic in natureo The same responses showed that 
only 20.5% of the Company managers have enough power to discover 
their own Company return on net capital employed. 
When comparing practice with principle, we can conclude that 
there is a correlation between the. two as far as bureaucracy is 
concerned. Human behaviour is now better understood and therefore 
more predictableo As a result today's organisations can and do 
rely more on indirect and intellectual means to obtain conformity» 
e.g., the conmunication structure and work flow, the technical 
setting of jobs, economic incentives. In respect of the power 
ooncept 1 there is a difference between principle and practice, 
and the pririciple is considered the more correct for achieving 
' \ 
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satisfaction among managers. So the practice in the Company 
is on the whole unsatisfactory. 
5o Responsibility and Accountability 
Co Barnard describes responsibility in broader terms as, 
"The power of a personal code of morals to control the conduct 
of an irutividual. " He added that "The behaviour of an organisation 
is affected by the individual .moral· code of those within it." 
Returning to the respondent managers' answers to questions 
12, 13 and 14(a) in the Management Control Systems par'.:;, we 
find the following results. The respondents believed that 
(257~) of the managers in the Ccmpany senior to themselves and 
(18.1%) of the managers junior to themselves, had their 
responsibilities more clearly defined ~han they themselves did. 
In response to question 14(a), 97.2fo of the respondents believed 
ths.t the Company would achieve more if' the formal responsibility 
of individual members of staff v1as more clearly defined. It was 
also found. that as we move down the managerial hierarchy, the 
percentage of "Less clearly defined responsibilities" increases. 
A theory of accountability, in addition to that of respons-
ibility, has been developed by some writers, notably Koontz and 
O'Donnel, who view it as, "The ability for the proper discharge 
of duties by the subordinate. " The concept of accountability, 
although it m:ay be useful in a military organisation, clearly 
has too strong an overtone of being a control technique. 
With regard to accountability, the respondents' answers 
to questions 11 and 14(c) in the Management Control Systems part, 
cz:· showed that 72. 2}o of them are fonnally held accoWltable for what 
(t\8) 
they do and 66.61~ of them are held accountable informally. The 
researcher was informed by a senior manager in the Company that 
every one who works in the Company is held accountable for what 
he does either formally or informallyo But the degree of 
accountability varies according to the individual manager and 
according to the degree of support ·he enjoys from higher 
authorities o 
On comparing the principles of responsibility drawn from 
texts produced in developed countries vnth the practice in the 
Company, we find very big differenceso These stem from the 
incorrect application of the responsibility principle in the 
Company. 
As for accountability, this varies according to the 
percentage of accountability held. by the respondents formally 
or il'l..form:!lly in the Companyo .Again it is apparent that there 
are same clif'ferences between the principles of accountability 
as they appear in text books and the practice of accountability 
in the Company. 
6. Reporting 
Ro Campbell describes responsibility reporting as a method 
for providing information for man~ement controlo He writes: 
One concept that received a great deal of attention 
is responsibility reporting. The objective here is 
to identify results with the executive responsible 
for producing the.'ll. Responsibility involves perf= 
ormance measurement, in which actual results are 
compared with pl·edetermined standards. This can be 
accomplished by introducing account classifications 
that parallel the Company's organisation plan in order 
that reports may be prepared to show, in financial 
terms, the results of the operations for which each 
individual is responsibleo 
, ( ?:79) 
So much for the text book account. To canpare this 
with actual practice in I.C.P. Co. we have to examine the 
answers of the respondent managers to the questions 6(a), 
(b), 7, B(a), (b) and 10 in the questionnaire about cost 
control. The answers to questions 6, 7 and 8 indicate a low 
level of efficiency in the cost control systems used by the 
Company. The answers to question 10 .indicated that about half 
of the respondent& never know how efficient their subordinates' 
pe~ormance is, because 45.&,% of the respondents either never 
prepared a report, or did not know how often they prepared a 
report on their subordinates' control of cost. 
The information about reporting as supplied by authors 
from developed countries suggests that it has cvmprehensive 
applicability in both developed and underdeveloped countries. 
There are however, big differences between the principles of 
reporting as laid dovm in text books and what is actually being 
.'}'; .. 
practiced by the Company for we have already noted the ineffic-
iency of cost control systems in the Company, (see Chapter IV). 
We can conclude, that the principles of reporting systems lhave 
not been properly applied. 
7. Organisation 
We have already discussed the concepts of western developed 
countries about organisation in Chapter III, under the headings 
of "Organisation", "What is an Organisation?", and uModern 
Organisation Theory". If we compare these concepts with what we 
found to be the practice of organisation in I.C.P. Co., the result 
·'\. 
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will show whether the principle is inapplicable or the practice 
incorrect. 
In Chapter III we cited some of the ideas current in developed 
countries. E. Brech's definition of organisation is: 
The structura of the responsibilities allcx:ated to 
the managerial, supervisory, and specialist positions 
Of the I formal' relationshipS that arise in the dis-
Charge of those responsibilities. 
Koontz and O'Donnel considered organisation to be: 
The establishment of authority relationships, with 
provisions for structural co-ordination both vert= 
ically and horizontally, between positions to which 
have been assigned specialised tasks required for 
the achievement of enterprise objectives. 
From this it can be seen that it is the structural relation-
ship which binds an enterprise together, and provides the frame-
work within which individual effort is co-ordin~ted. 
Let us now return to the respondent managers, who answered 
the questions relevant to the functioning of I.C.P. Co. and its 
efficiency as an organisation. The answers of the respondents 
to questions, 1, 2, 3, 7, 9, 12, 13 and 14 on the Management 
Control Systems par.t of the questionnaire were as follows: In 
their answers to question 1, most of the respondents showed 
enthusiasm for the Company's objectives, but in actual fact 
their answers do not represent the full reality of the situation, 
because the structure of the question was such as to provoke a 
positive answer from almost any manager, whatever his attitude 
towards responsibility. Answers to question 2 showed that there 
is some degree of exchange of influence among managers at the 
same management leveL This can be ascribed mainly to the social 
and cultural structure of Iraq which tends to encourage people 
to work together for long periods of time, so that they tend to 
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influence their colleagues as a result of long standing every 
day dealings with themo If we take a look at the basic 
questionnaire~ question 2~ we can understand this situation even 
better~ since more than 50}6 of the managers of this Compazzy have 
spent more than 6 years in their present positions. This gives 
f'\lrther evid.ente of' the stability of' the management personnel 
structure within the Company. Answers to question 3 indicate 
that the managers in general feel some obligation to exert a 
kind of' social influence on some of the other members of' the 
Company. Answers to question 7 ~ indicate that there are such 
serious shortages in the amount of' infonnation getting through 
to managers that their job performance is affected. Answers to 
question 9, indicated that about half of the respondents are not 
sure about the ext~nt of their responsibility. The answers to 
questions 12 and 13 showed that there is no clear-cut definition 
of' responsibilities. Answers to question 14., showed that the 
majority of the respondents believed t},at there was a lack of 
proper definition of responsibility, authority ana accountability, 
and this means that a loose organisational structure exists in the 
Company. 
The comparison between the principles laid down by authors 
in developed countries, and what we have discovered to be the 
practice in IoCoPo Co. indicates that these principles~ regarded 
as universal in their applicability~ have not been adequately put 
into practice in the Company o 
Second: Comparison of 1~nagement Policy and Practices at 
State Industry Level 
1o Central Planning 
It is obvious, that any successful Management Control 
System should depend on the simple princip~e of producing a plan, 
and then making decisions and taking action. The major difference 
between the planning produced in a free enterprise system arid a 
state owned enterprise system is that t~e main objective of the 
first system is to satisfy shareholders and consumers. Plans in 
this system are drawn up mainly by the ~oard of Directors of 
the enterprise 9 and if the enterprise is of medium or large 
size, the Board of Directors considers suggestions drawn from 
middle management level. In state ownea enterprises, plans are 
drawn up by a central committee which is part of the government, 
and the outline of these plans should harmonise with the central 
policy of the state. Theoretically the suggestions of the Board 
of Directors of state owned enterprises are taken into consideration 
before finalising the plan for the industry, but in practice the 
extent to which suggestions from the enterprises are actually 
adopted depends on the personality of the Board of Directors and 
their political influence. 
In Iraq the plans for long-term general policies on 
financing, production and investment, which embrace the public 
industrial sector as a whole as well as all other public sectors, 
are drawn up by the High Planning Council. For -the public 
industrial sector, the Council determines and approves the sug-
gestions prepared by the Consultation Council for Industrialisation. 
\ 
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Its suggestions are made in the light of preliminary studies 
of the economic and technical validity of any particular projecto 
Ota Sik admitted that in the Eastern European Countries 
'~he rigid centralized planning and management became the main. 
impediments to greater efficiency". He added: 
The existing system of planned management was not 
only unable to overcome the contraditions between 
the production trends; but that the very system 
of central management, relying more and more on 
p1u:ely e.dministrative methods, was deepeniJ;lg the 
discrepancies between the structure of production 
and the structure of requirements. 
In the U.S.S.R., the September 1965 Plenum introduced 
reforms in central planning by granting greater independence to 
individual enterprises. The number of indices in enterprise 
plans fi:xed from above by central planners ·.vas drastically 
reduced. 
If we refer to Chapter two (Public Company for Mechanical 
Ind~stries in Alexandria), we notice according to statute No.90 
(1970): 
The jobs of planning, following-up and co-ordinating, 
the issuing of financial statements and the supervision 
of the affairs of officers and employees, are all 
the responsibility of the State Organisation for 
Engineering Industry. However, every public company 
carries out the general plan by preparing the production 
requirements and manufacturing its products in order 
to fulfil its forecast budget. 
From the above mentioned process of central planning we 
can see that Iraq virtually follows the pattern of planning 
adopted in Eastern European Countries. In Iraq, as in the 
U.S.S.R. the approach to administration is srunmarised in the 
concept of centralized planning combined with decentralized 
." 
operational decisions. 
( 28.4) 
2. Authority 
The Presidium of the Council of Minister of the U.S.S.R. 
at the begining of the 1960's started to dele~ate more powers 
to some of the enterprise managers. D. Granick wrote on the 
subject: 
In actual fact, plant directors have possessed great 
authority. But in theory, they have not; and so they 
have constantly struggled to legitimate their 
power. 
As we have seen in Chapter four, only the General Manager and his 
consultative committee in I.C.P.Co. have enough authority to 
carry o1:.t the general plan by preparing the production require-
ments and manufacturing the products in order to fulfil the 
forecast budget. The writer noticed that the limitation of the 
authority granted, according to Granick, to Soviet enterprise 
managers, could equally apply to Iraqi managers. For instance, 
in September 1976 when I asked the general manager of I.C.P.Co. 
about the possibility of travelling in one of the Company cars 
to Kufa Cement factory to present the questionnaire to the factory 
managers,he replied: 
I am sorry I ca~not help you because I have no 
written permission from the State Organisation fer 
Construction Industry. Do you know that, if they 
appoint a person to a particular post, I do not even 
have the authority to purchase a chair and deck for 
hi8 office. 
I cannot see much difference between the enterprise Directors in 
Iraq and their counterparts in the U.S.S.R. in this respect. 
·-·-----
·--
·., 
'-. 
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3o Profitability Trend 
A. Kosygin remarked in his speech to the Plenum, that: 
The volmne of profit to a considerable extent 
characteris.es the contribution of each enterprise to 
the net income of the country, and controls the 
extension of production and improvement of the wel-
fare of the people. Prior to the September 1965 Plenum,· 
profits and the rate of profit were not basic indicators, 
and there were many planned loss enterprises. 
Iraq also realised that the State sector must not neglect 
profitab~lity when considering investment. Of course, there are 
social and political objectives as well as profitability targets 
in the state sectors, but profitability represents an index of 
management capability in using the economic resources which are 
placed at its disposal. The Vice President of the Iraqi 
Revolution Command Council in September 1976 exhorted all 
presidents of the State Organisations: 
To be responsible and to produce profit ••• Money 
incentives depend on p_rofits from production and profits 
imply high quality and great quantity. 
The thinking ·on profitability which took shape in Eastern 
European Countries in September 1965 is similar to the Iraqi 
attitude of September 1976, summarised in the previous quotation. 
4o EnvironnJent 
The environment within which the State-owned firms operate 
in Iraq can be classified as an environment of sudden, complex 
and rapid change, coupled with a high illiteracy rate among 
workers, and a middle management lacking in technical and 
organisational knoVthow. This situation has lead them to dislike 
the methods-of.control applied to their performance. They con-
sider that controJ\methods exist only because top management 
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does not have enough confidence in them. 
One of the layers of environment in any given nation, is the 
societal environment, which includes the economic, political, 
social, cultural and legal aspects of any nation. All these 
aspects played a decisive role in crystalizing the Iraqi 
environment, as we noticed from the findings in the field research 
in Chapters two and four. A-Negandhi in his recent study of 
cross-cultural management, found that: 
Most of the developing countries are authoritarian 
in their management style. Authoritarian style 
is not necessary dysfunctional in developing countries. 
This may be perhaps the right type of leadership for them. 
In ~nalysing Q.14 of the Training Questionnaire, we found 
that I.C.P.Co. :Management followed a highly auihoritarian style. 
I belie·, e that this style of management in I:caq is like that 
found in most of the developing countries and even in some developed 
countries, and the results from the impact of the societal 
environment of these countries. My experience indicated that 
this could sometimes be an effective style of leadership in Iraq. 
D. Granick described the Soviet Manager: 
If the manager's goals are established for him, 
their achievement is his personal responsibility. 
Often the drive to meet quotas will force him into 
illegal activities; this cannot be helped. It is 
a basic part of his tack to determine what is necessary 
in order to "succeed". 
This situation often leads him to behave as an independent 
business man in an authoritarian style. 
M. Ellman believes that the major social problem of the 
U.S.S.R. is: 
The irresponsibility of the administrative apparatus 
leading both to an unwillingness at all levels to take 
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responsibility for decisions, and to an arrogant 
treatment of the population by all officials from 
petty clerks upwards. 
The analysis of the findings of the field research in Iraq 
proved that there are a lot of similarities with the social 
problems of the management environment of the U.s.s.R. 
As a conclusion to this Chapter my major observations are: 
Iraq has chosen a central planning method for its 
development, and this basically requires previous planning to 
develop the managerial apparatus; the question now arises as to what 
strategies must be adopted in the process of managerial change. 
The researcher observes that it is essential to take account of the 
political and social indices of the Iraqi environment. Change should 
be introduced gradually, step by step, so that it can be gently ab-
sorbed into the Iraqi environment. Changes should be understood fully 
and objectively, and full account taken of social and economic cir= 
cumstances in the country, of the nature of its current industrial 
development and of the level of its production capacity. A subjective 
diagnosis of the social situation and its problems should then be 
made and upon this basis clear concepts should be developed for the 
operation of the country's managerial apparatus. The basis of 
successful managerial change is to start with that small part which 
attracts overall interest, to allow the change to prove its 
efficiency there and then to extend to other managerial spheres. 
According to this analysis, therefore, it is necessary to be flexible 
in adapting to the prevailing environmental circumstances within which 
Iraqi state -~pparatus works. 
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Summary of Chapter V 
This chapter is primarily concerned with the differences 
and similarities between, on the one hand the concepts, principals 
and practices of management and Management Control Systems.put 
forward by authors from the U.K.p U.S.A., U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia 
(see Chapter III), and on the other hand the current practices 
of Management Control in the Iraq Cement Public Company in 
particular (see Chapter IV), and the State Industrial Sector 
in Iraq in general (See Chapters I 9 and II). To examine the 
differences and similarities, we have ~oncentrated on three 
major areas: 
1o Training 
2. Cost Control 
3. Management Control Systems 
These thTee areas necessarily involve questions of influence, 
authority, the supply of information, satisfaction, central 
planning, profitability trends, the environment, etc.; 
Within the framework of Management Control Systems., 
The Chapter is divided into two sections: 
The first investigates the differences between the principles 
which have universal applicability described by authors from 
Western developed countries, and the practices currently applied 
by I.C.P.Co. This investigation concentrates on the differences 
in performance at factory level. 
The second section concentrates on the comparison between 
the managerial practices in the State-owned industries in Eastern 
•. 
European Countries~ as described by U.K., U.S .A. , and Eastern 
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European authors, and the practices currently applied by Iraqi 
State-owned industries (see Chapters I and II) The findings in 
the first section show that the differences in nearly all the 
investigated areas are rather large. These differences are 
considered one of the major obstacles to efficient Management 
Control Systems in the Company, and a major cause of the low 
level of satisfaction among the managers. The finding in the 
second section show that here the differences are much smaller. 
\ 
\ 
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1.a Introduction 
CHAPl'ER VI 
CONCLUSION 
The researcher believes that managerial processes tend to 
reflect the political and economic development of the country 
in which they operateo In industrial countries' managerial 
sciences have kept pace with the generu development of the 
countryo Ever sLiCe the industrial revolution the expansion 
of production has required the setting up of a managerial 
structure to deal with the ensuing problemso Iraq was unable 
to develop these structures at the tim~ they were developed in 
industrial countries, due to :foreign domination o:f the country o 
Iraq remained isolated until a :few decades ago not only :from 
teclmological development as such, but also :from its organised 
:framework, i.ee modern management knowhowo More recently, as 
Iraq has moved closer to a more advanced level o:f technology 1 
new problems have been created, becau~ie of the imbalance between 
the managerial requirements o:f an undeveloped society and those 
o:f modern technology. Industry may not achieve its :full potential 
unless scientific processes are adopted and the thinking and 
behaviour of' society become more disciplined. Now Iraq faces 
a shortage of' trained manpower as well as a serious lack of' 
managerial knowhow for industrial processes at their most basic 
level. In addition she has inherited a number of attitudes which 
in various w~s conflict with modern managerial processes, and as 
a result have effectively hindered the adoption of modern techniques. 
An instance of this is the tendency towards bureaucracy and the 
' :feeling of arrogance to the people camnonly held by members of 
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management. These factors are major obstacles which must be dealt 
with to ensure the smooth rur..ning of industry. Industrialisation 
is not an economic phenomenon in isolation, but requires a qual-
itative change in the structure of the society as a whole. Nqw 
Iraq has the financial ability to make vast improvements in her 
economic situation and the desire to benefit from progressive 
techniques. The problems are likely to arise from human 
factors in general and from their effect in management in 
particular. The underdevelopment of management will tend to 
have a limiting effect on the ability to execute new projects 
and it decreases the capability of management to exploit 
available energies a This in turn leads to low productivity, 
both qua1.itatively and quantitatively. 
The contribution of the private sector to gross domestic 
industrial products is rather small, but by 1980, as important 
state projects are completed, this contribution will be smaller 
still. Industrial production in Iraq is dominated by five 
important qualitative State Organisations and the companies they 
control. At present the economic development of Iraq is domin-
ated by public organisations in nearly all fields of economic 
activity, including the industrial. 
As the development of industry in Iraq is ~onsidered to be 
in its infancy , it is obvious that its most common problems are 
similar to those of the public s.ectors in general and derive from the way 
its .. present size was attained. The public sector of industry has .ex-
panded great~y during the short period that has elapsed since 
1970/71, and this has placed an enonnous responsibility upon the 
\ 
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inefficient and over-burdened management apparatuso 
(b) General Conclusions 
The general problems of the public sector of industry may 
be summarised in these two major considerations: 
1 o The public sector's performance is hindered by 
control systems which are not relevant to the 
new requirements of business. At present a high 
number of control bodies fail to see the difference 
bstween a public enterprise and an ordinary govern= 
ment departmento As a consequence, the bureaucracy 
and routinism of managers of public companies is 
usually more apparent than their initiative and 
efficiency. What is needed is a new formal control 
eystem for public enterprise in industry, incorp= 
orating a clear understanding of such requirements 
for efficiency as cost control analysis and product= 
ivity measurement. It may be the case that the 
scarcity of skills is responsible for the failure 
to employ these tools, but this would only ~ly 
that more effort must be devoted to the development 
of the appropriate skills. 
2o A huge industrial public sector, such as that in Iraq, 
definitely requires rational overall planning of its 
investment and production programmes. Iraq's planning 
efforts are certainly ambitious, and this places a 
great strain upon the management machinery. 
"\ 
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11 Though the five-year plan for the years 1976-1980 
has not been published, the investment programme 
I for this year envisages· spending :f)7. 9 bn., compared 
with an allocation of about $5 bn. in 1976. Of this· 
J b • k f • ( 1 )II f11k. ar3· 2 n. ~s eannar ed or ~ndustry. :Lp.e planners 
might have been expected to take account of the 
capacities of the middle and lower executive units, 
but they have not done so, with the result that 
their plans have become little more than statements 
o£ intent. The remedy would seem to be, at least 
in the foreseable future, to plan carefully taking 
into consideration actual managerial capabilities. 
The immediate need is for more trained personnel, 
better informational and statistical services, and 
a change in attitude towards the application of modern 
management control tools. The public sector of 
industry, which is under the direction of the 
Ministry of Industry and Mines and tht.1s follows 
a policy in line with the overall government prog-
rammes, should be encouraged to develop a series 
of annual programmes far production. If the 
authoritative bodies succeed in promoting the 
habit of programm1ng at all managerial levels, and 
at the same time succeed in improving information 
systems, statistics, and also control systems, then 
there may be a gradual move towards the stage where 
the ambitious five-year plan could become a reality. 
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2o Analysis of the First Field Research: Background to 
Management Control Systems in the State Industry. 
The information gathered during the first field research 
with seven state industrial companies in Iraq, and reported 
in Chapter two, together with the information contained in the 
introduction to Chapter one, led the researcher to make the 
following feasible recommendations for the improvement and 
development of the Iraqi industrial apparatus as a whole: 
1o ! general survey of management problems should be 
made, including scientific studies of their roots and 
causes, and of the influence ~f the historical and 
social background. Iraqi industry will not find 
solutions to its problems unless the origins of these 
problems are taken into account. 
2o It is important tr..at the basic axiom of "centralised 
planning and decentralised execution" should be applied. 
3o Continuous training should be given to staff and workers 
to increase the level of expertise and competence, and 
to create a supply of managers with the skills needed 
to carry out their jobs effectively. 
4o The National Centre for Consultancy and Management 
Development, should be expanded and further enriched 
with specialised personnel. This will give it more 
authority to serve and advise in the different 
managerial fields. Thus it would aid the National 
organisations in both a more comprehensive and a more 
specific wayo 
·, 
(296) 
5o The long-term solutions to the problems of the 
management apparatus must be the subject of a 
scientific plan divided into various stageso 
The first stage should propose the solution to 
the inmediate problemso This would encompass 
recommendations for exact job descriptions and 
£or the application of training programmes etco 
In the long term school and university curricula 
should be reviewed, as it is essential that 
education should consider the needs of industrial 
production, of the service sector of the economy 
and of the overall development of the countryo 
6a ~hasis should be placed on material and moral 
incentives for workers throughout the national 
organisations and a clear scheme should be set up 
to establia~ a system of work assessment based on 
studied stages, and an equal salaries and wages 
policy related to the economic situation. 
7o Clear scientific specification for jobs and the 
qualifications of employees should be established 
in order to eradicate the influence of prejudices 
among the workforceo Thus, those most suited for 
particular jobs would be selected irrespective of 
personal feelings or mood.so This would bring greater 
reliability to the system of job assessment, and 
through the right person being given the right postg 
\ 
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would also create a spirit of justice in the organisation. 
Ba A working plan should be provided for each department; 
it should be divided into stages while remaining flexible 
enough to ·allow for sudden problems a 
9o Attention should be paid to comparative scientific 
studies of control systems and rules in developed 
countries and in Iraqo 
10. A policy should be pursued of strengthening good human 
relations and directing them towards the service of 
productivity. 
11 o Opportunity should be given for low management levels 
to participate in decisions through committees and 
general meetings. This would enable correct decisions 
to be made and would give the lower managers a chance 
to develop their abilities and be promotcdo 
12o Attention should be given to influencing managers so 
that they become more positive and creative j) and 
develop a sense of responsibility for their work; 
this would eliminate the carelessness and lack of 
interest associated with a negative attitude. 
13o If local organisations are made more independentj) 
problems associated specifically with a particular 
region and the organisations working in it P could be 
more easily dealt with. Decentralisation could also 
help promote good human relationships and a general 
awanmess of personal responsibility P and could 
facilitate .. the 1 definition 1 of authority and 
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responsibilitiesa 
14o The managerial structures of all industrial 
companies should be reviewed so that duplication 
of responsibilities is minimised and the structure 
is sufficiently flexible to meet demands made by 
unforseen changeso This could help to : 
(a) decrease the overall size of the managerial 
apparatus and its attendant costso 
(b) decrease dependency on routine. 
(c) create simple and good methods of communication 
between the leadership and its subordinates, 
and between the subordinates themselves. 
Successful communication would allow the objectives 
of the company to be fully clarified and would 
guarantee that they were understood by those at the 
lower levels. It would also encourage top managers 
to consider the needs of lower level of management 
and the workforceo 
15. The tools of control systems should be modernised, 
control systems should be more widely used and more 
importance should be given to them. 
3. Management Control §ystems 
The first part of Chapter III discussed in detail, management 
control systems, techniques and training. The second part 
explained the managerial processes of the U.K. nationalized 
industries, and also considered the ideas and experience of 
management in State-owned enterprises in Eastern European 
Countries. The conclusions of the discussion are: 
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- An organisation is seen as a reflection of national 
political thinking, w}'l..ich is largely concerned with 
co-ordinating tasks through the use of legitimate 
authority.. An organisation is based on the fund.a-
mental, and usually implicit assumption, that the 
behaviour of' people is logical, rational and more-
over within the same system of rationality as that 
used to formulate the organisation.. People are 
thought of aa the means by which objectives are 
accomplishedo The distinctive qualities of modern 
organisational theory are its conceptual analytical 
basis, its reliance on empirical research data and its 
integrated nature., These qualities presuppose the 
assumption that the only meaningful way to study 
organisation is to study it in terms of a whole 
systelllo As to the purpose of organisation: one must 
conclude that organisation helps people to work 
together effectively towards the accomplishment of 
specific goals. It unites people involved in inter-
related taskso For work to be fully effective, a 
manager must know what specific a.cti vi ties he is to 
llllmage, who is to help him, whom he should report to 
and who should report to him.. In addition he should 
understand the structure of the entire group working 
together, his own place in it, and the official 
chann~ls of communication.. In brief, organisation is 
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essential to good management, without it managers 
cannot function properly, and management control 
systems become obsoleteo 
A control system is a means of bringing performance 
into conformity with planned action. According to 
T. Jerome, 
Control has one purpose and that is to act as 
a catalyst for lower management. A control 
system should be open-ended and emphasis 
should be on how to stimulate imagination and 
not how to force compliance. Management control 
should be concerned with balancing of the organ-
isational parts into a har-monious whole.(2) 
R.. Mockler admits that, 
Despite the diversity of control tools and 
situations, the basic approach in using these 
tools and dealing with each control situation 
is the same. ( 3) 
He adds that the management control process should: 
1o Diagnose the situation in order to define the 
problem and the method for dealing with it .. 
2. Examine the control problem and review the 
facts in order to find the key factors a:ffect-
il'lg the problem and its solution. 
3. Develop tests, and evaluate alternative control 
tools and systems, and W~S to implement them. 
4. Exercise control .. 
5. Prepare a written report if necessary. 
Financial control ensure: that the business enterprise 
operates within the funds available. The first step 
is to create a budgeting system where the costs of 
operation are estimated annually far ahead of time .. 
This is an excellent method of control, because it 
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reviews the facts related to future operations and 
requires a justification of the need for these op-
erations. Real financial controls begin to operate 
when there are funds ava:Uable for spendingo Funds 
are allocated to the various departments or the Company 
on the basis of their needs. Vfuen money is about to be 
spent actual control is exercised through auditing. 
Regulations on procurement guide fUnds judiciously. 
Auditors and accountants should be highly trained 
technicians. The maintenance of efficiency in financial 
control depends on success in training and motivating 
subordinate so 
Information is the lubricant of the contrr1l systemo It 
is the vital force upon which the organisation dependso 
Methods of providing it include teaching, communication 
and co~ordination. On the one hand the provision of 
information involves formal reports that deal with the 
causes and solutions of certain problems in business, or 
control reports that review trends. On the other hand, 
the provision of information includes merely informal 
talks. Whether formal or informal, information should 
relate to trend comparisons and should be limited to crit-
ical factors e 
As for training, it -must be the policy of th~ Board of Direc.= 
tors to see that the importance or management development 
is recognised throughout the Company, as the British Central 
Training Council statede It will be the particular respons-
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ibility of the senior executives to keep under review 
the training policies of the organisation as a wholep 
Against the background of rapid technological and social 
change, managementtraining and development should be regarded 
as a continuous process applying to all managers, both as 
individuals and ·as members of a team. 
In the western developed countries, firms make decisions by reference 
to the profit-motive; in the Easte~n Socialist Countries all 
decisions must be based on and conform to the plan. This 
generalization, while not wholly accurate*, does underline 
an essential difference between the systems, even if con-
siderations other tha.n direct profit expectations do in-
fluence the actions of managers in the west, and profit 
expectations do affect to some extent the behaviour of managers 
in the Eastern bloc. 
For instance the primary task of a Soviet manager, as we have 
noticed in Chapter three, is to fulfil the plan, or more 
strictly plans, since he is judged and rewarded according to 
a number of plan indicators. 
The role of the budget is "in all countries" to transfer 
resources, in accordance with government decisions, from one 
part of the national economy to anvther. The Eastern 
Societlist Com1tries are no different in this respect. However, 
the relative importance of the budget is very great there, 
because of the direct responsibility of the state for the 
bulk of economic life. 
·, 
*It does not apply, for instance, to most nationalized industries 
in the west. 
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We could conclude that the pressure to reorganise in 
order to keep up with the complicated progress of technological 
advance, will be great in the next decadeo As the rate of 
technology increases, the tools of control systems will become 
increasingly importanto It is doubtful whether ma~r companies 
in the future will be able to survive without major changes in 
production methods and the maintaining of a skilled work-force. 
:Managers who want to face change with confidence have to keep 
in touch with up-to-date management knowhow. 
4. Discussion of Findings in the Irag Ce;nent Public Company 
The empirical research in the Iraq Cement Public Company 
showed t.hat the Company suffers from serious deficiencies 
in applying knzyNledge of management control systems. 
These deficiencies may be summarised as follows: 
1 • The Coll\PanY suffers from lack of t:-aining 
and a lack of appreciation of the benefits 
of training programmes by top management. 
BesicJes this, there is no training office 
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in the Company~ and most of the managers in the Company 
emphasised the need and importance of training~ while 
about half of the respondent managers mentioned their 
interest in receiving their training abroado This result 
not only indicates that the managers feel there is a 
serious shortage in training, and that they are interest-
ed in overcoming this shortage ll but it also implies that 
they have little confidence in the method and efficiency 
of any training which could be given in the Company or in 
th.._~ countryo For instance~ the National Centre for Consult-
ancy and Management Development is considered to be the 
. biggestp most experienced and best equipped Centre for 
managerial training in Iraqp but even so, only 20 
respondents out of a total of 72p preferred to have their 
tl'aining in this Centre o 
2o Meat of the Company's managers complained of insuf"ficient 
authority and influenceo Their responses showed that the 
re~onsibility they held was much greater than their 
authority. Also the degree of actual authority of the 
respondents' superiors and degree of their perceived 
influence P mean that managers always tend to believe that 
their superiors have more influence and authority than 
responsibility, especially when the superior is in the 
first echelono This means that there is high authority 
and perceived influence concentrated in the hands of top 
management o This situation would cool the enthusiasm 
of middle and lo.ver management, and decrease their 
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initiative and confidence in their abilitieso 
3o The responses of the respondents showed that the Company 
information system is not efficient, since the majority 
of the respondents indicated that they do not have 
enough information to enable them to function properly 
in their jobs, and mentioned areas where they need more 
informationo Besides this lack of inf'ormation, more than 
half of the respondents indicated that the higher levels 
of management followed rather an authoritarian policy~ 
a.1 though we f'otmd that the Company used reasonably 
correct channels for giving information to and receiving 
it from managerso Only 12o 5% of the respondents believed 
that there were too many formal !.nformation systems avail-
abJ.e to pro--.ride feedbacko Without feedback information, 
managers cannot compare targets with actual perfonnance, 
and then take corrective acticnwhere deviation occurso 
The researcher found that there were no serious studies 
to provide the Company with a far.mal information system to 
suit its objectives, nor was there any serious appreciation 
of infonnation systems by top management, who mostly provide 
authoritarian leadership, and prefer full information to 
be supplied only to certain levels of the Companyo As a 
result we can say that influential managers are significantly 
different from non~influential managers in the amount of 
information they find available to assist them in their worko 
4o The accounting system, especially the cost control system, 
is not helped to fulfil its task of producing accurate 
costing at the right time, because the Company, up to the 
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time when the research was made~ had no standard costing 
systemo This, the Manager of the Accounting Division 
attributed to the lack of competent cost accountants., 
Further evidence of poor perfor.mance in the cost control 
system is that about half of the respondents either never 
prepared reports on their cost control or answered that 
they did not know how often they prepared reports~ and 
similarly most of them either never prepared a report on 
their subordinates' cost control, or did not know how often 
they prepared such reports.. This result indicated clearly 
that a good percentage of this Company's managers do not 
know how efficiently their subordinates handle the costs for 
which they are responsible, and this means they have a loose 
control over their subordinates' performance.. This deficiency 
in the Company system is considered one of the main reasons 
why the Company accumulated losses~ as shown in ·niost. of .. the final 
general balance sheets in Chapter II .. 
About half of the respondents do not use budget committees, 
which means that there are no serious studies on budgets, 
and that the Company's policy tends to be bureaucratic in 
natureo Again only 14 managers have a free hand to get on 
with their own budget, which :indicates a high level of 
centralisation of authority, and similarly only 29 managers 
believed in using budgetary and planning as a means of 
motivating their staff, which indicates haw much budgeting 
and planning can mean to the staff o We also found that only 
1.5 managers knew the return on net capital employed by their 
\ 
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Company last year o 
5o Although the research indicates that there is quite 
a good exchange of influence among managers at the 
same level of management, this kind of influence could 
be described as a sort of cO=operation or social inf'lu~ 
ence, ste:mning mainly from the social and cultural 
structure of the Iraqi people, who tend. to work together 
for a long timeo On the other hand, we found that the 
intl.uential people in the Comp-my are few and concentrated 
mainly at a high level of managemento This in!'luence in 
business was found to be connected with authority, since 
middle ar.si lower management were discovered to suffer from 
the lack of a degree of authority equal to the degree of 
their responsibility. 
6o Over 96% of all the respondent managers indicated that 
the Company would achieve more if individuals' formal 
responsibility, formal authority and fonnal accountability 
were more clearly definedo This very high percentage 
gave a clear indication of the lack of proper definition 
of responsibility, authority and accountability,due to 
a lack of properly formulated job descriptions for each 
post. This means that the Company structure is inadequate. 
·. 7o Almost half of the respondents were not sure about the 
limits of their responsibilities, and we found., moving 
down__ the managerial hierarchy, an increase in the 
percentage. of "Less clearly defined responsibilities" o 
When there is no clear-cut definition of the managers' 
(308) 
responsibilities, the infor.mation given to Company staff 
will tend to be less predictable.+ This and most of the 
other shortcomings mentioned above were the result of the 
absence of known and written management control systems 
suitable to the objectives of this Company. 
8.. Only 10.75% of the respond~nt managers have a "good 
influence" on the majority of the Company's activities. 
Another point is that almost all of the respondents felt 
they should have had much greater influence than they had 
in their unit and in the Company as a whole. This 
situation emphasises the need to reassess unspecified 
job descriptions 9 and to have more flexibility regarding 
the concentration of authority by top management, and to 
adapt the principle of "putting the right man in the right 
place", if the Company is to achieve manpower satisfaction. 
To obtain this sort of satisfaction in Iraq, a very canplex 
solution is required. In the researcher's experience, 
when Iraqi managers feel that their superior is just, and 
has all the required qualities of a leader, then dissatis-
faction is much reduced. To understand this attitude in 
present-day Iraq, we have to realise that at the root of 
it lies a distrust towards superiors, bred by several 
centuries of untrustworthy rulers. Only by considering 
all the factors which have shaped the current standards 
of the Iraqi people's social behaviour, can top manage-
ment _!1.ope to overcome all the managerial problems and 
+ Please see No. 3 aboveo 
(309) 
other shortcomings, mentioned in Chapter IV in the 
analysis to the answers to question 8 in the Manage~ 
ment Control Systems section and question 11 in the 
training sectiono This alone will ensure the best 
possible satisfaction of the work-force, conducing 
to raised productivity and increased prosperity for 
their organisationo 
The empirical research in Chapter IV assesses four factors 
and.their interrelationships, namely: 
~ The extent of any difference between authority 
and perceived influenceo 
We found after analysing the responses of the respondents, 
that there is a slight difference between authority and influence 
among the managers of this Companyo This means in general that 
perceived influence was not higher than practiced authority, 
except at top level management, where high authority and 
influence were both maintained. 
Bo The extent to which the lack of appropriate 
training had led to lack of improvement of 
management information systemso 
Analysis of the managers' responses regarding training 
indicated that there was a serious lack of appropriate training, 
and as we found that only 13 managers had attended management 
information programmes, we could understand the strong correlation 
between these two factorso 
(310) 
Co The level of satisfaction with current control 
systemso 
We found that 79.2% of the respondent managers were 
completely dissatisfied with current control systems in the 
companyo 
Do The relationship between influence and the 
obtaining of information. 
The research showed that only 10.75% of the total 
number of managers in the Company had "a good deal of 
influence" on the majority of the Company's activities, and 
onlY 12.5% of the total number of managers believed that there 
was too much formal information in the Company. A clear 
relationship between these two factors was found to exist. 
5o Comparative Study 
a) Section One 
In the first section of Chapter V9 a comparison is made 
between the principles of Management, and Management Control 
Systems, discussed in Chapter III, part one, and usually 
taken to have universal applicability, and the practice of 
Management and Management Control Systems presented in Chapter IV. 
The first major finding is that practice at factory level does 
not conform to the accepted principles. 
However, it is recognised that these principles have been 
published by authors from western developed countries, while 
the practice described is that of Iraq. The next question to be 
considered is, therefore, the significance of this mis-match 
between principle~ and practices. Does practice in Iraq simply 
', 
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fall short of a theoretical and practical ideal because of 
ignorance or lack of experience? We found that the environ-
mental elements, and especially the cultural context within 
which managers have to operate in Iraq 9 do riot :in .fact corresl?ond 
with the life and experience of managers in developed countries. 
The comparison between principles and practices concent-
rated on these following areas within the framework of Management 
Control Systems,in order to point the way in which the I.C.P.Co. 
should develop: training, cost control, influence and authority, 
satisfaction, information, power and bureaucracy, responsibility 
and accountability, reporting and oreanisation. 
Current practice in the Company could be considered 
generally unsatisfactory, but this practice should nevertheless, 
only be developed after careful consideration of the influences 
stemming from the environment. It is essenti8.l to adapt 
mcdern principles and management knowhow to suit the environment, 
and the transition must be tackled through a better understanding 
of the present positiono 
b) Secion Two 
The second part of this Chapter draws upon the information 
about the managerial and economic systems in Iraq presented in 
Chapter8 I and II. It examines their effect upon the managerial 
task, comparing them with practices in the State-owned industries 
in Eastern European Countires. The second main finding of the 
Chapter is that while these systems have effect at the level of 
industry-wide policy-making, they do not have an immediate 
influence at factory levelo 
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SUMMARY OF OHAPl'ER VI 
This Chapter is the conclusion of the whole-thesis 9 
and illustrates the complexities of the last five chapterso 
These chapters presented ~~ integrated view of management 
control by focusing in Chapter I on the nationalisation 
policy, on how the cement industry was established in Iraq, 
the position of the public sector in economic life, ~'ld the 
attitude of the public sector towards managemento 
Chapter I could be considered a summary of the baokgrOWld 
of Iraqi industry from the standpoints of .management and 
economicso 
Chapter II was the result of fi.eld research in Iraq, of 
inter.~.:..ewing several Iraqi managers in seven different indust-
rial state companies. These companies were ~elected from the 
:five dominant qualitative Industrial. State Organisations, in 
order to obtain comprehensive background infonnation about the 
Management Control Systems in Iraqi state industl:-yo Discussion 
focussed on these subjects: the current objectives of the 
canpany, management structure, budgets, control reports, cost 
control, information systems and how problems concerning the 
efficiency of the companies were investigatedo The research 
disclosed a seriously low productivity level, and an accum-
ulation of losses in almost all the companies included in the 
field research. This result reflected the lack of skilled 
~ower in both teclmical and managerial aspects, the 
deficiencies of cost control and information systems, and 
generally inefficient systems for control. The purpose of 
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this Chapter is to present an accurate picture of the 
current managerial situation and the standard of Management 
Control Systems followed in Iraq State Industry as a vrholeo 
Chapter III contains two parts 9 the first one is an 
analytical survey of the literature on Management Control 
Systems theory. The second part explains the managerial 
processes of the U.K. Nationalised Industries, and discusses the 
ideas and experience of Management in ftate-o\vned enterprises in 
Eastern European Countries. This enables inferences to be drawn 
from the difference between what is generally accepted in 
Management Control theory, as presented by British or American 
authors, and the practices tested by the researcher in I.C.P.Co. 
at facto~7 level, and then at the level of industry-wide policy 
making, and recorded in Chapter IV. 
Chapter IV deals with the main field rese2~ch in I.C.P.Co., 
and the findings stemming from the responses of managers to the 
presented questio~~ire, which was designed to test the current 
Management Control Systems and the training level in the 
Company. It revealed that there is a lack of good systems for 
control, and of sufficiently trained personnel. As a result 
of this, most of the respondents showed dissatisfaction with the 
present control systems in the Company. The empirical research 
presented in this Chapter assessed four factors and their inter-
relationship, namely: 
(a) The extent to which there was a diffe~ence between 
authority and perceived influence. 
(b) The extent to which the lack of appropriate training 
' \ 
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had led to lack of attention to the improvement of 
management information systemso 
(c) The level of satisfaction with current control 
systemso 
(d) The relationship between influence and the obtaining 
of information. 
Chapter v focused on the comparison between the principles, 
drawn from a survey of the literature on Management Control Systems 
(Chapter III), and the practices of Management Control Systems 
revealed through the empirical research in I. C. P. Co. (Chapter IV). 
After assessing the comparisons, we found that the practice at factory 
level could be considered generally unsatisfactory. The second part 
of the comparative study draws on infonnation about the managerial 
and economic systems in Iraq presented in Chapters I and II. It 
examine;: their effect upon the managerial task and draws a comparison 
with the situation in the State-owned enterprises in Eastern European 
Countrieso The finding in the second section shows that here the 
differences are much smaller. 
The comparison between industry-wide policy-making in Iraq 
and the experience of Eastern European Countries in this respect, 
concentrated on these areas; central planning, authority, profitability 
trends, and environment. 
The finding of this second section is that the differences 
between practices in Iraq and in State-owned industry in Eastern 
Europe are much smaller than the differences discovered in Section one 
between Iraqi practices and the commonly accepted principles of Management 
and 1mnagement Control Systems. 
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The central problem, reflected in the specific recommendations 
recorded in the separate Chapters and summarised above, is the need 
to improve the attitude of the work-force and their ability to 
co-operate, and this holds good both for the I.C.P.Co. and for 
state industry as a whole. Positive co-operation among workers 
and management, can only be achieved if the authoritative -bodies 
in the Ministry of Industry and Mines first consider the environmental 
influences in order to understand the present situation better. Modern 
know-how can -then be adapted to the needs of Iraq a."1d a situation 
created in which balanced control can exist, in which compliance can 
be combined with creativity, and co-ordination with efficiency. The 
specific recormnendations in this work are put forward as means to 
this end. 
(316) 
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APPENDIX A 
EXIUBIT ONE AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
EXHIBIT ONE 
1 o Does the organisation have clear objectives 
IF YES = wat are they? 
2. Who seta the objectives? 
3. How often do objectives change? 
4o Does the organisation have a clearly definad 
structure? 
IF YES = obtain a copy o 
5. How often is the etroctux-e reviewed? 
6o Whet purpose does the structure fulfil? 
7 o Whose :responsibility is it to monito:&" the success 
or failure of the struotUE9? 
8. Does the ox-ga.nisation prepare a budget? 
IF YES = obtain a copy e:n.d/ or find out o 
9. For how mtmy years ahead 'is the budget prepared? 
11. Is there a manual to help managers construct 
~he budget? 
IF YES - obtain m. copy 
YES = NO 
YES = NO 
YES = NO 
IF NO = hem do I!!Wlegers prep~ their budgets? 
12. Is the budget prepared by the organisations senior 
management or by their wccrunt&Rllt~S? 
13 o For a given department = say maintenance = who 
prepares the department's budget? = 
(i) The managex- on his cmn 
(11) The .IM.ml.g6X" with his boaiD 
I 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
(vi) 
The manager with his aupeX"Visors 
The l'iW'l8gar mth thra lllCCOWiltt:mt 
The ~er in consultntion with thra 
production a~a~isora 
The m&ne\ger is told by his botiUilo 
14o How frequently era control reports aent to the DWlager 
15o Obtain a copy of the control documents sento 
16o Does tha organisation usa standard costing to control 
engineered cost? YES = NO 
17 o It YES who sets thS standards?= 
Preduotion man~e~ent 
the accountruats 
work study offiorars 
18o If NO = what is the system of control of rangineerad 
costs = this ye~ Vo 
last year 
this yra&r's costs 
19o What other non=accounting measures ue used to control 
costs such as .IIIS!.terial.s? 
20o What other non=aocounting measures ax-e used to control 
direct labo'l.U' costs? 
21 o What infoX'm~Ation systems are used to plan for manager 
cost = such as maintenance~ research, development P 
quality control~ technical» etco? 
22o Is there a dooum~mtP such as a management plan~ which 
lists the objectives for such departm:antso YES= NO 
If YES obtain a copyo 
23o Is th~ra BJ. docUil:entp such u a ~ement plan» which 
outlines hm1 tha B\!Pel!:"Visors and wmegers in these 
II 
departments are going to set about achieving the 
objectives? 
24. Is each supervisor responsible for the costs under his 
control? 
25o Is there any system which enables each supervisor or 
section-head or manager to find out precisely what is 
expected of him? 
General 
1o Which are the easiest costs to control? 
2o Which a:re the hardest costs to control? 
3o What information not currently available would pe of 
most use to managers? 
4o Is exporting activity controlled with the sama information 
systems used or have dif'ferent ones had to be designed? 
If different ones are used obtain a c~yo 
Final question 
If you were seconded to the organisation for a period 
to work full=time on a problem in connection with making the 
organisation more ef'ficient and effective = what would the 
problem be? 
III 
llllANAGmENT CONTROL SY~ 
I am vrary plaMed thnt you ere ta.ld.Dg p&R"t in the study 
called (~IGlment Control Syatoow) o This ifJ e.n ao&Otamio 
stt!lc'zy pl'epax'ad. M l:Nilscao.rch ffE a Doctorate in Busine121s 
Adminiat~ation0 end is o~letaly independent of both your 
organisation end your Wliono Ixtt"omation obtained. via tha 
Questionnaire or or&l interview ~11 be treated. in st~ictest 
conf'id.ence.P ea it will be premGDted withil!l a Doctorate 
d.issertrn.ticm" in such a manner ths.t it uill not be t~acOOa 
to exzy individ.'i!B!.lo 
Plemse o~lete the enclosed Questionnaire sa honastly 
M you o&no If' you M.'Te e.ny doubt in lUlGWaring any plllrlicul&r 
qUei!tiOR'Ap plefl.£a6 1G!l.V6 that question 8Hld £!Xl~X' the next OK!Go 
After the cC!!!lpletion of' th® Qu.eationnnire I will tey to clarl.fy 
~ q~stiona ~hich heva o&u.aed dif'f'icultyo 
Tom~oo I will return to collect the completed questionnaire. 
Th&nk yomo 
£tUESTIONNAIRE 
Basic Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions by placing 
a tick in the most appropriate boxo 
Qo1 o What is your present grade? 
Ao Supervisor 
B. Manager of Department 
c. Manager of Division 
D. Manager of Factory 
E. General Manager or his assistant 
Q.2o How many years have you been in your p~sent grade? 
A. Under 1 year 
B. Between 1 and 3 years 
C. Between 3 and 6 years 
D. Over 6 years 
Q.3o How many years have you been in your Organisation? 
Ao Undex- 1 year 
B. Between 1 and 3 years 
Co Between 3 and 6 years 
D. Over 6 years 
Q.4o What academic degree do you hold'? 
Ao Elemsntary 0 B. 
c. Secondary D D. 
E. BSco/BA D F. 
Intermediate 
Diploma 
Higher than 
BSq/BA. 
Q. 5o Into which bx-oad. category does your work fall? 
A. Marketing or salea 
Bo Production 
c. Serv:i.ces to Management (io.eo AocountingD 
personnel» etco) 
D. General Management 
I 
0 
D 
tJ 
.0 
D 
0 
D 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
D 
D 
0 
0 
0 
.Q.uestionnai.re about TR..AINING 
(a) Have you attended any Training programma? 
"Please tick the appropriate box" Yes 
No 
(b) If' yes ll approximately how many training programmas 
have you attended? 
4 = 6 7 = 10 
(Please tick the appropriate box) 
QoTo2 Did you attend the Training programme(s)? 
On the advice ot your s~rvisorl' 
On your own initiative? 
Arranged by training office? 
On advice from someone else? 
On advice of a colleague? 
0 
D 
D 
0 
D 
D 
On advice from outside your employing Organisation? 0 
(Please tick one or more) 
QoTo3 Please write the type of training programmes or courses 
which you have attend.edj) in the box apposite the type 
concerned a 
Ao General Management Course 
B. Management Information System 
C. Specialist Technical Course 
D. Any other Course o 
(Please tick one or more) 
Q.T.4(a)WP.ich type of course do you feel you currently need? 
A. General Management Course 
B. Management Information System 
II 
0 
D 
D 
D 
0 
a 
C. Specialist technical course as it applies 
to your p~eeent duties. 
D. Any other co~se 
(PleMe tick one or more) 
(b) How long would you choose this oourse to be? 
(Tiok one). 
A. One day 
B. One week 
c. Between 1 week and one month 
D. Mo~ than 1 month and less than 6 months 
E. 1 year 
F. More than 1 year 
Q. T. 5 Where would you like to have your training progra.:mm2 
to be held? (Tick one). 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
0 
0 
A. Abroad = state the country = 0 
B. In Iraq 0 
C. In the Training Office in your Organisation 0 
D. In the National Centre for Consulting and 
Management Development 
E. Any other training centre 
Q.T.6 (a) How much inf'l~nce do you have to obtain the training 
you want in Q.4? 
(Please indicate in the seale your inf'luence degrae) 
1 2 3 5 
None great deal 
III 
0 
0 
(b) Do you have the authority to arrange for the training 
outlined in QoT4 and QoT5? 
(Pls&ae tick one) 
Yes 
No 
QoTo 7 (a) Does your superior have the authority to arrange 
tor the training outlined in QoT4 and QoT5? 
0 
D 
Yes r::J 
No t:j. 
I do not know CJ 
(b) How much influence do you think your superior has 
on obtaining the training you have outlined in 
QoT4 and QoT5o 
(Please indicate in the scale your superior 
influence degree) 
1 2 3 4 5 
None great deal 
QoTo8 (a) Do you have the authority to arrange for subordinate 
Training? Yes 
(Please tick one) No 
(b) How much influence do you have to obtain training 
for your subordinate? 
(Please indicate in the scale your influence degree) 
1 2 3 4 5 
None great deal 
Indicate the sentence which is most expressive of 
your feelings about the training outlined in Qo T4 
and Qo T5o 
0 
D 
Ao The training programme will be useful to D 
me in the future 
B. The trlilining programme will be immediately 
useful to me in my present job~ 
C. ~ of my colleagues have attended training 
programmes so I think I should. 
Qe To 10 How oocurate is the following sentence as a description 
of what happens in your Organisation? 
"Staff who have attended training programmes 
are promoted more quickly than those who have 
not attended" 
1 
strongly 
disagree 
2 3 
QoTo11 M& superior is in that position because~ 
Ao He is more experienced than me 
Bo He is more qualified than me 
C. He is older than me 
D. For other reasons 
(Please tick one or more) o 
5 
strongly 
agree 
Q.To12 Do you have the information to judge which is the 
best/most sui table training programme to meet your 
needs? Yes 
No 
Q. T. 13 Do other people in the Organisation have better 
information on which they decide the best training 
for you? Yes 
No 
I do not know 
v. 
0 
0 
0 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
0 
r:J 
D 
QoTo14 (a) Is it somebody0 s job to decide the best training 
for you? Yes 
No 
I do not know 
(b) If the answer to QoTo14(a.) yesll then, how o:rten 
does he discuss training with you? 
(Please tick one) 
<>nee every month 
Once every three months 
Once every six months 
Once a year 
Never 
VI 
CJ 
D 
.o 
0 
0 
D 
t::l 
.Questionnaire about COST CONI'ROL 
QoCo1 Which of the following costs do you diEectly control? 
(Please tick one or mora) 
Labour 
Material 
Machine use 
Administ~ation ove~head 
Others = please specifY -
QoCo2(a) Do you compare the actual costs incurred with a 
standard cost which has been set? Yes 
No 
(b) If no is this because: 
Ao There is no standard 
Bo There is no actual information prepared 
Co There is actual information prepared but 
you do not see it 
(Please tick one) 
QoCo3 How well do you control the cost for which you have 
direct responsibility ? 
1 2 3 4 5 
very bad very well 
QoCo4 What is the source of the information which you used 
to judge your own performance in QoCo3? 
Ao My own experience of doing the job o 
Bo My boss's view of how well I am doing 
VII 
0 
D 
D 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
D 
D. 
0 
0 
tJ 
Co Information s~lied by other deptso -
accounting~ etco 
Do I compare rqy performance with that of 
rqy colleagueso 
Eo Others~ please specify: 
(Please tick one or more) 
QoCo5 (a) Do you feel you have all the neoessar,y information 
to enable you to control the costs for which you are 
responsible? Yes 
No 
(b) If no~ what sort of additional information 
would: be useful? (Please specify by ticking one or more) 
1 o Sort of information 2o Who l!hould supply it 
0 
0 
!D 
Qo Co 6 (a) How often do you yourself prepare a rep@rt on your 
control of cost? (Please tick one or mOX'e) 
1 Deily 0 
4 .AnnuauyO 
2 weekly -o 
5 Never 0 
3 Monthly 
6 I do not lalow 
(b) For wham do you yourself prepare a report on your 
control of oost? (Please specify) 
1 Yrn- ~GoMo 2 Your bllssi s boss 3 YoQss 
QoCo 7 How often does your superlor prepare a report on your 
control of cost? (Please tick one or more) 
VIII 
D 
0 
D 
D 
D 
D 
0 
0 
D 
0 
D 
D 
1 Daily 0 2 Weekly 3 Monthly 
4 Annually D 5 Never 
0 
0 6 I do not know 
QoCo8(a) Does someone other than yourself and your superior 
prepare a ~port on your control of cost? 
Yes 
No 
(b) If answer to Q.C.8(a) is yes: 
Do you receive a copy of that report? YES 
No 
QoCo9(a) Which of the following people e~ress views on your 
control of cost? (Please tick one or more) 
A. Your factory .manager 
B. Mambar of your Board of Directorm 
c. Your superior 
D. Your colleagues 
E.; Your subordinates 
F. other members of the Company 
(b) In respect to those you ticked in (~) can you indicate 
how much the views which they express influence the way in 
which you control cost? 
A. Your factory manager 1 2 i i I 
B. Membex-s of B.D. !1 f ~ !t 
c. Your superior ,1 2 3 
' 
9 • 
D. Your colleagues ,1 2 3 
' 
0 • 
E. Your subordinate ,1 i ~ ~ 
F. Other members of tha ~ 
D 
D 
D 
0 
0 
D 
D 
D 
D 
0 
s. 
a 
5 
9 
5g 
5, 
n1 i ~ ~ Company. veR a ~art lit le 
IX 
Q. c. 10 Hem often do you prepa:Nl a report on your subordinates 
control of cost? (Please tiok one o~ more) 
1 0 Deily or 2. Waekly D 3. Monthly D 
4.. . AnnuallyD 5. Never D 6. I do not know 0 
Q.C.11 (a) Is a budget prepared for your department~ if you 
have ~ ~ or your own aotivi ty if you do not have a 
department? 
1. MY department 
2o MY own activity 
(b) If' for your department~ is the budget prepared: 
Ao By you 
B. By ~ur boss 
C. By you and your boss together 
Do By someone else 
(Please tick one) 
Q.C.12 2o what extent do you assist your sUbordinates when they 
are preparing their own budgets? 
1 2 3 5 
not a1 all a great deal 
Q.C.13 Do you uae a budget committee? 
Yes 
No 
Q.C.14. Ara budgetsp (a) imposed on managersp for examplep an 
x% ~duotion in last year's actual, allowing for volume 
changes is expected or (b) are managers allowed to get 
on with their own budget, and it is only when submitted 
th&t it comes under review? (Please tick one). 
0 
D 
0 
D 
CJl 
D 
0 
0 
A. Imposed 0 B. Free hand 0 C. In between 0 
Q.C.15 Do you use budgeting and planning as a means to 
motivating your staff? Yes D 
No 0 
QoCo16 Do you know the return on net capital employed» 
achieved by your Organisation last ye~ Yes 0 
No D 
XI 
9uestionnaire about Management Control Systems 
Suppose that members of your unit expressed general 
disinterest in their jobs~ how much effort would you 
be willing to spend to build up theil" interest? 
(Pleue tiolt by rbickiug the appropriate point on the Scale) 
1 2 3 4 5 
None a great deal 
Q.M.2 How much influence do you personally have in determining 
policies and actions of your colleagues at your level of 
management? 
1 
None 
2 3 4 
Q.M.3 In general~ how much inf'luence do you personally have on 
what the following groups~ or persons~ do in your Organ= 
isation? 
Ao On what the General Manager does 1 2 3 l ? n ! R 
B. It II " Board of Directors " 01 2 3 4- 5 
c. II II II Member of the 1 2 3 4 5 
Organisation as a whole does No a great 
influence deal of 
influence 
Q..M.4 (a) How often do the following people seek advice from you? 
A. Your factory manager 1 2 i 4 ( I I 
B. Member of B. of D. 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Your superior 1 2 3 4 5 
D. Your colleagues 1 2 .3 4 ? g A R 8 
E. other members 1 2 i l ( 0 a 
Never very often 
XII 
(b) How otten do the following people seek &ssistanoe 
from you? 
A. Your factory manager 1 2 3 4 5 
B. Member of B. of D. 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Your superior ,1 2 i t 3 ~ 
D. Your colleagues l1 2 1 
' 
1 I 
E. other members 1 2 .3 4 i A I ! 
never very often 
(c) How often do the following people seek instruction from you? 
Ao Your factory manager 1 2 3 4 5 
B. Member of' B. of D. 1 2 .3 4 5 
c. Your superior 1 2 
' 
3 4 5 
D. Your colleagues j1 2 1 \ ~ 9 
E. other mambers 1 2 3 4 5 
never very otten 
Q.M.5 How often do you give information, concerning company matters 
to the following persons? 
Ao YoUX" factory manager 1 2 3 4 5 
B. Member of B. of D. 1 2 3 4 5 
c. Your superior 1 2 3 4 5 
D. Your colleagues 1 2 4 5 
E. Your subordinates 1 2 3 4 ~ • . • 
F. other members 1 2 3 4 5 
never very often 
QoMo6 Hocr otten do the following persons give you information 
concerning company matters? 
1 2 3 4 5 A. Your factory manager .. 
B. Member of B. of' Do 1 2 .3 4 5 0 
c. Your superior 1 2 3 4 5 
XIII 
D. Your colleagues 1 2 3 4 
E. Your subo~tes 1 2 3 4 
F. other members 1 2 3 4 
never very 
Q.M. 7 In tel'JM of doing your job properly)' tr.e information you 
receive is: 
(Tick one box only) 
~. Much more than you need 
B. More than you need 
C. Just what you need 
D. Less than what you need 
E. Much less than you need 
Q.M.8 How satisfied are you with the present control syste'lls in 
your Organisation? 
1 
not at 
all 
2 5 
very 
satisfied 
Q.M. 9 When doing your job Jl how much uncertainty do you experience 
in respect of your responsibilities? 
(Tick one box only) 
A. No tmcertainty at any timeo 
B. Occasional uncertainty 
C. Some areas of uncertainty, others O.K. 
D. A lot of uncertainty 
E. Your re~onsibility is not defined at all, 
so you work it as you go. 
Q.M. 10 When doing your job how much information do you have 
to co=ordinate the effort of your unit? 
(Please tick one) 
XIV 
5 
5 
5 
often 
D 
D 
D 
D 
D 
[0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
A. No information at any time 
B. Occational information 
0. SomB areas inadequa.te information~> others O.K. 
D. A lot of :infOX'l:D&tion 
E. All the information you need 
Q.M.11 How often are you held accountable for what you do? 
(Please tick one in each column). 
Formally Informally 
A. More than once a week 
B. Once a week 
0. Once a month 
D. Once a season 
Q.M. 12 Do you think people in the Organisation~ senior to you 
have their responsibility: (Tick one box only) 
A. More clearly defined than yours 
B. .As clearly defined as yours 
C. Less cleaJ."lY defined than yours 
Q.M. 13 Do you think people in the Organisation junior to you 
have their responsibility: (Tick one box only) 
A. More clearly defined than yours 
B. .As clearly defined as yours 
C. Less clearly defined than yours 
Q.M.14-Qa) This Company would achieve more if individual people 0 s 
formal responsibility was: 
A. More clearly defined 
B. Less clearly defined 
XV 
D 
0 
D 
0 
0 
0 
D 
D 
D 
.D 
0 
D 
(b) This Organisation would achieve more if individual 
people's formal authority was: 
A. More olearly defined 
B. Less clearly defined 
(c) This Organisation would achieve more if indi'Tidual 
people 1 s formal accountability was: 
A. More clearly defined 
B. Less clearly defined 
Q.M.15( a) How often do you seek advice from the following people? 
D 
D 
D 
D 
Ao Your factory manager 1 2 3 4 5 
B. Member of BoDo 
c. Your superior 
D. Your colleagues 
E. Your subordinates 
F. Other members 
never very 
often 
(b) How often do you seek assistance from the following people? 
A. Your factory manager 1 2 3 4 5 
B. Member of B. D. 
C. Your superior 
D. Your colleagues 
E. Your subordinates 
F. Other members 
never very 
often 
(c) How often do you seek instruction from the following people? 
A. Yo'UX' factory manager 1 2 3 4 5 
B. Member of B.D. 
c. Your superior 
XVI 
D. Your colleagues 
E. Your subordinates 
F. other mrambers 
never very 
often 
Q.M.16(a) How much of the information you currently use to do 
your job is supplied by the formal information system? 
(Please tick one only) 
A. Less than 1<>% 0 B. Between 1o% = 2.5"fo 
C. Between 2Gc;6 = 50% tJJ 
E. Between 76% = 1 OO% 
D. Between 51% = 75% 
D 
0 
(b) The percentage shown in (a) indcates that: (Please tick one) 
A. There are too IllBllY formal information systems 
B. There are about the right number of formal information 
systems. 
C. There are too few formal information systems 
Q.Mo 17 How much influence do you have over the development and 
design of the management information systems in your unit? 
1 2 3 
none 
4 5 
a great 
deal 
How much inf'luenoe do you think you should have over 
the development and design of the management information 
systems in your unit? 
1 2 
none 
3 5 
a great 
deal 
Q.M. 19 How much influence do you have over the development and 
planning of the policies and operation in your unit? 
XVII 
D 
0 
D 
1 2 
None 
3 5 
a great 
deal 
How much influence do you think you should have over 
the development and planning of the policies and 
operation in your Unit? 
1 2 3 
None 
4 5 
a great 
deal 
How much influence do you have over the development 
and design of management infor.mation systems in the 
Conpany as a whole~ 
1 2 3 
None 
5 
a great 
deal 
How much influence do you think you should have over the 
development and design of management infonnation systems 
in the Company as a whole'? 
1 2 3 
None 
4 5 
a great 
deal 
How much influence do you have over the development and 
planning of the policies and operation in the Company 
as a whole? 
1 2 
None 
3 4 5 
a great 
deal 
How much influence do you think you should have over 
the development and planning of the polcies and operation 
in the Company as a whole? 
1 2 3 
None 
VIII 
4 5 
a great 
deal 
·• 
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T.i:.CHNICAL 
AFi~l~ 
OFI•'ICE 
B.AL.AlmE SHEET OF THE PUBLIC COMPANY FOR THE FERTILISER 
INDUSTRY AS AT 31ST MAROHJm 
IoDo IoDo 
--
Fixed Assets Fixed Li&bilities 
Non~ovable AsQets 9p212p84-5 Capital 8p252Jl 791 
Stock held & work Financi~ Allee= 
in pro~se 301Jl368 at ion 2,1)519p850 
Liguid As~eto Liguid Liabilities 
Stocks & D~nt= Cnditox-a 1pO~p700 
~Ox-edit 1 D 114-Jl329 
DM"f' o C2rod! t 
Sundry Da btOlr's & Acco'lmting 351)835 
bMSBWea dua 1p418jli08 
<>veror&tt 197 p810 
Cash in~ MD. --
at BIO\!iilk 336 
TOTAL 129 046 0 986 TOTAL 12o046D986 
PUBLIC COMPANY FOR THE FERTn·ISER INDUSTRY 
AMMONIA UNIT General Report of Azlmonia Unit PrClduction Date:-
· During the Month:-
Product Quantity Working Conditions & Ch&Qges in Maintenanoe duririg the 
Date Capacity Produced Production Capacity Durill'lg the .Month .Month 
,; (TODile) 
I 
' 
• 
' 
I I I 
---~ - ~---------------- ·- --- -
Table No. 6. 
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-
MA.TEniAL UHIT TlYSTRUlillTT QUAlTTI'l"f 
--f - r;-r,~/D • H. G fJ.-:2!._ PHOCESS\ FR-1103 
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- -I 
\"IR (RAH \·lATER 2 = F2-ii2)-(~~-5117) ! .... __ , HF (FIL. HA'rER ) 
-· 
FS-1126 
-· 
riP _(fR~ .HATER ) = I FS-112~- t 
----·; 
____ f B. F. H. (POIL".:R NA·rrn) K£b2_.,_ F2-112:: I 1 ._......,( 
---S35~35K S'I'Ef\ii) = FI-1116 / I. I ~1''(1QV. sT~~~rn = FS-1·122 a,.; ,v . -- ---~ -
'S3 (3K C!r';ll?t~ t) ·- :t.,S-1121 ! :.... - ....__:.. .. ~. 
.. ~--
i 
I 
!lfSA ~ BY CALCULATIOH I 
I 
I 
-
I 
-..-.. .. I n~FO:. = = I ' I 
- I --· 
_1·!r-.:'S03 - = I ! 
' I 
~ 
--· 
. .,; ~ 
-
. 
! 11q0H~------------------r--~-------+----~--------------~------~-------~-t _.,;,.;.;.----
' ~.]TI FDf~.;r~:G 
i -::~T ---
. l·;.J 
REJ',;J\RI\}:-
Jl~-~/24/11 
l'Jf/D ------------~---------·-----~1 
TABLE No, 7 
B.AL.&NCE SHEET OF THE PUBLIC COMPANY FOR THE PAPER 
Il\IDUBTRY AS M 31ST DIDEMBER liTh 
IoDo IoDo 
!Fixed Asset@ Fixed Li~bilities 
!Non-=mmreble ~mats 18l)435j)363 C~it&l i8p514p 701 
~took hald & t:/0&-k F~ia.l.Uloo= 
lin px-ogx>a~>:us 2p 790pi55 e.tion 8789340 
!LiQuid .Amaaig Liguid Limbilities 
ifltooks & D~X!t= CX'editO&"t'J 'i p 72ip508 
~ O&'adit 2J)768p673 
!Btmdx-y DebtoX'&l & 
Ditf' o C~ctlt &/oo 1pti2J)069 
lbalalllOGEI d'i!.W 8901)548 Ovax'draft 21)3831)494 
Cswh in &md. ami 
mt BS!Xlk 25p373 
TOTAL 24.~~910J) 112 TOTAL 24p910p 112 
0 
.. 
THE PUBLIC BATA CQIIPANY 
Cmparison Table of Actual and Forecast Sales for 1973/74 with Previous Yearc 
Actual Sales Sales Figwre (I .. D.) 1973/74 Percentage of Percentage 
1972/73 Actual Sales ·nif'f'erenoe 
to Planned from 1972/73 
Planned Aotual (Forecast) 
3,116,702. 4,362.,600 I 4,585,299 105}& +47% 
L__ ~-- ~----- - -
--
-----
(i) The annual Report of the Ministry of Industry & Minera.l.s does not mention 
final accounting f'or the Public Bate. Camp any. Above Table is f'rom the 
I 
I 
same source P. 102., showing marketing of actual production more than 
the Planned (Forecast). This. ind.i.oates that the Company have sold 
most of last year• s stock. 
Table No, 9 
I 
I 
BAL.ANCE SHEET OF THE PUBLIC COMPANr OF MECHANICAL INDUSTRIES IN 
Atml\IDRIA AS AT 31ST MAROHn l974o 
IoDo IoDo 
Fixed Assets LiabiH.tie~& 
LM.d 4~532 Autho Capit&l i0p794p987 
Constructions & Reserves & Finano 
Building 4J)354J)031 Allocation 3J)830J)788 
Various Machines 5p38ip269 Profit & LO!S6J (3811)663) 
'· 
V wales & Furn= Loans 2p876~923 
iture 500j) 748 
! 'l'@olap Sp&&'e PBX"ts 
Credit P~nt 10 8140 825 
& Equ.ipment 146p~ Creditors & Credit 
Bmlmoes 1J)928p820 
Suspended Inc~ Expo 254p662 
Unpaid .Amount~ 88!>306 
Goadtvill Assets 70409 
Projects under Constro 712p263 
Total Fixed Asasta 11,361p358 
DepX'eciation i /i16 p038 
Liquid Assets 
Cash i.n Hand & at Bank 917 j)620 
SundT,Y Debtors ~ 
B&l.S!R10es due 2p.503J)218 
Documentary Credit & 
Commooitiea 288j)Oi4 
Stores Assets 4l)766j)538 
' 
TOTAL 20p952p786 TOTAL 20l)952ll786 
T'ab.le Noo 1 1 
BALANCE SHEET OF THE PUBLIC VIDETABLE on, COMPANY 
.AS AT 3 iST MABDH. 19]~ 
I.D. 
Fixed Assats Fixed Liabilities 
Non9m0Vabla Assets 7l)950l)973 Capitu 
Stock held & WO:&-k Reserves 
in progress 301p368 Financial Allooo 
Long & Medium 
Texm Loa.ru~ 
Liguid Assets Liguid Li~bilities 
Stocks & Doo~nt= Creditors 
ery Credit 7p556j)444 
Dif:f. Cx-edi t 11./ o. 
Loans 110,1)000 Overdraft 
Sundry Debtora & 
Balances due 29 258»308 
Cash in Hand and 
at Bank 3,1)637 
Investments 20,1)000 
TOTAL 18fi683D252 TOTAL 
Table No. 14 
I.D. 
3»367»612 
5»675»386 
4-f/977))894 
202p323 
2p864l)299 
518))868 
1,p076p870 
18p683j)252 
--Table No. 15 
'i'f:.J:: PUlJLIC V".;GF:rA.T'J..f. On. co:.O"A.'~ 
S~ M0~7HLY REPORT FOR ~CPJ~~ EY~OITATION FOR THE MONTH..,,,,,~····•· 
' I ~ 
_OILS SC;..P.:; D:·~.!.'r:l(Gt;;;TS cas:.:.:·:l'JC!> IND. PRiii"Tl1'G CART01"S NID :30:GS 
1 Central CROSS Rashid I !Aaamun jPlasticl Rashid j:.~ ... ~~un /c~.in i'~a:Jhid ;.rao:nun c,l(!::Jetics Alumi!1. Cartons Cans Rashid 1~aa;~un ){aslcid :~a.'uun Boxes TO'i','J.. . ' ., ·-----f----·-1 DETAILS 
'J:otol !lo~• ,,or~od ~ I I I t=l-_ ' I , - _j 
'!oto.l Stm:lard 11ours I I 
Total Eour's 'l.a:Jted . 
Total P.ours Available 
i <:!·cen:"r"' U:;ed -~ ----i 
First/Stc;:>;.>"£"S 100 --· ____ ~- 1-----+_J 
101 ;:o.r>::r.::.n:l ~ 
102 l\o f(:.iW :.:'-'~:_ria::-_s -!----+·---+----+--- ---t-·--+ ----t-----+----t----t---J---+---+---t---+----i----
103 lio :.:at. in Product. +-I . 
1 C4 t:o Lal.•oUl· I . 
105 '.l.:dtir:;; for Tools J I j 
106 Cler-ulin~- " .. ?.~1-~~~.}.r(.:.:.. . jt=3l! 
4 C' • • 11 ... ~~;::-~:~~:::-~:~:- ... ····-- -----1 I --· I .. 
109 Fr~prin;.: !)c 3: for I I I I I 
I ·,·, o:·l:i::;.; _::_!..~??n?e 
110 S!::1c::iz~ .. '/c.Prodt.:et. 
------·-·-·----·--
111 M:niting ~lty. Cor:trol 
~--
112 Chec~:ing ;,~:,..cf1ine 
113 Production :.:a terial 
U."1~~Jitab1e 
114 Dir~ct Eo.:tra ?roc•:ssinf~ 
---···- ....... -................... ___ , __ _ 
119 Jifferent l:J.e;;;<'nts 
TC:.!.' .. ~.l. liCu:W ~Tc~:!=-,;~:~!!.!3 
~~ccnd/i'iolid:.ye 200 
~·.:.·1 :.:.::r:h:.~ics in :r~chines 
'p 
~2 i:.l~ctric:..;:.;-inl::a~hi:;;-; +----! ~-----
~03 Ch~r::ist in :.:achines 
I 
204 Pc,·.-er Failure Tv'~~-;.;.;;; .. ater }'ailure I I I' +---t-l---~---~----i'r----t----f·---f----f,---f----J----J---___,1-_:::== 
.C~9 :.iffe:-~nt =.le::.·...:nts 
tttt;c;-;J.. 1:::.:~-.:::.. ~-~·o~·.::·i:;.::s I I I I I I l b . I 1==1 I1:d f~c~~:-.cy ·. I --------- r ·[-+--+---4 ~T' .•. ~~·., ;;y· ... Ol'~r. .. 'TC" .·~~ -""' . r _ _., ... d ... , --'•• l.'"· ", ... 6 _, 
BALANCE SI-OO:T OF THE IRAQI PUBLIC SPINNING & WEAVING 
COMPANY AS AT 31ST MARCH. 19]4 
I.Do 
Fixed Assets Fixed Liabilities 
Non=movable Asaeta 2p717 j)08i Capital 
Reserve a 
Stock held & ~rk Financial .Alloce in progress 2»832 9 84.5 
Long-term loans 
Liquid Assets Liquid Liabilities 
Stooks & Dcoument~ Crediton 
a:ry Credit 1p884.j)5i5 
Dif'f' o Cradi t A/co 
Sundry Debtors & 
balances due 4..56J)659 Overd.rBlft 
Cash in h.anJi md 
at Bank 14.6 9 720 
TOTAL 8j)037j)820 TOTAL 
IoDo 
1 p220p579 
46·5p810 
1p974.j)045 
29 227v535 
538p 181 
4.19225 
1p570j)445 
8p037p820 
!.able Noo 1lo 
THE IRAQI PUBLIC SPINNING & WEAVING COMPANY 
Noo: Mainterumoe Department Ordex-
Date: From: 
Please repair this material To: 
Machine Machine 
Sequence 1\/Iodel NOo 
Departmental Head: 
The above material repaired on: 
By Technical WCilrker Noo : 
Speci£ o of Material 
Requiring Repeir Remarks 
(Signature) 
Factor,y Manager. 
STATE ORGANISATION OF SPINNING AND WEAVING 
THE IRAQI PUBLIC SPINNING AND WEAVING COMPANY 
NQ!i!ile and funct ioo of pert : 
Order No.: 
Ordax- Date: 
Costing Cem.treg 
!Pmx1ii&l runomt Whole .Amolmt 
1 o Coat of MEl.terlal used in .P.!:-od.uction & 
Unit 
M!h MatoNOo ~.used Unit ~e ~
. 1 0 
2o 
3o 
4. 
5o 
2o Wox-loon' w~ 
Ocoup&tion Av.Hcrurly t!~e 
ID/Files (i 
Hrs.Worked 
1 0 Lathe 
2. Saw 
)o Welding 
4. C~n.tey 
5o 
.3. Ms!chi.nes Hourly Machine Cost 
1. Lathe 
2. 
)o 
4o 
5o 
4o 
Saw 
Welding 
Mining 
Carpentey 
Oth.eE' E:!cpenae 
Cost of one unitg 
Date of Completion: 
Tot&l Cost 
' I.Do Fils IoDo 
! 
Stores Receipt No: 
Workshop Engineer 
(i) I.D. = 1p000 File~. 
Fils 
B.A:UNOE SHEET OF 1'HE IRAQ Cii:MENI' PUBLIC COMPANY 
.AS AT 31ST MARCH" 12l!k 
IoDo 
F~st~ixed Asaets ~ 
Lb.b:ili ties 
Non~vable Aaoets 6ll087ll133 Capital 
M.a.ohines & Equip!!!!f:nt 81)4731)611 Reserve 
Tools &: Sp~SJ.N 1Poo:ots 106p435 Long=te.Nl loans 
Vehicles & Trflnspoxt. 'i 11190,426' 
FtmrAi twre D Clerical Total Fixed 
Equipment &: Books 260p760 Liabilities 
Suspended lno!GJ8e Second/Liguid 
Expenses &: Balmnce 372»135 Liabilities 
Projects tmdax- con= Creditors & CroBal 
atruotion 3li60ij)667 Fino Allooe.tions 
Dep:reoiat:l!.on 80620P769 Overd&'f.'l.f't 
Total Fixed £aaets 1'i 1)417 ll398 Total LiqUo Liabo 
Secgpd/Liquid Assets 
Stoon 4ll419ll598 
DooumentSX'J' ~dit 923»123 
Sundey Debtors and 
Balances due 2Di90ll892 
Cash in Hand & at Bank 3'i1ll578 
Investmenta &: LoMa: 
A = Dividenda 566li'U51 
B =Loans 180»000 
Total Liquid Assets 9ll591p~2 
General Total of Fixed General Total of 
and Liquid AsootB 21ll0081)740 Fixed &: LiquoLiebo 
~ ~- <' ·-= - , 0 ~ ~ 
Table Noo 12_o 
IoDo 
7 p258p44-5 
4D920ll225 
3.o938 0 541 
16 .117 211 
31)767ll134 
353,964 
7700431 
4ll8911)529 
21 1)0081) 74D 
, ~~ 
= 
Table No. 20 
Baghdad on: ~/~ 
STATE Oi~ANISATION OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES 
'l'lili IRAQ C~NT PUBLIC COMPANY 
Budget and Costing 
Factory: 
Date: 
1 o Production and Daily Supply & BalQilCes 
A~ Cement 
1. Production 
2. Sales 
3o Balanoe 
B = Clinkex-
1 0 Production 
2.; Expense 
3. Balance 
2. Raw Materials 
1 • Materials 
2. Expense 
3e Balance 
Resistant 
T/K 
Lime Stone Gypsum 
T/K T/K 
Normal 
T/K 
Soil 
T/K 
Sand 
T/K 
.3. Factory Problems and Major Machine Stopp&ges 
1. 
2o 
Total 
T/K 
Iron Stone 
T/K 
( i) T= Tonne; K:: Kilogram 
THE PUBLIC CCB«PANY FOR FERTILISER INDUSTRY IN B.ASRAH 
FllW\:OIAL AFFAIRS ~Ell~ S DU!'IES 
1 o To s~~&Je the woounts depart.Mant and t@ eli'WUK"e the effie= 
iemJy e»f ti'@&-k ~ pere@nnelo 
2o To v.lloo&ta uork Q1lld dutia~ to dif'felrent dep~malilta oocoro.ing 
to general interasto 
3o To prepeJro the annual forecMt budget ft:IK' the Company in concert 
cith othex' divisional man.mgeN and heM.I!l of department 'tdthin 
the cCl:mlldttees eX'anted fox- this purpoae arui to toll~ tha 
execution of the bud.getp ami supe:rviae o:&"edit e~elQ.ditwro Toy 
&pplyimg the X'equired regulationgo 
4o To B'l!peX'Villle tho finenoial ~faix's of the Compeny &XAd enter 
in the :&"alev&R!t joUX"iilal ill f'inmnoi.al tram~a.ctions which h~'l!a 
tWmn plSlee = peymant ~ receipt P stores D pl'Oduotionp me.letip 
assets sw:d liab:Uitiea = through ~lavM.t dco\M!e~:Q:so 
5o To pay &Jalerl.e&~ 11 t1~es &lleoatioMp gittsp lo~ and @thar 
e~enaea per ~gulationso 
6o To e~e:&"Vise the stook inventory ©t the proo~assea of tlw 
C~e.ny ramd venty stock levels per &'egul~tiontao 
7 o To supeX"Villle ohaok lists and ta.blea ®.d documents be:fogoe 
spendingp Blrui ens'I.!R Nlev&!llt budget &llooationso 
Bo To ohack Company obligations snd enswre theh- entey in the 
journal pGX" regulatio~o 
9o To stlJldy the problems ot tu:es em.d levies to be paid by the 
CODJp&nyo 
iOo To s~ervise the Balmce Sheetp Cash StatementE!I and 'timumoial 
and px-ed:u:ation aitUSJ.tion in &dditi.on to periodical tWd ae&aCJ®l 
I 
xoeporls on tixlancial ruld woo1.mti..ng mett~rGo 
i 1 o To &MJ.yse th0 annwU. budget m.nd delayed account, Md tha 
proti t end ltOas account and pJreaent & point of vi taw and 
X"aoomm.and&.ticms o 
i 2o To supervise the organisaticm of the filing of dooum.ents 
speoielia~ in tha 200ounts division and its dap&rtmentmo 
n 0 f);gq Mdi ticm!U duties :roquix:ado 
II 
. I 
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